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PEASANTS IN ARMS: THE INSURRECTION OF THE LOT-ET-GARONNE IN DECEMBER 1851

The Ohio State University PH.D. 1980

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PEASANTS IN ARMS:

THE INSURRECTION OF THE LOT-ET-GARONNE

IN DECEMBER 1851

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

James Joseph Ahern, Jr., B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1980

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AUX MES PARENTS, A MA FEMME, A MON DIEU

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I wish to thank the many individuals whose assistance and constant support overcame what appeared at times to me an unbridgeable gulf between a dream and its reality:

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Minor Fields: History of the Soviet Union

History of Japan

American Foreign Policy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

"Why would an American historian travel three thousand miles to a city of 40,000 inhabitants in Southwest France?" asked the reporter from Le Petit Bleu, the local newspaper of Agen. For many inhabitants, the history of the Lot-et-Garonne drew to a close with the Revolutionary period. For a century and a half the area seen by many as the garden basket of France threatened to commit demographic suicide as family size contracted and youths struck out for Bordeaux, Toulouse or Paris, leaving homesteads to die out with the elderly. Only the timely immigration of Spaniards and Italians early in the twentieth century kept the area from becoming a "demographic desert." So the reporter had every reason to question my research into an episode in the history of nineteenth century Lot-et-Garonne.

The Lot-et-Garonne had been a concern for the government during the nineteenth century, but it was not due entirely to the department's waning population. The advent of the Second Republic brought to a dramatic confrontation mounting explosive forces within the department. The government focused its attention on the Lot-et-Garonne because the department was afire with the demo-soc gospel. Several forces caused the fires of democratic-socialism to burn brighter and hotter than in any neighboring department. The Lot-et-Garonne was a house divided. A gulf had developed between the highlands of the North and Northeast

and the lowlands and river valleys of the West and Southwest. This deep cleavage was aggravated by economic, social, political and demographic forces. The coup d'état of December 1851 was the catalyst to these explosive forces. Over fifteen hundred peasants, artisans and bourgeois of the Lot-et-Garonne responded to the call to defend the democratic and social Republic. But the promise this Republic held for the insurgents was never explored. Perhaps the revolutionary rhetoric hid much more elemental forces.

Historians of the Second Republic have preferred to examine the more dramatic lower Midi and Limousin. So the reporter's disbelief that I should travel three thousand miles to study her department's obscure history was understandable. For me, the study of the insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne has been more than dusting off obscure documents and reviving one last time names retreating into oblivion. It has revealed the dramatic interaction of economic, social, political, geographic and even demographic forces that drove a people to take up arms.

CHAPTER 1: The Island Lot-et-Garonne

The small agricultural department of the Lot-et-Garonne in Southwest France does not fit the prevailing models for interpreting the cause of the insurrection of December 1851. Outside the intensively examined areas of the lower Midi and the Limousin, the Lot-et-Garonne registered the greatest number of individuals arrested. In fact, the number of arrests in the Lot-et-Garonne was surpassed in only five departments.[1] Moreover, the Lot-et-Garonne was an island of collective violence in the Southwest. The number of arrests in the department was double that of the neighboring Gers. The remaining departments surrounding the Lot-et-Garonne had barely one hundred arrests (see Figure 1). Yet, aside from a ten-page monograph on the revolt[2] and a thorough study of the events in the city of Marmande,[3] the insurrection of December 1851 here remains an enigma. Despite the numerical evidence of strong democratic and radical leanings during the Second Republic and coup d'état -- which have continued to the present day -- the Lot-et-Garonne has been omitted from study of the roots of recent radical and communist strength in the Midi.[4]

From eyewitness accounts to present-day analyses, contemporaries and historians alike have examined in depth the provincial insurrection against Louis-Napoleon's coup d'état of December 1851 as an index of the timing and degree of political maturation of the French peasant.



Figure 1

Number of Arrests - December 1851

(Source: Roger Price, The French Second Republic; A Social History (London, 1972), pp. 291-93)

Before the ink on the summary decisions of the commissions mixtes had dried, the Duc de Morny immediately set out to portray the revolt as a "jacquerie" skillfully quelled by loyal army and national guard units. For the forces of order, the coup successfully routed the "social war which would have broken out in 1852."[5] The plebiscites of 1851 and 1852 reassured Louis Napoleon and his retinue of the fundamental conservatism of the French peasant.

The republicans banished from France took up the pen in defense of the individuals who rose up to defend the betrayed Second Republic. Writing from exile, Victor Hugo,[6] Victor Schoelcher,[7] and Hippolyte Magen[8] had no access to personal accounts by provincial Frenchmen of that fateful December. They were forced, therefore, to brand all charges of "jacquerie" as calumnious inventions of the emperor's sycophants. But the Second Empire stifled any major revision of the official portrait of the insurrection as a violent revolt of the have-nots.

Only as the Empire grew more liberal did the republican version of the insurrection develop. La Province en 1851 by Eugène Ténot[9] was the first account of the insurrection to emerge from polemics into history. Utilizing personal interviews, newspaper accounts and official transcripts, Ténot sought to "refute the calumnies spread against the defeat and proscribed Republicans of the provinces," calumnies like that of M. de la Gueronnière, senator in 1865:

> The Jacquerie had just raised its flag. Bands of assassins spread throughout the countryside, marched on the towns, overwhelmed individual homes, pillaged, burned and killed, leaving everywhere the horror of abominable crimes which were reported to us on the worst days of the barbarity. It

> was no longer such fanaticism as one finds unfortunately in party struggles -- it was cannibalism so terrible that the wildest imagination would hardly have been able to conceive it.[10]

On the contrary, the widespread "excesses" of the peasantry were the exception, according to Ténot, and those which actually did take place, he insisted, had been exaggerated beyond all proportion for propagandistic effect. As a dedicated republican, Ténot maintained that the coup was illegal and that the insurrectionists were fully within their rights to defend the violated Republic and its Constitution. His work so concerned the administration of Napoleon III that the Minister of the Interior in 1868 requested all prefects to verify Ténot's account of the events of 1851 in their own area in hope of discrediting him. A careful examination of the prefects' replies reveals only minor discrepancies.[11]

With the advent of the Third Republic, its historians rushed to the defense of the proscribed of December 1851 in an effort to show the continuity of republics. The republic of peasants sought its ancestry in the Second Republic. Throughout provincial France monuments and monographs were created to commemorate those citizens who had fallen for "law, justice and the Republic," "the defense of law and the Republic," "Martyrs for Justice...in...the lawful resistance to the coup d'état of December 2, 1851."[12] The defense of the Republic and its Constitution became the accepted interpretation of the insurrection for official historians during the Third Republic. Charles Seignobos, in his contribution to Ernest Lavisse's Histoire de la France Contemporaine,[13] stood in the forefront of republican historians who

insisted upon political maturation of the French peasant and the legal reasons for the insurrection. Writing during the period of emerging class consciousness, Seignobos emphasized the facts surrounding the insurrection to dispel the charges of a jacquerie as well as to defuse any charges of nascent class conflict. "Of a political uprising against a declared illegal government, the government [of Prince Louis-Napoleon] made a social revolt, an explosion of hate by the lower classes."[14] By minimizing the social component, moreover, the republican historians hoped to prevent giving ammunition to the post-Communard far-left who sought to portray its revolutionary struggle as the natural sequel to the insurrection of December 1851 and the aborted Democratic and Social Republic of 1852.

Their version, however, was challenged by the conservatives. Historians like Emile Ollivier,[15] the Duc de Broglie,[16] and Pierre de la Gorce[17] defended the coup d'état as a legitimate defense against the growing threat of socialism. The portrait of the insurrection of December 1851 in the provinces as a violent jacquerie was carefully downplayed. La Gorce maintained, however, that the insurrection had its roots in social rancor. The peasantry, the rank and file of the revolt, were driven by egalitarian hope. "Credulous, ignorant, in dejected poverty, the peasants with little difficulty were won over by those who overwhelmed them with the prospect of land and lower taxes."[18] The countryside arose, not in defense of a legal document or government system, as republican historians held, but for the republic of more land and lower taxes.

The arguments of the participants in this controversy depended upon the degree of political maturity with which they would credit the French peasant. This debate was of crucial importance because it reflected each party's estimation during the Third Republic of the French peasantry's political acumen. For the conservatives, their view of the insurrection as a social upheaval reflected their disbelief that the peasant could understand, let alone take up arms for, the defense of a constitution or a specific form of government. The center-left, who was to depend heavily on the support of the peasantry during the Third Republic, portrayed the insurgents as the last line of defense of a constitutional republic. These portraits in black or white of the insurrection of December 1851 would die hard.

