Review: Peasant Protest in the Second Republic
Reviewed Work(s):
    La République au Village
    by Maurice Agulhon;
    Une Ville Ouvrière au Temps du Socialisme Utopique. Toulon de 1815 à 1851
    by Maurice Agulhon;
    La Vie Sociale en Provence Intérieure au Lendemain de la Révolution
    by Maurice Agulhon;
    Pénitents et Francs—Maçons de l'Ancienne Provence
    by Maurice Agulhon
Review by: Ted W. Margadant

Ted W. Margadant

Peasant Protest in the Second Republic

La République au village. By Maurice Agulhon (Paris, Plon, 1970)
543 pp. 52.50F
Une Ville ouvrière au temps du socialisme utopique. Toulon de 1815 à 1851.
By Maurice Agulhon (Paris, Mouton, 1970) 368 pp. 48F
La Vie sociale en Provence intérieure au lendemain de la Révolution. By
Maurice Agulhon (Paris, Société des Études Robespierristes, 1970)
534 pp. n.p.
Pénitents et francs–maçons de l'ancienne Provence. By Maurice Agulhon
(Paris, Fayard, 1968) 452 pp. 37F

These four volumes, numbering 1,897 pages, put the department of the
Var on the historical map of modern France.[1] With a vast display of
erudition, Agulhon has analyzed the socio-cultural foundations of
protest movements in lower Provence during the Second Republic.
His most important book, *La République au village*, is entirely concerned
with this theme. It presents an original interpretation of rural militancy
and revolt as the outcome of traditional social tensions and modernizing
cultural influences within the "urbanized" bourgs and villages of the
department. *Une Ville ouvrière* analyzes parallel developments in the
only industrializing city of the Var, Toulon, and the other books
examine the historical origins of two politically relevant features of
nineteenth-century Provençal society: its proliferation of voluntary
associations (*Pénitents et francs–maçons*), and its traditional hierarchy of
classes (*La Vie sociale*). These latter studies are filled with information on
such novel topics as the secularization and politicization of upper-class
associations during the eighteenth century; the role of bourgeois ideo-
logues and skilled immigrants in organizing local populations of
workers during the early industrial revolution; and the persistence of
traditional social classes into the nineteenth century, despite the up-

Ted W. Margadant is Assistant Professor of History at the University of California,
Davis.

1 Although issued by various publishers, the first three volumes are derived from
Agulhon's doctoral dissertation entitled "Un mouvement populaire au temps de 1848,
Histoire des populations du Var dans la première moitié du XIX siècle," and defended at
the Sorbonne in 1969. *Pénitents* is a revised version of an earlier work entitled *La Sociabilité
méridionale* (Aix-en-Provence, 1966).

heaval of the French Revolution. In general, however, they can be regarded as prolegomena to *La République au village*. Agulhon is first and foremost the historian of the "Red Republic" in the Var.

What are the main elements of his interpretation of political radicalization? To begin with, he investigates "archaic" and "modern" social struggles during the Restoration and July Monarchies (1815–1848). He finds the peasants engaged in interminable legal battles with forest owners and in occasional riotous demonstrations against tax collectors. They responded to modernizing pressures in the rural economy with a collective defense of traditional rights and immunities. This communal mentality and form of behavior were subsequently projected into the Republican movement and became the basis for rural mobilization against the government at the end of the Second Republic (December 1851).

Unlike the peasantry, some artisans experienced substantial social change during the same period. At Toulon, the work force in the state naval arsenal expanded rapidly in size and acquired new skills as productive methods were mechanized. Apprenticed to trade union organizations and strike tactics in the 1840s, converted in part to the social ideals of Saint-Simonian intellectuals, the naval workers of Toulon entered the Second Republic as the political allies of bourgeois Republican politicians. Their energies were displaced from politics to economic cooperatives, however, once the central government purged Republicans from the municipal government and relied on a large troop garrison to intimidate potential subversives. They remained quiescent when Louis Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Republic in 1851.