Historians of the far-left, however, linked the purely legalist and socialist interpretations. I. Tchernoff outlined the economic aspirations which, integrated with the idea of the republic, won provincial artisans and workers to the nascent republican movement.[19] But it was the socialist Albert Thomas, in his contribution to Jean Jaurès' multivolumed Histoire socialiste, who best fused the social and political interpretations. "This much is true -- that in the minds of all those men who awaited and prepared for the republican renaissance of 1852, the republican political form and traditional social demands remained inseparable."[20]

Nineteen forty-eight produced a sea of monographs commemorating the Second Republic. In the celebration of the centenary of 1848-51, professionally dispassionate individuals analyzed the events and their causes. Georges Duveau,[21] Albert Soboul [22] and Jean Dautry[23] dealt with

the national experience during the Second Republic. The Society of the History of the Revolution of 1848, directed by Ernest LaBrousse,[24] on the other hand, carried out detailed studies of the Second Republic on a regional basis. Some of the most troubled areas have even more recently received detailed scholarly investigation: the Var by Maurice Agulhon,[25] the Alpine region by Philippe Vigier,[26] the Drôme and Hérault by Ted Margadant,[27] and the Limousin by John Merriman.[28]

This recent scholarship has sought to find in the insurrection the key to the social and political evolution of the French peasantry in the watershed era of the mid-nineteenth century. For Albert Soboul, in his "Les troubles agraires de 1848," the insurrection of 1851 was a resurgence of recurring peasant reactionary violence. "There is an astonishing continuity of peasant reactions, always similar, in 1848 and 1851, as in 1789 and 1830: the traditional peasant defended the ancient collective rights which guaranteed his existence against the new agricultural enterprises."[29] The period of 1848-51 marked the last episode of violence, "the last upheaval of the traditional peasantry on the point of disappearance in that great revolution which would culminate with the integration of the agricultural production into the capitalist economy."[30] The capitalist formation of agriculture demanded the enclosure of those communal lands so vital to marginal farming enterprises. As communal rights in both forests and pastures were whittled away with the conversion and consolidation of isolated communal plots, those peasants whose very existence rested on their use resorted to violence. The government, meanwhile, had a vested interest in favoring the conversion of French agriculture from self-sufficiency

to market capitalism, for with it came a more viable agricultural export trade and a unified national market. The violence of the French peasantry during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, according to Soboul, was the reactionary protest of these small peasant landowners and sharecroppers against the capitalization and centralization of French agricultural and governmental power in Paris. The insurrection of 1851 was the culmination of this reactionary violence.

Ernest Labrousse, on the other hand, found a direct link between the economic fluctuations from 1846 to 1851 and the life and death of the Second Republic. Both the crises of 1846-47 and the depression of 1848-51 exerted a profound impact on political and social developments. In the countryside the wild fluctuation of grain prices won, and later lost, the peasantry for the Second Republic. "Before February, the economic difficulties played a role favorable for the revolution; without bringing about the revolution itself, the crises created a revolutionary situation. After February, the crises together worked against the revolution, contributing to exhausting in turn the provisional government, the republican majority and the parliamentary majority. The desire for economic order equalled the desire for political stability."[31] Although not willing to assign economics as the primary cause for the rise and fall of the Second Republic, Labrousse found that the economic crises and depression of 1846-1851 played a key role in the peasant insurrection of 1851.

Two scholars who worked under Labrousse's direction expanded their centenary monographs into major contributions into the historiography of the Second Republic. Both Philippe Vigier's La Seconde République

dans la région alpine and La République au village by Maurice Agulhon are landmark works in the regional study of the Second Republic.

In many ways Vigier echoed the thesis of Soboul, but from a new perspective. Like Soboul, Vigier saw in the numerous peasant protests of the Second Republic in the Drôme and Basses-Alpes the recurrence of age-old peasant grievances. The haunting spectre of impoverishment hung over Vigier's peasantry as much as it did Souboul's. But Vigier saw in the increasing tempo of peasant protest during the Second Republic not a protest against the destruction of communal lands and rights by the encroaching capitalist market but the anguish of marginal landowners caught in the scissors economics of diminishing agricultural returns and rising expenditures. The most debilitating expenditure for these small landowners was the traditional burden of usury.[32] So while both historians saw peasant protest during the Second Republic and their culmination in the insurrection of 1851 as generated by traditional grievances, for Soboul it was the destruction of cherished communal rights and lands, while for Vigier it was the hardship generated by plummeting agricultural prices and simultaneous usurious interest rates.

In La République au village, Maurice Agulhon painstakingly studied the development of peasant politicization in the department of the Var. The myriad seemingly innocuous cercles, clubs, chambrées and mutual aid societies served as nerve centers for the dissemination of sociability, fraternity, information and political indoctrination. These organizations complemented the already existing community occurrences like the numerous fairs, markets, religious festivities and local charivari to draw the populace together in a more tightly knit

communications network. The long-standing communal relationships in the Var (and throughout the lower Midi) became the organizational skeleton of the social and democratic republic. Moreoever, the intermingling of social levels within these societies enabled the peasant to model his lifestyle and political outlook upon the more articulate bourgeois members of society. The peasant's exposure to the republican ideology within these clubs and cercles, on the village square during market days and over a bouteille de cru, won him over to the democratic and social republic.[33]

Although Agulhon's thesis put new emphasis on the institutional diffusion of ideologies in the Midi, he subscribed to many of Soboul's and Vigier's reasons for the eventual call to arms. The peasantry of the Second Republic were driven to revolt by the archaic causes of communal rights and long-standing animosity toward the well-to-do. While acknowledging the advanced state of political awareness among the peasantry -- witness its defense of the constitution and demand for the restoration of universal suffrage -- Agulhon conceded that reactionary ideas did spur some to action.

This thesis of the insurrection of 1851 as the culmination of peasant reactionary protest has been contested by a recent American scholar. Charles Tilly's many works portray the period from 1830 to 1930 as the "violent century" in French (as well as European) history and trace what he believes as the evolution of French political protest from reactionary, localized collective violence to that of "pro-active" or proto-modern. Unlike Soboul, who held that the usurpation of communal lands and rights by agricultuarl capitalists triggered the

peasant reactionary protest during the Second Republic, Tilly maintains that this so-called "reactionary" protest was in reality a more modern collective response to political centralization and nation-building. Because their violent protests encompassed a more national scope, the French peasant of the Second Republic was responding no longer to specific, local grievances like the deprivation of communal lands, but to much larger, national questions like the coup d'état. During the crucial Second Republic, the peasant's gaze shifted from an inward, localized focus to a broader, national one.[34]

Two more recent studies examine the reasons why the glorious Republic of the February Revolution died so abruptly in the tumultuous days of the insurrection and plebiscite. Ted Margadant, in his article "Modernization and Insurgency in December 1851: A Case Study of the Drôme," uses a novel approach to the study of the coup d'état and the resulting peasant revolt. While not totally dismissing the reactionary components of the insurrection as viewed by Soboul and Vigier and the proto-modern of Tilly, Margadant views the insurrection as the final collision between the repressive measures of Louis-Napoleon's police state and the conspiratorial republican network. Dealt the bloody defeats of the June Days at the barricade and electoral reverses in both the presidential election of 1848 and the legislative election of 1849, those who sought a more democratic and socially just republic spread out into the countryside to carry their vision to the majority of Frenchmen -- the peasants. The accelerating tempo of harassments and arrests at the hands of Louis-Napoleon's prefects and police forced the republican leadership underground into small, inter-connected

conspiratorial groups, preparing for the day of rectification in May 1852. Margadant emphasizes the preponderant role of the Montagnards in the Midi in organizing, disciplining and arming a militia prepared to meet armed government repression. Like Agulhon, Margadant sees in these secret societies the social network that supplemented already existing familial and communal ties to create a regional consciousness of political solidarity.[35] Increasingly forceful political repression drove the secret societies into more feverish recruitment and indoctrination. For Margadant, "the resistance to the coup d'état in the Drôme was a political protest movement under military guise rather than either a social revolt or a revolutionary war. As an outcome of both conspiratorial organization and communal hostility to the state, it combined 'modern' and 'reactionary' dimensions of protest in an unusual manner."[36]

Margadant's thesis on the roles of repression and conspiracy as the motive forces for the insurrection is reinforced by John Merriman's in-depth study of the repressive forces the administration of Louis-Napoleon brought to bear against the republicans. In his Agony of the Republic, Merriman goes beyond Margadant's study of the Drôme and Vigier's study of the Alpine region to study the evolution of radicalization due to repression during the Second Republic in key areas throughout France. Expanding on his own doctoral study on the Limousin to include the Nord, Creuse, Ariège, Finistère and Yonne, Merriman argues that the extreme left, by the spring of 1849, had a coherent message which spread both far and wide as the repressive measures of Louis-Napoleon's regime increased. "The coup d'état was

not one single event, but the culmination of a long series of blows against the montagnards. Between the two most memorable events of the repression -- the June Days and the coup -- there were thousands of incidents, and their combined effect was to destroy the socialist organization in most areas where it was seeking a foothold or had already become entrenched."[37]

Merriman reinforces Tilly's thesis that the Second Republic was indeed a transitional stage in the evolution of collective violence. With the February Revolution and universal suffrage, formerly unenfranchised Frenchmen found their newly-won political importance a heady liquor. An explosive situation developed throughout the countryside when the movement was forced to go underground, its leaders were arrested, its journals seized, its publishers imprisoned and many of its members disenfranchised by the law of May 1850. Having once tasted the fruits of universal suffrage and offered the vision of a truly social republic, many provincial Frenchmen would no longer be content with the reactionary protests of tax revolts or grain riots. The political awareness and sophistication of Frenchmen today was born during the Second Republic.

We have been given a general, blow-by-blow account of the insurrection of December 1851 by Ténot, a description of the struggle for a Republic and its Constitution by Seignobos, a study of the societal forces in the Var by Agulhon, Vigier's thorough examination of the Alpine region, as well as Margadant's research into the Drôme and Hérault and Merriman's dissertation on the Limousin. Despite the breadth and depth of these histories of the insurrection, a vacuum has

yet to be filled. Virtually all of the well-known radical areas have been covered. Lower Languedoc, the Rhône Valley and the Centre, areas of long-established radicalism, have been studied with such thoroughness that some studies complement or even overlap. But a very important area of radicalization during the Second Republic, the Southwest, has been virtually untouched. We do have Jean Dagnan's study of the Gers during the Second Republic, but in many ways his work lacked the insight into the causal forces of the insurrection to be found in Vigier or Agulhon. Le Gers sous la Seconde République became a panorama of the people and events of the Gers.[38] Albert Charles' study on the Gironde,[39] on the other hand, devoted the bulk of its pages to detailing the constant battles for political and social dominance between the major political factions. Moreover, when the tocsin sounded throughout the land to rally republicans to defend the Constitution, Bordeaux and the surrounding areas did not move, thus freeing the troops to march on a much more volatile situation in the neighboring department of the Lot-et-Garonne.

Though it belongs in many ways very much to the cultural traditions of the Midi, the history of the Lot-et-Garonne during the exhilarating and turbulent days of the Second Republic remains to be written. The Lot-et-Garonne played a key role not only in the protest against the coup d'état but also in the growth and spread of republicanism throughout Southwest France. Unlike many other strong republican areas, the Southwest did not enjoy the leadership of a strong urban-based demo-soc movement. The Southwest did not have a Paris, Lyon or Marseille from which to take ideological, moral and

financial sustenance, while Toulouse and Bordeaux were locked in political battle within their own walls. In many ways the departments of the Southwest, especially the Lot, Dordogne, Gers and Lot-et-Garonne, were left virtually on their own, as the only remaining republican source of inspiration -- Paris -- was distant and alien.

Historians have said little about the birth and growth of radicalism in the Lot-et-Garonne from the demo-soc tradition of the Second Republic to the strong Socialist and even Communist preferences of today. They have failed to explain why the Lot-et-Garonne, despite its predominant rural composition, awarded Ledru-Rollin one of the highest percentages of votes in the presidential election of 1848. And although the entire slate of the Party of Order was elected to the National Assembly in May 1849, its margin of victory over the republicans was a mere six thousand votes.[40] While an insurrection in such areas as the Basses-Alpes, the Var or the Hérault could have been anticipated, how does one account for such a large insurrection in the virtual isolation of Southwest France? Perhaps historians might find valuable clues to the process of peasant political maturation in the political evolution within the Lot-et-Garonne not found in the often-studied areas of the Lower Midi.

The unique character of the insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne, however, does not arise solely from the number of its arrests compared with the surrounding departments. While comparable to the number of arrested in the departments of Southeast France, the Lot-et-Garonne does not share the same socio-economic bases that gave rise to the insurrection of December 1851 in the Southeast. The

peasants in Agulhon's Midi often resided in large, semi-urban communities, thus facilitating the diffusion of customs and political ideologies. This very physical proximity enhanced political solidarity, hastened cultural imitation and created the foundations for a strong conspiratorial network.[41] But the geographer Deffontaines, in Les hommes et leurs travaux dans les pays de la Moyenne Garonne, emphasized the sparsely settled, widely scattered nature of rural life in the Lot-et-Garonne.[42] The rural settlements in the Lot-et-Garonne were so dispersed that even the parish church could not assemble a sufficient number of families about it to constitute an administrative center for the commune. In the sparse demographic distribution of the Lot-et-Garonne "one finds an essential difference from the Midi mediterranean, where the commune has exceptional importance."[43] Therefore, Agulhon's model of inter-class imitation for the Var would not be valid in the area of the Midi garonnaise.

The Lot-et-Garonne of the Second Republic does not fit the economic molds of other historians as well. Both Soboul and Vigier subscribed to the Marxian interpretation that economic distress breeds violence. Soboul focused on the struggle of small farmers to safeguard their communal rights. But the Lot-et-Garonne was an area of predominant individual holdings, and the agricultural census of 1851 registered few, if any, communal lands. Vigier, on the other hand, pointed out the link in the Southeast between declining grain prices and peasant unrest, in particular the increase in peasant indebtedness. The lean years of 1849-1850 produced a rash of foreclosures double that of the periods 1840-1845 and 1852-1855. Declining agricultural prices

not only deprived many of their lands but also forced others to resort to even more usurious loans to cover their growing indebtedness. Vigier concluded that "those recently expropriated, or those menaced by expropriation, were very numerous among the leaders and soldiers of the insurrection."[44]

An important corollary to the thesis of economic deprivation focused not on the landowner's struggle for solvency but on the rural artisan's dislocation as a consequence of the industrial revolution. Charles Tilly interprets rising peasant discontent as a result of the shrinking demand for cottage goods. The French industrial revolution of the mid-nineteenth century destroyed the once-flourishing artisans and craftsmen scattered throughout the French countryside. Some of these displaced persons joined the marginal agricultural laborers in the migration to the major urban areas. Those who remained behind in the countryside faced the spectres of unemployment, underemployment as agricultural day laborers or journaliers, and economic deprivation. This phenomenon of deindustrialization helps, according to Tilly, to explain the heavy participation of the rural artisans in the insurrection of 1851:

> The provincial disturbances of 1848 through 1851 brought out not only the dying peasantry, but also large numbers of people -- semi-rural, semi-industrialized workers -- whom the deindustrialization of the countryside was driving into oblivion.... More so than we have realized, the mid-century provincial disturbances recorded the final outrageous cries of whole classes whom the growth of a centralized capitalistic, industrial nation-state was stripping of political identity and means of existence.[45]

But whereas Tilly holds that the rural deindustrialization which triggered the explosive peasant responses of 1848-1851 occurred in the years immediately preceding the Second Republic, the Lot-et-Garonne underwent its transformation in the early years of the nineteenth century. The departmental surveys conducted before 1815 revealed a high degree of pride in the amount of export trade the department enjoyed. Its sailcloth was reputed to be the finest in France, dressing the ships of the line. Serge was another popular exported textile, and hemp went into outfitting the rigging of the French naval fleet.[46] But the decline of the French fleet after the Napoleonic wars greatly constricted the market. Moreover, the iron and coppersmithing industries scattered in small pockets to the west and northeast of the department folded long before the inroads of inexpensive Lorraine irons and steels.[47] The massive decline described in Tilly's hypothesis for the years immediately preceding the Second Republic struck the Lot-et-Garonne at a much earlier date. In fact the Lot-et-Garonne experienced an influx of artisans from other departments throughout the Second Republic, lured by the rich agricultural lands and promise of success. Tilly's interpretation, though perhaps valid for those areas of the country affected by the coming industrial revolution about mid-century, does not hold true for areas like the Lot-et-Garonne whose industries had faded decades earlier.