Similar social changes prepared some rural artisans for modern forms of political struggle. Between 1830 and 1848 around 2,000 bottle-cork workers were recruited from the local peasantry in the hill country of the Maures (behind the Côte-d'Azur). Employed in workshops by merchants and master-artisans, they were accustomed to a rapid work rhythm, steady employment, and comparatively high wages. At the same time they shared social resentments against their *nouveau-riche* employers. At the bourg of La Garde Freinet, the largest center of the bottle-cork industry, strikes and lockouts erupted during a wage dispute in 1835–36, and ostensibly religious, mutual benefit societies served as channels of working-class militancy in these and subsequent years. Here were the socioeconomic foundations of a serious political movement, and, during the Second Republic, la Garde Freinet became

a bastion of left-wing, working-class organization in the interior of the Var. When the hour of revolt sounded in 1851, cork-workers mobilized in arms, seized several of their employers, and forced them to accompany the small army of insurgents which headed toward the administrative capital of the department.

This contrast between the communal struggles of peasants and the labor conflicts of workers reflects a profound cleavage between traditional and modernizing forces within the Provençal economy and social structure. Yet the peasants, for all their economic traditionalism, did embrace in large numbers the cause of the "Democratic and Social Republic." Why? According to Agulhon, their Republican convictions only become intelligible once their receptivity to modern cultural influences is established. New speech habits and literary tastes, new patterns of sociability, new orientations toward religious belief and ritual, and a new style of patronage relationships created the preconditions for peasant political mobilization in 1848.

Agulhon applies a uniform explanatory model to most of the cultural changes which prepared the rural masses for the "revelation" of the Republic. The "bourgeoisie," an urban *and rural* social elite distinguished by the ownership of land, a French education, and an urban life-style, initiated change. The middle level of the social hierarchy, composed of merchants and artisans, imitated these bourgeois cultural innovations and relayed them downward to the lower class of agricultural laborers. This process of interclass diffusion was greatly facilitated by the typical settlement patterns of rural communities in the Var. Unlike the peasants of western France, who resided in dispersed farmsteads and resisted urban influences during the French Revolution and throughout the nineteenth century,[2] peasants in the Midi often resided in large semiurban agglomerations; physical proximity and a sense of community solidarity made them receptive to the example of neighboring bourgeois and artisans. During the July Monarchy, such bourgeois cultural influences, aided by national reforms in the system of primary school education, resulted in the spread of bilingualism, increasing literacy, and a growing preference for French dramatic and musical art. In this manner "the intellectual horizon of the masses" was substantially enriched (204).

Popular traditions of leisure activity were similarly transformed

2 Agulhon is strongly influenced by the work of Paul Bois, *Paysans de l'Oeust* (La Mans, 1960). He does not seem to have read Charles Tilly's comparable study, *The Vendee* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

through contact with bourgeois models of voluntary associations. During the Old Regime, Provençal towns, bourgs, and large villages had displayed a wide panoply of religious associations and communal celebrations through which convivial energies had been channeled. In the later eighteenth century, however, nobles and bourgeois began to abandon Church-sponsored brotherhoods (such as the *confréries de pénitents*) and public associations (such as *la Jeunesse*, an organization of young, unmarried men) in favor of private and secular associations (freemason societies and private social clubs known as *cercles*). Artisans and peasants imitated this upper-class pattern of secular sociability by forming their own private clubs, or *chambrées*, in backrooms of cafés, and by developing workers' societies of mutual benefit.[3] During the Restoration and July Monarchies, such tendencies were accelerated by administrative efforts to tax the consumption of wine, to suppress gambling, and to regulate associations. By the 1840s, some Provençal bourgs contained fifteen or twenty of these private, secular associations, and the arrondissements of Toulon and Brignoles averaged respectively 7.2 and 5.7 *chambrées* per commune. With the diffusion of such voluntary associations throughout the artisanate and large portions of the peasantry, the traditional Provençal disposition toward extrafamilial sociability acquired a distinctively modern orientation. For the lower classes of Provence, to form *chambrées* was to "make themselves responsive to innovation, to movement, to independence."[4] The organizational bases had been created for rapid politicization in 1848.