The question remains why the people of the Lot-et-Garonne arose in revolt in December 1851. Historians' previous models, whether national or regional, have not isolated those motive forces behind the insurrection in this department. The magnitude, scope and location of

the revolt in the Lot-et-Garonne merit a much more detailed study. Until recently historians have been content to examine those areas long thought to be traditionally radical. But what of the geographic, demographic, political and socio-economic forces which gave rise to the insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne? This inquiry will present new insights into those forces which stir an agricultural society to answer a call to arms.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

AN:	Archives Nationales
BN:	Bibliotheque Nationale
ADLG:	Archive departementales de Lot-et-Garonne
SHAT:	Service historique de l'armée de la terre

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER 1

1. Roger Price, The French Second Republic: A Social History (London, 1972), pp. 291-93; the departments with a greater number arrested were the Var (3149), Hérault (2842), Basses-Alpes (1670), Drôme (1615) and Nièvre (1503). The reported number arrested in the Lot-et-Garonne varies from 850 to 1100.

2. Léo Delbergé, "Le coup d'état du 2 décembre 1851 en Lot-et-Garonne d'après Eugène Ténot, rédacteur du Siècle," Revue de l'Agenais, année 83, trimèstre 2 (1957), pp. 91-101.

3. J.-Alfred Neuville, Deux décembre 1851, Proscriptions de Marmande (Lot-et-Garonne) (Agen, 1882).

4. The arrondissement of Marmande sent one of the few communist deputies to the National Assembly during the 1920's in the person of Renaud Jean. The elections of March 1978 sent one Communist and two Socialists to Paris. The only study I have encountered on the roots of radicalism and communism in the department is Gordon Wright's "Four Red Villages in France," Yale Review, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (Spring, 1952), pp. 361-72, in which he detailed the popularity of Renaud Jean.

5. Circular of Morny, December 10, 1851, cited in Claude Lévy, "Notes sur les fondements sociaux de l'insurrection de décembre 1851 en province," Information historique, XIV (1954), p. 142.

6. Victor Hugo, Napoléon le petit (London, 1852).

7. Victor Schoelcher, Histoire des crimes du deux décembre, 2 vols. (Bruxelles, 1852).

8. Hippolyte Magen, Le pilori (Bruxelles, s.d.).

9. Eugène Ténot, La Province en 1851 (Paris, 1865).

10. Ibid., p. V.

11. AN F^{18} 308; cf. Georges Bourgin, "Les préfets de Napoléon III, historiens du coup d'état," Revue historique, LXIV (1931), pp. 274-89.

12. Lévy, p. 142.

13. Charles Seignobos, La deuxième république, Volume 6 in Ernest Lavisse's Histoire de la France (Paris, 1922).

14. Ibid., p. 121.

15. Emile Ollivier, L'Empire libéral (Paris, 1869).

16. Duc de Broglie, Mémoires du duc de Broglie 1825-1870 (Paris, 1938).

17. Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire de la Seconde République française (Paris, 1887).

18. Ibid., t. II, p. 542ff., cited in Maurice Agulhon, "La résistance au coup d'état en province; Esquisse d'historiographie," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, (1974), p. 22.

19. I. Tchernoff, Le parti républicain au coup d'Etat et sous le Second Empire (Paris, 1906).

20. Albert Thomas, Le Second Empire, Volume 10 in Jean Jaurès, ed., Histoire socialiste (Paris, 1901-1908).

21. Georges Duveau, La vie ouvrière sous le Second Empire (Paris, 1947).

22. Albert Soboul, "La question paysanne en 1848," La Pensée no. 18 (May-June 1948), pp. 55-66, no. 19 (July-August 1948), pp. 25-36, no. 20 (September-October 1948), pp. 48-56, republished in Paysans, sans-culottes et jacobins (Paris, 1966), pp. 307-350.

23. Jean Dautry, Les Révolutions de 1848 en France (Paris, 1948).

24. The Bibliothèque de la Révolution de 1848, under the direction of Ernest Labrousse, has published a number of excellent monographs on the Second Republic, above all the volume entitled Aspects de la crise et depression de l'économie française au milieu du XIX^{e} siècle, 1846-1851, in Bibliothèque de la Révolution de 1848, Volume 18 (La Roche-sur-Yon, 1956).

25. Maurice Agulhon, La République au village (Paris, 1970).

26. Philippe Vigier, La Seconde République dans la région alpine, 2 vols. (Paris, 1963).

27. Ted W. Margadant, "Modernization and Insurgency in December 1851: A Case Study of the Drôme," in Roger Price, ed., Revolution and Reaction (New York, 1975); see also Ted W. Margadant, "Peasant Protest in the Second Republic," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, V. 1 (Summer, 1974), pp. 119-30, and Margadant's unpublished doctoral

dissertation "The Insurrection of 1851 in Southern France: Two Case Studies" (Harvard University, 1972).

28. John M. Merriman, The Agony of the Republic (New Haven, 1978) and his unpublished doctoral dissertation "Radicalization and Repression: The Experience of the Limousin" (University of Michigan, 1972).

29. Albert Soboul, "Les troubles," p. 333.

30. Ibid., p. 294.

31. Labrousse, p. xxiv.

32. Vigier, vol. I, pp. 264-67, vol. II, pp. 30-38, 60-64, 163-65, 336-37.

33. Agulhon, La République; Ted Margadant, "Peasant Protest," p, 121.

34. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century 1830-1930 (Cambridge, 1975); Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized France, 1848-1855," in William Aydelotte, et al., The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History (Princeton, 1972), pp. 192-255; Charles Tilly, "The Changing Place of Collective Violence," in Melvin Richter, ed., Essays in Theory and History: An Approach to the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 139-64.

35. Margadant, "Modernization," p. 271.

36. Ibid., p. 275.

37. Merriman, pp. xxi-xxii.

38. Jean Dagnan, Le Gers sous la Seconde Republique (Auch, 1928).

39. Albert Charles, La Révolution de 1848 et la Seconde République à Bordeaux et dans le département de la Gironde (Bordeaux, 1945).

40. André Tudesq, L'élection présidentielle de Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (Paris, 1965), pp. 252-53; Mémorial Agenais, 28 décembre 1848; Journal de Lot-et-Garonne, 16 mai 1849.

41. Agulhon, La République; Margadant, "Peasant Protest," p. 121.

42. Pierre Deffontaines, Les hommes et leurs travaux dans les pays de la Moyenne Garonne (Lille, 1932), pp. 69-96.

43. Ibid., p. 90.

44. Vigier, pp. 34, 62, 63, 408, 411; italics his.

45. Tilly, "Changing Place," pp. 160-62; Margadant, "Modernization," pp. 259.

46. M. Bessières, "Coup d'oeil sur l'industrie du departement de Lot-et-Garonne," Recueil des Travaux de la Société d'Agriculture, Sciences et d'Arts d'Agen, IX (1858-1859), pp. 39-57; J. Pieyre, fils, Statistique du departement de Lot-et-Garonne (Paris, an X); Deffontaines, pp. 275-95; Claude Lamouroux, Statistiques industrielles du département de Lot-et-Garonne pour l'année 1789 et l'an X (Agen, 1903); O. Granat, Les Artisans Agenais sous l'Ancien Régime (1691-1791) (Agen, 1904).

47. Lucille Bourrachot, "Les anciennes forges de l'Agenais," Villeneuve-sur-Lot et l'Agenais (Nérac, 1962), pp. 255-83; Norman Mutton, "Charcoal Iron-making in the Department of the Lot-et-Garonne, France," Journal of Historical Metallurgy Society, X, 2 (1976), pp. 64-69.

"Ces provinces comptent parmi les mieux cultivées qu'il y ait en France: la région de la Garonne est comme un jardin."

Arthur Young
Voyages en France (1792)

CHAPTER 2: The Lot-et-Garonne: A Zone of Transition

In order to fathom the forces which drove the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne to take up arms in December 1851, one must examine the socio-economic, political and even geographical factors that influenced the peasants during the Second Republic. The depth and breadth of the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne, when measured against the neighboring departments as well as the national scene, warrant a detailed study to find why this department in particular possessed unique ingredients for a peasant revolt.

The department of the Lot-et-Garonne, formerly part of the ancient province of Guyenne, was formed from the Agenais, part of the Bazadais, and small fractions of the Condomois and Lomagne regions of Gascogne in what is presently Aquitaine. The department surrounds the confluence of the Lot and Garonne Rivers in Southwest France. The department's relief shares elements of the rolling hills or mollasses of Périgord to the north, the plateau of the clay serre to the east, the sandy plains of the Landes to the southwest and the rich alluvial river

valleys of both the Lot and Garonne Rivers (Figures 2 and 3). This predominantly agricultural department rests midway between the major metropolitan centers of Bordeaux and Toulouse and approximately three hundred fifty kilometers from Paris.[1] In surface area the Lot-et-Garonne ranked sixty-eighth of eighty-nine departments and had a population density of 63.75 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1851 (below the national average of 67.46).[2]

The Lot-et-Garonne was divided into four arrondissements, thirty-five cantons and three hundred twelve communes. The population peaked in 1841 with 347,073 but has dropped continuously to the present day.[3]

Each arrondissement has a unique character that often separates the Néraçais from the Agenais, the Marmandais from the Villeneuvois. Reflecting their location, history, economics and politics, the inhabitants of the four arrondissements provide a rich and varied tapestry about the crucial threads of the Lot and Garonne Rivers (Figure 4).

The arrondissement of Agen, as both the prefectural and diocesan seat of the department, serves as the political and religious hub. Seven cantons and twenty-five communes compose it. Located in the southeast corner of the department, the arrondissement forms a triangle stretching from the Garonne's southeastern entrance to the department to Aiguillon and the junction of the Lot-et-Garonne to the northwest, then eastward along the plateau to neighboring departments of the Lot and Tarn-et-Garonne.[4] The countryside shared the topography of such riverine cantons as Laplume and Port-Sainte-Marie as well as the



Figure 2

Soil Types of the Lot-et-Garonne

(Source: Zapata, p. 18)



Figure 3

Topography of the Lot-et-Garonne

(Source: Zapata, p. 18)



Figure 4

Arrondissements of the Lot-et-Garonne

distant plateau reaches of Laroque-Timbaut and Beauville. Houses in the plateau region were made of the very abundant chalk stone that created blinding-white edifices, while the riverine inhabitants were forced to construct their buildings on pilings to circumvent the hazards of frequent flooding. Moreover, the plateau was marked by a wide dispersal of settlements, while settlement patterns in the valleys were denser.

Agen, its most prominent city, stands on the right bank of the Garonne River at the foot of the chalklined plateau. As the most populous city in the department in 1851 with 16,027 inhabitants and because of its riverside location along the Bordeaux-Toulouse commercial axis, Agen long aspired to become a premier commercial entrepôt. National route 113, following the meandering river basin, passes through Agen on its way from Bordeaux to Toulouse. But the river's frequent flooding rendered the road oftentimes impassable. The Garonne itself is normally such a shallow river that only shallow-draft paddle steam boats could navigate the treacherous waters. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the public focused its hopes on the lateral canal. Begun in 1835 after centuries of planning, the first major section of the canal, from Toulouse to Agen, was completed in 1849. The canal eventually linked Agen to both Bordeaux and Toulouse and circumvented the capricious and oftentimes impassable Garonne.[5]

By the advent of the Second Republic, the modern city of Agen had already savored its heyday. The eighteenth century had been the golden age for the city, as flourishing sailcloth and hemp manufacturers transformed the city's environs into a booming small-scale industrial town. By the end of the eighteenth century, Agen had become a

veritable "cloth town." Unlike many factory towns throughout France, Agen's commercial and manufacturing growth did not depopulate the surrounding countryside. In order to break the hold of entrepreneurs in the city, the merchants farmed out their work among the peasant-artisans of the countryside. This strong alliance between the countryside and the urban factories actually widened the horizons of the peasantry while maintaining the family structure. Moreover, the cottage industries saved many communes from a premature decline and disappearance.

But just as the manufacture and trade in Agenais cloths peaked, market tastes altered, rapidly collapsing the intricate web of socio-economic supports. The decline of the religious orders, the loss of the Canadian markets and later the eclipse of French naval power under Napoleon all dealt fatal blows to the flourishing cloth and hemp trades of Agen. The area's flirtation with manufacturing came to an abrupt halt by the beginning of the nineteenth century. From the French Revolution onward, Agen would no longer be identified as an industrial city. Yet, by the Second Republic, the city fathers were still anxiously lobbying to make of Agen the premier commercial center of the region.[6]

Laying claim to the most fertile region of the department is the second arrondissement of Marmande. Located in the northwest corner of the department, the arrondissement of Marmande stretches from the hilly Côtes de Duras on the northern Perigordine border to the Landes and Côtes de Buzet to the southwest. The Garonne, fed now by the Lot River, meanders past the principal towns of Marmande, Tonneins, Mas d'Agenais

and Meilhan. The arrondissement was composed of nine cantons and one hundred three communes. It took great pride in producing two of the most lucrative agricultural products of the department: tobacco and wine. With the removal of the monopoly restriction of the eighteenth century, tobacco production in the area, especially about Tonneins, flourished. By the Second Republic, the area was renowned as a site for the national manufacture of first quality tobacco. And both the Côtes de Duras and Côtes de Buzet produced nationally-esteemed wines. Like the first arrondissement, the countryside of the second shares both the topography of the highlands in such cantons as Lauzun and Seyches and the lowlands with Mas and Tonneins. Duras shares both these topographical features, and, because of its remote location (and deep involvement in fine wine production), is oftentimes regarded as more akin socially, economically and politically to the Bordeaux region than to the Lot-et-Garonne.

Resting on a terrace overlooking the Garonne River some twenty meters below is the capital of the second arrondissement: Marmande. The seat of a sub-prefecture with a population of 8,336 in 1851, Marmande enjoyed a strategic commercial position as a gateway to the markets farther inland. Until the completion of the lateral canal, Marmande served as the port of dependable river traffic from Bordeaux, as floods or droughts rendered the upper reaches of the rivers impassable. The city governed the most radical arrondissement of the department. In December 1851 an insurrectionary force of peasants, artisans and bourgeois successfully seized control of the municipal government of Marmande and ventured beyond the city gates to meet the

government troops in a violent clash of arms. And during the Third Republic it was this same arrondissement which sent one of the few communist deputies to the National Assembly during the 1920's in Jean Renaud of Samazan.[7]

The inhospitable landaise region makes up the greater part of the third arrondissement of Nérac. The seven cantons and seventy-nine communes covered 1,430 square kilometers of flat, sandy stretches of pine trees and underbrush to the west in cantons like Houeillès and alluvial soils in the far east of Damazan and Lavardac. The same entreprenurial blossoming that transformed Agen during the eighteenth century infiltrated the area in the north central part of the arrondissement. Taking advantage of the vast landaise pine forests and a number of small streams, the region had supported modest copper and iron forges, grain and paper mills and glass factories into the French Revolution. But increasingly scarce raw materials rendered the forges and mills uneconomical. By the Second Republic these small mills were but a shadow of their eighteenth century form. The few remaining forges fired up only seasonally, if at all, creating a fluctuating unemployment picture among the iron workers of the Baïse, Avance and Gélise Rivers. Deeper within the forest, bottle cork and naval stores manufacturers dwelling on the fringes of civilization inhabited the desolate western reaches, while to the southwest fine Armagnac brandies were distilled.[8]

Nérac, the sub-prefecture of the third arrondissement, is located thirty kilometers southwest of Agen. Situated along the banks of the Baïse River (which flows northward into the Garonne), Nérac counted a

population of 7,094 inhabitants in 1851. Once a prominent center of Protestantism under Jeanne and Marguerite d'Albret, Nérac entered the nineteenth century a shadow of its former greatness. Nérac would remain, as its origins decreed, merely the commercial outpost for the more remote regions of the Landes to the west and southwest.[9]

The fourth arrondissement of Villeneuve-sur-Lot surrounds the Lot River from its entrance into the department at Fumel to its junction with the Garonne near Aiguillon. The arrondissement has ten cantons and eighty-eight communes covering 1,462 square kilometers. Though an agricultural arrondissement, Villeneuve also contained the industrial heart of the Lot-et-Garonne. The easily accessible surface-mined iron ores, coupled with the powerful Lède and Lémance Rivers, made the area about Fumel a manufacturing haven. As the department entered the nineteenth century, the area to the north of Fumel boasted three grain mills, eight iron forges, two copper forges and twelve paper mills. But like the forges of the arrondissement of Nérac, the mills of the far northeast were plagued by problems of supply, in this case charcoal, and by the Second Republic had succumbed to the problem of uneconomical raw materials. As in the other manufacturing district, mill and forge work became merely supplemental seasonal income for journaliers or métayers.[10] The countryside of the fourth arrondissement is the most varied of the four. It shares the plateau region with Agen in the canton of Penne, the rolling hills with Marmande with Monclar and Cancon, and the riverine regions with Villeneuve and Sainte Livrade. In addition, the remote regions of Fumel and Tournon resemble the steep hillsides of the neighboring department of the Lot.