Other features of Provençal culture which Agulhon examines are religious ceremonies, popular demonstrations, and patron-client ties. In each case he points to symbolic changes which permitted a new political content—Republicanism—to be grafted onto a traditional cultural form. For example, public funerals of community leaders had long been associated with a religious "cult of the dead"; when the clergy began refusing to honor bourgeois heretics with their customary rites, local populations carried out the municipal portion of the burial ceremony anyway. Thus were invented the first of those secular funeral rites so

3 It should be noted that Agulhon's interpretation of the origins of popular associations in Provence has been convincingly challenged by Lucienne A. Roubin, *Chambrettes des Provencaux; une Maison des Hommes en Mediterranée septentrionale* (Paris, 1970). See also Natalie Zeman Davis, "The Reasons of Misrule: Youth Groups and Charivaris in Sixteenth Century France," *Past & Present*, L (1971), 41–75. Agulhon has published a reply to Roubin, "Les Chambrées en Basse-Provence: Histoire et ethnologie," *Revue historique*, CDXCVIII (1971), 337–368.
4 *Ibid.*, 245.

characteristic of anticlerical Republicanism in the later nineteenth century. Similarly, popular "folklore," such as the *charivari*, provided models for seditious demonstrations against local anti-Republicans ("Whites").[5] Finally, patron-client relationships, so prominent a feature of municipal life in eighteenth-century Provence, also became a source of political innovation once bourgeois politicians began adopting an egalitarian pose of Republican fraternity. In a dialectical movement of continuity and change, traditional elements of the culture functioned as media for the communication of a new political consciousness.

To explore the links between economic grievances, cultural forms, and political militancy, Agulhon adapts a case-study approach to his abundant archival materials. This method has the strong merit of advancing our knowledge of political action at the grassroots level, where individuals and small groups merged with larger collectivities in impassioned strife and protest. Unlike some regional histories of nineteenth-century France, whose abundant quantitative data on demographic trends, occupational distributions, and landholding patterns are presented in isolation from descriptions of political behavior, Agulhon's narrative approach provides a synthesis of economic, social, cultural, and political forces.[6] On the other hand, his method does sacrifice the possibility of testing general hypotheses through quantitative analysis: He selects only a handful of cases, none of which are negative examples of right-wing communities, and he generally neglects to present systematic quantitative evidence. His local or "village" perspective has the further disadvantage of minimizing the importance of inter-community or regional influences, despite substantial evidence from the Var and other departments that protest against the government was organized regionally during the later months of the Second Republic. His erudite descriptions have the strengths and weaknesses of village ethnographies: an intimate knowledge of the local setting, but a blurred perspective on regional phenomena.

The major generalization which he draws from his case studies is that Provençal peasants relapsed into archaic forms of protest during the

5 It is noteworthy that the English equivalent of the charivari was not apparently adapted to left-wing political purposes during the nineteenth century. See Edward P. Thompson, "'Rough Music': Le Charivari anglais," *Annales*, XXVII (1972), 285–312.
6 For example, Philippe Vigier, *La Seconde République dans la région alpine* (Paris, 1963), 2v.; George Dupeux, *Aspects de l'histoire sociale et politique du Loir-et-Cher, 1848–1914* (Paris, 1962); André Armengaud, *La Population de l'Est aquitain au début l'époque contemporaine; recherches sur une région moins developpée (vers 1848–vers 1871)* (Paris, 1969).

later months of the Second Republic. Social cleavages, communal traditions, and repressive administrative policies all converge to reorient the Republican movement away from peaceful electoral competition and toward symbolic demonstrations and futile violence. This regressive trend culminated in the massive insurrection of December 1851 against Louis Napoleon's coup d'état. Although Agulhon notes the ostensible modernity of Republican goals during that revolt—defense of the Constitution, restoration of universal suffrage, and seizure of political power in the municipalities—he stresses its archaic elements of ritual, communal unanimity, social resentment against the rich, and spontaneous violence. Beneath the political moderation of Republican leaders, who had assimilated bourgeois values, seethed the primitive social aspirations of a turbulent and impoverished peasantry. In 1851 the Republic was swept away by the opposing violence of government and populace.