Located at the crossroads of the axes north-south from Paris to Spain and east-west along the valley of the Lot is "la jolie bastide" of Villeneuve-sur-Lot. This seat of the sub-prefecture had a population of 13,212 in 1851. Although not as politically radical as the arrondissement of Marmande, Villeneuve-sur-Lot had spearheaded the opposition to the census of 1842 and the forty-five centime tax during the Second Republic. And it was Villeneuve that broke the monarchist control over the electorate in 1846 by electing Charles Lesseps, a liberal Parisian newspaper editor from Monflanquin, to the National Assembly. Opposition to any governmental encroachment could be virtually guaranteed from the inhabitants of Villeneuve and its sister-city Sainte Livrade. Because they aspired to the leadership of the liberals within the department, the Villeneuvois found themselves wrestling with Agen for preeminent political position in the department.

These governmentally-decreed demarcations of arrondissements, cantons and communes, however, cannot adequately describe those forces which drove the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne to take up arms in December 1851. Although each arrondissement possesses a local color all its own, there existed among the rebels similarities that cut across these artificial boundaries. Rather than reflecting the administrative subdivisions of the department, the peasants who clamored for the fulfillment of the Second Republic shared geographic, religious, socio-economic and ethical characteristics common to all the arrondissements. The human geography of agrarian individualism holds the key to the understanding of the insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne. The migration and settlement patterns, the pattern

of land ownership together with the ethic of bien-être, communications networks, and religious heritage influenced the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne during the evolution of the Second Republic to its powerful climax in December 1851.

Rather than divide the department into four arrondissements, thirty-five cantons or three hundred twelve communes, the Lot-et-Garonne is best examined on the basis of physical geography. A topographical survey of the department reveals several distinct land masses and soil types (Figure 2). The mollasses, or rolling hills, extend from the confluence of the Lot-et-Garonne northward. Composed of sandy clay soils, the mollasses supported only large tracts of wheat and maize, separated by brush or grape vines of poor quality. The terrefort, or rich clay loam, of the Agenais plateau to the east proved to be the breadbasket of the department. But again large tracts were necessary to yield a profitable harvest. The landes to the west and southwest revealed trackless vastnesses of pines and sand. The ribière, or riverbed, has proven to be the garden basket of the department since the nineteenth century. There were four distinct soil types, but even they can be reduced to two -- the highlands of the mollasses and serre and the lowlands of the landes and ribières (Figure 3). This dichotomy reappears constantly.

Until the late eighteenth century, settlement had favored the highlands. The uncontrollable Garonne River too often left a path of destruction in its wake, relegating the riverbeds to outcast flatboat operators and dockworkers.[11] Even without periodic fertilization, the mollasses and especially serres yielded an adequate harvest of seven to

ten hectoliters per hectare (compared to a national average of fifteen to twenty). The peasant was forced to rely heavily on only biennial crop rotation and meager amounts of pigeon droppings to avoid soil exhaustion, because of the expense of commercial fertilizers, the dearth of livestock and deep-seated skepticism. A test hectare plot, on the other hand, properly fertilized by a progressive farmer in 1836, yielded between twenty-eight and thirty hectoliters of grain per hectare, revealing the soil's latent fertility. Despite the peasant's reluctance to fertilize for optimum yields, the Lot-et-Garonne had produced abundant grain crops of 5.16 liters per inhabitant, compared to 3.95 per inhabitant nationwide since the eighteenth century.[12] This permitted the department to export between one-third and one-half of its grain production. While one-quarter was destined for the rest of France, another quarter found its way to the foreign markets of England, Ireland and Belgium in 1851. The Lot-et-Garonne, especially its highland farmers, were linked intimately to the national grain market and suffered its vicissitudes. It is no wonder, then that these peasants formed a formidable political bloc dedicated to peace and prosperity.[13]

During the early nineteenth century, however, a system of dikes and dredging began the gradual reclamation of the Garonne River valley from the ravages of periodic flooding.[14] As the capricious waters were tamed, a modest internal migration from the _mollasses_ and _serres_ to the _ribières_ commenced.[15] The highlands to lowlands migration was also hastened by the increased use of _jachère_ in the highlands region, reflecting an increased interest in the growth and improvement of the bovine stock. During the 1830's, the department increased its

subsidies and prizes for the improvement of cattle breeds.[16] But this movement also displaced numerous journaliers whose livelihood rested on the intensive wheat-maize cultivation. So the displacement of day laborers coincided with the opening horizons of work in the valleys. And the crops cultivated there were highly labor-intensive, beckoning journaliers from the highlands as well as from beyond the department's borders.[17] The lure of the fertile river valleys was so strong that the department experienced a very small level of emigration.[18] It was during the first half of the nineteenth century that the very popular export crops of tobacco[19] and the prune d'Agen[20] enjoyed their greatest popularity. Wine production peaked in the department as riverine crops joined the hillside production before the devastating blights of the latter half of the century.[21] Moreover, many fruits and vegetables like peas, beans, beets, onions, cabbage, carrots, table raisins, peaches, apples, apricots and figs flourished alongside the traditional hemp, flax and colza.[22] "There is hardly an agricultural region which can compare in unceasing fertility than the valley of the Garonne."[23] The alluvial river beds were so fertile that a popular saying maintained that "these prairies regained during the night almost all the verdure lost to the animals' appetites during the day."[24]

The increased migration to the river valleys drove prices up for land in that region and altered the pattern of land tenure prevalent on the hillsides. Whereas a hectare of land around Tonneins, located along the Garonne seventeen kilometers southeast of Marmande, sold for 2,000 to 2,500 francs in 1820, the price had skyrocketed to as high as 12,000 francs per hectare in the area by 1866. But the peasant's land

holdings decreased in size from ten to twenty hectares to less than ten hectares, at a time when the population of the department had already begun its downward spiral.[25] The high fertility of the land, its resultant increased price and the ever-growing population density due to internal migration from the uplands, as well as immigration from other departments (Figure 5), forced farmers to purchase smaller tracts of land or be content with the option of métayage or sharecropping. In fact, a careful examination of the following maps reveals growing cleavage between the highlands and the lowlands in the form of large land ownership versus small plot tenure and métayage (Figures 6 through 9).[26] In order to achieve a marketable grain crop, the peasant landowners in the north and east were constrained to work large tracts of land. The riverain, on the other hand, relied more on the excellent fertility of the alluvial soils to yield a cornucopia in a much smaller area. Because of the proportionally higher land costs, coupled with the desirable location near the commercial arteries, many farmers who struggled to realize the peasant dream of becoming a moyen propriétaire, or middle-income landowner, settled for either ownership of a plot of land often less than five hectares or the temporary "apprenticeship" of métayage. "The peasant's horizon may be narrow, his mental aptitude low, but he knows what he wants, and he clings to it tenaciously. What he wants is land, and the right to till it without interference. He is individualism personified in silently ferocious form."[27] This land hunger drove the peasant to extraordinary lengths of deprivation and hardship. It was not uncommon to see petits and moyens propriétaires



Figure 5
Population Changes 1846 - 1851
(Source: Statistique Générale de la France, 1852)



Figure 6
Size of Average Landholding (1892 Census)
(Source: Zapata, p. 284)



Figure 7

Mode of Cultivation - Métayage
(Source: Zapata, p. 292)



Figure 8
Mode of Cultivation - By Owner
(Source: Zapata, p. 292)



Figure 9
Percentage Métayage (1851 census)
(Source: Statistique Générale de la France, 1852)

as journaliers (day laborers) or métayers (sharecroppers) in order to amass even more land.[28]

In fact, the hunger for land among the peasantry of the Lot-et-Garonne was translated into a very striking trend for all the nation to witness. The internal migration to the lowlands was just one aspect of the change the department was undergoing in mid-nineteenth century. But recent scholarship has altered significantly the demographic view of the area and its impact on the social and economic evolution of the Lot-et-Garonne. Using published government reports, early demographers had noted that the Lot-et-Garonne peaked in population in 1841. But Etienne Van de Walle, with his reconstruction of the French census, singled out the Lot-et-Garonne as one of the first departments to experience a net population decline, three decades before the period determined by earlier demographers.[29] This was at a time when new agricultural opportunities were opening up in the lowlands. Since emigration was minimal and the deathrate for the department average, Van de Walle attributed the premature population decline in the Lot-et-Garonne to a decline in fertility (from 22.5 births per 1000 women in 1831 to 20.4 births per 1000 in 1851). And yet, what is especially noteworthy was the high proportion married coupled with the lower marital fertility. The plummeting birthrate while marriage was both popular and early pointed to a more fundamental change occuring within the Lot-et-Garonne during the first half of the nineteenth century.[30]

To secure and maintain the much coveted lands the peasant of the Lot-et-Garonne practiced voluntary population control. Herein lies the

explanation why the fertility rate dropped precociously in the department. To "faire un aîné" (have an only son)[31] became the overwhelming preoccupation of the peasant. Morcellement among many heirs spelled ruin.