The most obvious scholarly context of Agulhon's work is the historical literature on social protest movements during the nineteenth century. Much of that literature shares some variant of the Marxist theory that impoverishment generates collective violence. Marx himself suggested that some peasants were radicalized during the Second Republic because of their growing burden of debt to urban creditors, and Vigier has recently argued this thesis at length. For Soboul, rural social tensions from 1848 to 1851 were focused, instead, on the struggle of small peasants to retain their communal rights against the individualistic tendencies of large farmers and landlords. In their study of *Captain Swing*, Hobsbawm and Rudé have pursued yet a third line of reasoning within this general scholarly tradition: The establishment of capitalist labor relationships in the countryside, when coupled with mechanization, provoked a massive uprising of English rural laborers in 1830. A final example of this school of thought may be drawn from the studies of Spanish anarchism by Malefakis and Waggoner. They both agree that desperate economic conditions among the agricultural laborers of the Andalusian countryside were a primary cause of rural anarchism in the later nineteenth century.[7]

7 Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963), 126–128; Vigier, *La Seconde République*, I, 264–267, II, 30–38, 60–64, 163–165; Albert Soboul, "La question paysanne en 1848," *La Pensée*, no. 18 (May–June 1948), 55–66, no. 19 (July–Aug. 1948), 25–36, no. 20 (Sept.–Oct. 1948), 48–56; E. J. Hobsbawm and George Rudé, *Captain Swing* (New York, 1968), 33–52; Edward Malefakis, "Peasants, Politics and Civil War in Spain, 1931–1939," in Robert J. Bezucha (ed.), *Modern European Social*

Although these studies draw impressive connections between economic change and popular protest, they have less to say about the conditions under which economic grievances are translated into politically conscious peasant movements. Agulhon implicitly challenges the economic interpretations of Vigier and Soboul by emphasizing the importance of communal institutions and bourgeois cultural and political patronage in shaping the consciousness of Provençal peasants. By comparison with England, his study suggests the crucial role of institutional channels of mass political competition in reorienting local grievances toward national policy and personnel. The possibility of sociocultural similarities between southern Spain and Provence might direct scholarly attention toward the agglomerated settlements, social hierarchies, and voluntary associations through which Spanish anarchism spread in the later nineteenth century. The shared cultural traits and political experience of social classes are no less important than their economic antagonisms in explaining the emergence of political militancy in the countryside.

Agulhon's study of the Var can also be compared fruitfully with some of the recent literature among American social scientists concerning cultural change and political revolt. His emphasis on interclass imitation receives some support in the anthropological literature on cultural brokerage and peasant acculturation to peasant values.[8] In asserting, however, that such imitation occurred in the absence of significant economic change, he is on shakier ground. In a comparable study of "lagging emulation" in contemporary Greek villages, Friedl has stressed the crucial role of economic change—expanding markets, greater specialization of labor, and rising per capita incomes—in facilitating peasant imitation of urban elites.[9] As for the traditional

---

History (Lexington, Mass., 1972), 192–204; Glen Waggoner, "The Black Hand Mystery: Rural Unrest and Social Violence in Southern Spain, 1881–1883," ibid., 163–168.

8 E. R. Wolf, "Aspects of Groups Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," American Anthropologist, LVIII (1956), 1056–1078; Clifford Geertz, "Studies in Peasant Life: Community and Society," Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1961 (Stanford, 1962), 1–42; Charles H. Lange, "Cultural Change," Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1965 (Stanford, 1965), 262–297.

9 Ernestine Friedl, "Lagging Emulation in Post-Peasant Society: A Greek Case," in Jean Peristiany (ed.), Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology (Paris, 1968), 93–106. See also Andrew Pearse, "Metropolis and Peasant: The Expansion of the Urban-Industrial Complex and the Changing Rural Structure," in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies (Baltimore, 1971), 69–80; Joel M. Halpern, The Changing Village Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967).

Mediterranean "agro-towns," untouched by modern economic influences, they have been described by Pitt-Rivers as "closed" communities, self-sufficient, deeply loyal to their distinctive cultural traditions, and linked to the outside world by only a handful of upper-class cultural brokers.[10] If Provençal communities were "open" to regional and national influences, their economies may well have been relatively "modern" (although nonindustrial) rather than "traditional." Agulhon himself notes the export orientation of Provençal agriculture, its special dependence on the rapidly growing city of Marseille, and its improving transport network, high density market system, and growing differentiation of crafts and commerce. Bourgs with cash crops and wage labor, producing wine, olive, and cork for export, were the foremost centers of insurgency in 1851, drawing the more backward "forested villages" into their rebellious orbits.

The concept of "social mobilization," with its emphasis on the political consequences of expanding communications networks, has interesting implications for Agulhon's historical accounts. Deutsch has suggested that during the transitional phase from a pre-industrial to an industrial social order, rates of increase in literacy will tend to outstrip rates of increase in per capita incomes, urbanization, and industrialization. Such disequilibriums will increase the likelihood of political instability. Huntington has applied a similar idea in his concept of the "Green Uprising," whereby pre-industrial peasant populations, once exposed to the "enlightenment of the cities," may join urban-based revolutionary movements. Finally, several quantitative analysts of civil strife in twentieth-century politics have emphasized the relationship between revolutionary movements and a social situation characterized by a rapid expansion of primary school education but a slow rate of economic growth.[11] This literature certainly finds qualitative support

10   Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, "The Closed Community and its Friends," *Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers*, XVI (1957), 5–15. See also Eric R. Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, XIII (1957), 1–18; P. Friedrich, "The External Relations of an Open, Corporate Village," *Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers*, XXVII (1962), 27–44; William G. Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIII (1971), 270–281.
11   Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *Political Science Review*, LV (1961), 493–514. For a review of the literature on social mobilization see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change, Modernization, Development and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, III (1971), 283–322. *Idem, Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968), 72–78, 291–300. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, and B. A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," in H. G. Graham and T. R. Gurr

in *La République au village*, but Agulhon's evidence can also be used to refine the theoretical connection between literacy and radicalization. He describes numerous cases where political militants in the bourgs and villages were young men. When we further consider that the expanding educational opportunities of the July Monarchy produced considerably higher literacy rates in the younger generation than among its elders, we might ask whether there is a systematic relationship between age, literacy, and political leadership. In traditional peasant cultures, older men exercise prestige and authority in part because they are masters of the oral tradition. The rapid expansion of written communications within the younger generation may reverse such traditional political hierarchies. Young men, more literate and more open to urban influences, would emerge in such historical circumstances as the leaders of the entire male population, replacing the dutiful resignation of the aged with the militancy of youth. The revolutionary potential of mass education would thus be a generational phenomenon, transferring political leadership from older to younger villagers.

Agulhon's case-studies of the sociocultural dynamics of political protest can also be related to another concept familiar to contemporary political scientists—relative deprivation. As initially defined by Davies in his theory of the "J-curve," deprivation is relative to the gap between people's expectations—what they want—and their satisfactions—what they actually get. Such a gap grows intolerably when a period of economic growth is followed by a sharp depression, creating a revolutionary situation.[12] This concept, although applied at the outset to the relationship between economic trends and revolutions, has since been extended from economic to political "goods" or "values."[13] Indeed, it is arguable that the very distinction between economic and political causes of revolt is in danger of being lost by "polimetricians" such as Gurr, whose search for an elegant causal model of civil strife has led to the all-purpose but vacuous concepts of "value expectations" and

(eds.), *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C., 1969), 524, cited by Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution 1529–1642* (New York, 1972), 96. See also the Feierabends' correlational analysis in "Aggressive Behaviors within Polities, 1948–1962," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (1966), 249–271.
12 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociology Review*, XXVII (1962), 5–19.
13 Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, 1970). See Stone's discussion of Gurr's theory, and his application of the concept of political deprivation to the English Civil War: *Causes of the English Revolution*, 18–20, 125.

"value capabilities."[14] Agulhon's work shows the importance of relating both economic and political deprivation to specific social groups. He argues that although peasants in the Var did not generally experience a decline in their living standards during the Second Republic, they were bound to experience a heightened sense of deprivation by comparison with other social classes.[15] Economic deprivation is relative to social class as well as to time-periods, helping to explain why political propagandists can arouse popular grievances even when economic conditions are stable or improving. As for political deprivation, Agulhon presents evidence that it was an important determinant of collective motivation in some communities which had experienced repression before the coup d'état. On the whole, however, he contrasts the frustrated political aspirations of upper- and middle-class Republican leaders with the social resentments of their lower-class followers. My own research elsewhere in France points to a broad social base of political deprivation during the Second Republic, but, in any case, the question of social class certainly needs to be raised when the concept of relative deprivation is applied to historical situations.

In yet another respect, the work of political scientists is applicable to Agulhon's historical evidence. Theoretical and quantitative studies of "internal war," "civil strife," and "political conflict" have examined the importance of the repressive apparatus of governments—their "coercive potential"—and the organizational capabilities of opponents —"facilitation" or "subversion"—in determining the magnitude of collective violence.[16] They have also noted that conspiratorial or revolutionary movements are not correlated in space or time with less extensive, less highly organized types of protest or "turmoil," such as

14 Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, XX (1968), 245–278. For his combination of all aspects of relative deprivation into a summary measure for quantitative analysis, see idem, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," The American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), 1104–1124.
15 Other scholars have emphasized the relationship between agrarian depression and peasant radicalization during the Second Republic. The Var seems to be an aberrant case. See, for example, Vigier, La Seconde République, II, 10–169; Leo Loubere, "The Emergence of the Extreme Left in Lower Languedoc, 1848–1851: Social and Economic Factors in Politics," American Historical Review, LXXIII (1968), 1019–1051; and Ch. Marcilhacy, "Les caractères de la crise sociale et politique de 1846 à 1852 dans le département du Loiret," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, VI (1959), 5–59.
16 Gurr, Why Men Rebel; idem, "A Causal Model"; Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," History and Theory, IV (1965), 133–163.

riots.[17] Organized efforts to seize power can be interpreted in part as the outcome of deliberate strategies, based on calculations of the balance of power between potential "insurgents" and "incumbents." Agulhon's case studies provide some support for this equilibrium analysis of revolt: Rebellions occurred in communities where Republicanism was well-organized along conspiratorial lines and where the repressive apparatus of centralized authorities was nonexistent or small, inefficient, and counterproductive. As one might expect of such deliberate mobilizations for political power, they were not closely associated with previous incidents of social turmoil.[18]

At the same time, Agulhon's descriptive accounts suggest that repression and subversion are interdependent aspects of power struggles which need to be analyzed in the context of traditional forms of social behavior. This is especially true with respect to the organizational bases of conflict. By centering their propagandistic activities on the Provençal *chambrées*, Republicans were able to operate within a formalized setting of quasi-official voluntary associations. When administrators responded to this process of politicization by issuing edicts to dissolve such traditional gatherings, the members were driven underground. Especially in rural communities, where police surveillance was rare, such a repressive policy only stimulated opposition and increased receptiveness to urban-based conspiratorial organizations. Thus, the social setting of conflict between administrators and Republicans ensured that efforts to thwart "subversion" actually increased it. The drift toward conspiracy and revolt was hastened as much by administrators as by the organizational preferences of Republicans.

At its most general level, the insurrection of December 1851 in the Var—and elsewhere in France—can be interpreted as the culmination of a "participatory crisis" in the polity of the Second Republic. To retain control of the national political system, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and the legislative "party of order" had armed officials of the

17 Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations, 1958–1960," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (1966), 47–64; R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within Nations, 1946–59," *ibid.*, 65–73. The theoretical distinction between turmoil and internal war was formulated by Harry Eckstein, "The Incidence of Internal Wars, 1946–59," *Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation* (Washington, D.C., 1962), Appendix I.
18 They *were* related in some cases to previous instances of protest against political repression, but Agulhon's identification of forest riots in 1848 with revolt in 1851 is based on only a handful of isolated cases and does not correspond to the pattern of events elsewhere in France.

central bureaucracy with extensive powers of political surveillance and repression. The prolonged struggle of these administrators with Republican associations (whether politicized social clubs or secret societies imported from towns) generated the specifically political conflicts which erupted on a massive scale in 1851. Agulhon underestimates the importance of this organizational struggle when he attributes political calculations and objectives solely to "middle class" leaders, while relegating the peasantry to an "archaic" domain of mindless violence, expressionism, and social mimesis. My own research in other areas of France indicates that Republican militants, organized in regional networks and including many peasants, adopted similar strategies of conspiracy and revolt in response to the standardized national policy of political repression. Their hopes of success proved illusory, and their armed mobilization was "archaic" in the sense that never again would such a movement be attempted in France by rural political leaders. In the context of the Second Republic, however, revolt against Louis Napoleon's coup d'état was the supreme effort by mass converts to Republicanism to defend their participatory rights as voters and as citizens. It was the political system, not the socioeconomic structure, whose future was at stake in the upheaval which marked the death of the Second Republic.[19]

19 Ted W. Margadant, "The Insurrection of 1851 in Southern France: Two Case Studies," unpub. Ph.D. thesis (Harvard University, 1972). I am currently writing a book on the social and political dynamics of the insurrection.