> Numerous statistics prove that, in all countries, families who possess [land] have on the average fewer children than those who do not. Even a small piece of land suffices to give a family the avarice and fearful spirit of a propriétaire, distrustful of himself and the future, absorbed by the terror of dividing his wealth or losing it.[32]

It was acknowledged that the aristocracy long practiced some means of birth control to maintain the patrimony intact. Stories abound of noble couples pledging complete sexual abstinence after an heir was secured.[33] But it took the moyen propriétaire to popularize the practice. "The restriction of births thus became a means to maintain the social rank of one's family. But since the moyen propriétaire was held in highest esteem, it was he who imposed his will on the countryside; birth control thus entered into the customs."[34] The petit propriétaire and métayer, envious of the moyen propriétaire's position, was willing to practice family planning if it meant rising in socio-economic status. The journalier as well, mindful of the shrinking horizons of work in the highlands, followed suit. Limiting one's family became as much a part of the common morality of the department as the relentlessness of work and economic frugality.

During the first decades of the nineteenth century. to faire un aîné became the cornerstone of departmental ethics. To have more than two children brought opprobrium upon the parents. Jacques Bertillon, in his Le dépopulation de la France, said of the Lot-et-Garonne: "A

second pregnancy is a disgrace; the man who has several children is scorned, even by women; the in-laws are displeased and will overwhelm the parents with their own sort of reproaches."[35] It became almost a truism to say when one announced the birth of a third child: "A third, it will not live."[36]

It was not out of the desperation of poverty that the peasant of the Lot-et-Garonne voluntarily limited the number of offspring. The continued immigration and lack of substantial emigration bore witness to the promise the department held. In fact, Van de Walle states that "the richest departments, as far as landed income is concerned, are those where birth control has made the most inroads, or affected fertility first."[37] The migration from the mollasse and serre was absorbed by the ribière. The loss of artisanal work in the scattered hamlets was met by the blossoming of the river towns. The wheat and maize cultivation of the hillsides was being superseded by the poly-cultural fruit and vegetable cornucopia of the riverbeds. Arsène Dumont, in his Dépopulation et Civilisation, laid blame for the demographic scandal of the Lot-et-Garonne, rather, upon what he termed "social capillarity." The urge to improve one's social and economic status drove the peasant of the Lot-et-Garonne consciously to limit the number of offspring.[38]

Unfortunately, there are insufficient data to state unequivocally that the same highlands-lowlands cleavage that was evident in the patterns of migration and land tenure also held for the practice of family planning. Authors later in the nineteenth century have stated that the lowland truck farming regions had the lowest birthrate of the

department, if not all of France. Moreover, the richest cantons like Sainte-Livrade (137.01 francs per hectare) had the lowest birthrate (11.9 births per 1000 families), while the poorest like Fumel (44.02 francs per hectare) had the highest birthrate (21.66 births per 1000 families).[39] Yet while we cannot categorically state that the lowlands experienced a population decline earlier than that of the highlands due to a precocious drop in the birthrate, the evidence does show that, as a department, the ethic of conscious family planning to secure property, maximize well-being and guarantee an assured patrimony was well established. The peasants and artisans of the Lot-et-Garonne who resorted to arms in December 1851 shared these same desires.

The topography of hillsides and valleys reinforced a number of other major geographical and sociological differences in the department of the Lot-et-Garonne. As portrayed in the map (Figure 10), the routes of communication (and eventual politicization) followed the river valleys. The road system in the Lot-et-Garonne in 1851 proved to be almost twice the road length per square hectare of land surface as the national average,[40] this during a period when the level of population density was declining in the Lot-et-Garonne while growing in France as a whole.[41] Moreover, an extensive system of rivers and streams complemented the roads for communications and transportation. In the northeast the Lède, Lémance and Thèse rivers emptied into the Lot; the Dropt, forming the border between the Lot-et-Garonne and Dordogne, flowed westward into the Garonne in the neighboring Gironde; the Baïse, Auvignon and Gélise traveled northward from the department of Gers into the Garonne at Aiguillon; the Gers joined the Garonne south of Agen.



Figure 10

Royal and Departmental Routes - 1835

Although impassable for large river craft, these streams linked the hinterlands with the major market towns by means of shallow-draft boats. But most concern centered about the possibility of tapping the commercial potential of the Garonne.[43]

Local officials looked to the lateral canal to pull the area from the commercial doldrums. Unfortunately, the canal proved instead to be a source of constant debate and irritation during the Second Republic. During 1849 the department succumbed to the scourge of cholera. Like the ubiquitous flies, mayoral decrees filled the air prescribing sanitary precautions. In the newspaper health officials singled out the canal as the insalubrious breeding ground of vermin and disease. Simultaneously debate raged in the newspapers concerning the feasibility and desirability of curtailing work on the remaining section of the canal on the left bank destined to link Agen with Bordeaux. In its stead departmental leaders argued the pros and cons of using the projected canal pathway as a railroad roadbed from Bordeaux to Sète. Cost and health were not the only considerations, however, for this revised view of the canal. In many ways, the canal, like the roads and rivers, became a pathway for politicization of the inhabitants. It was recognized that the canal construction gangs were breeding grounds for dangerous socialist doctrines. The gendarmerie was often called out to the construction area about Lavardac and Damazan to arrest riotous workers. And as will be seen, an entrepreneur responsible for hiring and supervising the terrassiers by the name of Darnospil led the insurrectionary brigade of some two thousand workers and peasants that marched on Agen from Lavardac.

The river valleys served as the avenues of politicization in the Lot-et-Garonne from another important standpoint -- the spread of the printed word. Colporteurs and vagabonds often followed the more popular roadways and river valleys dispersing political tracts and revolutionary song with their various wares. In the eyes of the authorities, inns, hotels and markets were transformed from a local gathering over a bouteille de cru and a public reading of the leading journals to a veritable den in the ever-pervasive network of socialist secret societies. One cannot rely solely on the statistics on education and literacy rates to gauge the impact of the written word upon the peasantry. While virtually every commune in the department had its own primary school or shared a neighboring commune's, the Lot-et-Garonne ranked low in the degree of instruction afforded its population.[44] Even the departmental literacy rate of 58% fell behind the national average of 65.9%.[45] Only in the category of school-attending children as a percentage of all school-age children did the Lot-et-Garonne narrow the gap with the national average: 50.1% to 51.6%.[46] But an interesting pattern again emerges, reinforcing the highlands-lowlands difference. While at first glance the department trailed the nation in the level of literacy, presenting strong evidence that the level of politicization in the department may have been rudimentary, a detailed examination of the cantonal reports on conscript literacy in the Lot-et-Garonne reveals a concentration of literate conscripts in the lowlying riverine communities (Figure 11). Following the paths of the rivers and roads, the pattern of literacy in the Lot-et-Garonne facilitated the



Figure 11
Literacy Rates
(Source: ADLG, Séries R: "Liste du tirage au sort des jeunes gens de la classe de 1851")

radicalization of the peasant population in the valleys rather than their brethren in the hillsides.

As they met in the local auberge, traded in the market place or hailed the local postman, the peasants or artisans availed themselves of a wide spectrum of journals. The most widely read and influential newspaper in the department was the Journal de Lot-et-Garonne.[47] Founded by Prosper Noubel in 1806 as the Messager de Lot-et-Garonne, the newspaper had served as the official organ of the prefecture since its inception. As the prefect, Paul de Preissac, wrote in 1851, "The Journal de Lot-et-Garonne, an enterprise long devoted to the region and never a speculative venture, conforms to the most proper opinions."[48] During the Second Republic the Journal easily submerged its Orleanist leanings to become the mouthpiece of the Party of Order within the department. It avidly supported the presidential candidacy of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and intimated as early as January 1850 that a coup d'état was not entirely undesirable. The founder's son, Henri-Raymond Noubel, apprenticed as editor during the Second Republic, used the influential newspaper as a springboard to high political office as member of the Legislative Body under the Second Empire and senator under the Third Republic.

This center-right newspaper was stalked by the legitimist publication, the Mémorial Agenais. Born in 1831, the Mémorial changed its masthead with the February Revolution to appeal to a "National Union," while dropping the "Monarchist Cause." The newspaper folded in December 1848, only to be revived the next year as the Conciliateur Agenais.[49] Though on the far right of the political spectrum, it was

not uncommon to find the Conciliateur allied with the democrat-socialist journals against the Journal, as in the defense of the accused in the Plot of the Southwest.

The republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne struggled through the birth and death of at least four newspapers during the brief existence of the Second Republic. The Echo du Peuple, an immediate child of the February Revolution, enjoyed a month as the official government publication, then rapidly sank into obscurity, its last issue appearing in July 1848. The Echo was succeeded by the Oeil du Peuple which never raised sufficient deposit monies to legitimately publish. While these two newspapers were the product of the artisans and workers of Agen and reflected a definite socialist leaning, their successor, buoyed by the financial and popular support of more moderate republicans, flourished. The Républicain du Lot-et-Garonne provided the moderate bourgeois republicans with a mouthpiece, beginning publication in November 1848. Under the editorship of Léon Plée, and later the more democratic Paul Gauzence, the Républicain succeeded in keeping alive the republican spirit in the department, despite fierce internal disputes over direction, until it succumbed to governmental attacks and folded in July 1850. Undaunted, the fiery Gauzence turned to the readership in an attempt to create a genuine democratic paper by opening ownership of the paper to shareholders at one franc a share and control to a popularly-elected board of governors. The Radical de Lot-et-Garonne lasted only a few months when Gauzence was imprisoned in November 1850 along with other newspapermen in the Plot of the Southwest.[50]

In addition to these home-grown politically-oriented newspapers, the Lot-et-Garonne population subscribed to journals from Paris and neighboring Bordeaux. Moreover, each arrondissement was served by its own literary, agricultural and commercial digest.[51] The political newspapers were read in literary salons and smoky inns, oftentimes aloud. But what was most indicative of the unofficial readership of these periodicals, especially the republican newspapers, was the constant complaint of subscribers of late deliveries and dogeared, virtually unreadable copies arriving at the subscriber's door.

While literacy rates and journal readership help determine the level of political awareness in the department, the long religious tradition of the Lot-et-Garonne was intricately intertwined with its political evolution. The legacy of religious controversies and persecutions indelibly scarred the entire countryside. From the earliest times the region has been both a battleground and a prize for Romans, barbarians, Christian crusaders, English lords, French kings and countless hosts of true believers. Even during the relatively quiescent nineteenth century, tales of religious intolerance continued to haunt the region.

Although established in the third century, Christianity was rent internally very early in the region. The Albigensian heresy called forth the crusading sword of Simon de Monfort to reestablish orthodoxy. Heresy followed the Garonne River Valley northward into the Agenais region. Monfort laid siege to Marmande, Penne and Agen. During his holy crusade, Simon massacred the populations of both Penne and Marmande.[52] Religion and politics were inextricably interwoven, as the

regions of the Agenais and Quercy suffered through constant exchanges from the hands of the English to the French, as well as from the heretics to the true believers. At times it was impossible to separate the religious from the political elements of these struggles.

Unity under the French mantle in 1453 by no means spelled a tranquil existence for Gascony. The seeds of Protestant theology took deep root in the same soil which earlier had nurtured Albigensianism and the Cathars. Both Marguerite of Navarre and her daugher Jeanne actively propagated the Huguenot creed throughout Aquitaine. The year 1534 marked the introduction of Calvinism in the Agenais, the year when Calvin himself took refuge in Nérac. By 1546 the new faith had established itself solidly in Agen, Clairac and Bergerac. The nobility subscribed readily to the new creed for, as Blaise de Montluc observed, "There is not a son of a good mother who has not wished to sample it."[53] The "rustics and laboring folk," on the other hand, rallied to Protestantism with the same hopes of alleviating their miserable lot as their German counterparts. A veritable jacquerie erupted throughout the Agenais, triggered by the lynching of the baron of Fumel in 1561. "In the heart of Aquitaine, Agen and its region were profoundly troubled; the religious quarrels appeared to degenerate into a social war."[54] Despite the relative calm with the accession of Henry IV, "everywhere the ravages were heavy; unfortunately the misfortunes were not over for Aquitaine which, after having been one of the principal foci of the religious struggles, continued in the center of the battle under Louis XIII."[55]

The Edict of Nantes and "mass" conversions of the "heretics" by waves of Jesuit, Franciscan and Blessed Sacrament orders did not win all of Aquitaine to the Catholic fold. Despite having closed twenty-six Protestant centers in the Agenais in 1684 and 1685, the crown was unable to eradicate the movement. Aquitaine, especially the Garonne River Valley, became the site of two bitter anti-Protestant persecutions in 1685-1715 and 1745-60.

> This second persecution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries left a profound impression upon French Protestants, and they preserve, even today, especially in the Midi, a living, in some instances personal, memory. For them it is not only history, but an ever present warning of the spirit. These menaces against a minority religion, can they not reappear once again? From this recognition of history, French Protestantism has developed a profound distrust of authoritarian or anti-liberal regimes, a spontaneous and sincere condemnation of all persecutions, no matter what they be, and an informed defense of the rights of minorities.[56]

The almost 13,500 Protestants of the Lot-et-Garonne entered the nineteenth century with this legacy of trials and persecutions. Protestantism in the Agenais centered about five consistories located at Nérac, Tonneins, Clairac, Lafitte and Castelmoron. Protestants comprised sixty-five percent of the population of Clairac during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.[57] Outside the Rhône Valley and the northeast region of Alsace-Lorraine, the Southwest (the Tarn-et-Garonne and the Lot-et-Garonne in particular) counted the highest number of Protestants during the nineteenth century. As the map indicates (Figure 12), the valleys of the Lot and Garonne were the primary areas of Protestant settlement in the department. This proved to be another factor differentiating the inhabitants of the valleys from



Figure 12
Protestant Population According to 1839 Survey
(Source: ADLG, Séries V, 7V1: "Généralities, Police du Cultes, 1816 - 1905)

those of the highlands. Although the region would witness incidents of inter-confessional solidarity, latent religious antagonism and a watchful wariness born of century-long persecutions and wars proved to be a factor in the life, and death, of the Second Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne.

Whereas usurious interest rates, capitalist encroachment, reactionary communal protest or conspiratorial networks have been listed to explain the coup d'état of December in other regions of France, no theory of causation has addressed adequately the uprising in the Lot-et-Garonne. The dearth of first-hand accounts and statements of purpose impede the search for the motive behind the revolt. But a careful examination of the human geography of the Lot-et-Garonne can uncover many of the underlying forces that drove the peasant to take arms in December 1851. The pattern of arrests in the wake of the insurrection does not conform to the traditional political boundaries of arrondissements, cantons or communes. Rather the pattern of arrests that emerges divides the department between the highlands of large tracts, wheat-maize cultivation, traditional Catholicism, low literacy, poor communications and rural emigration and the lowlands of small tracts and métayage, polyculture, large Protestant settlements, high literacy, good communication and intensive immigration. The change in settlement, land holding patterns, market production and even the ethics of an optimum population reveal a more fundamental shift in the Lot-et-Garonne. The insurrection of December 1851 was a symptom of this profound alteration in the geographical, political, social and economic dichotomy between the highlands and lowlands in the Lot-et-Garonne.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER 2

1. Agen, its capital, is situated approximately one hundred kilometers from Bordeaux and one hundred fifty kilometers from Toulouse.

2. 535,396 hectares according to the 1851 census. See also Maurice Luxembourg, Géographie du département de Lot-et-Garonne (Nérac: G. Couderc, 1965); Joseph Zapata, Les éléctions législatives en Lot-et-Garonne sous la Troisième République; éléments d'analyse sociologique, Thèse pour le doctorat de 3^{e} cycle (Bordeaux: Université de Bordeaux, 1973), pp. 9-19; A. Bartayrès, "Statistiques agricoles," Receuil des travaux de la Société d'Agriculture, Sciences et Arts d'Agen VI (1852), pp. 373-91; VII (1854-55), pp. 77-90; Jean Tonnadre, "Techniques et économie agricole en Agenais de 1750 à 1850," Revue de l'Agenais, XCIX, 4 (1973), p. 215-36; C, 2 (1974), pp. 187-97, 267-91; Annuaire calendrier du département de Lot-et-Garonne (Agen: P. Noubel, 1848-52); M. de Saint Amans, Coup d'oeil sur le département de Lot-et-Garonne en 1828 (Agen: P. Noubel, 1828); Service historique de l'armée de la terre, Mémoires et Reconnaissances après 1790 -- Lot-et-Garonne, MR 1273; Charles Dartique-Peyrou, Histoire de la Guyenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950).

3. After 1851 the department was realigned into three electoral districts, even though the four arrondissments remained.

4. When the department was created during the First Empire, Agen was more centrally located within the department. But the creation of the neighboring department of the Tarn-et-Garonne in 1808 removed three southern cantons.

5. Th. Alem, "Propos sur la création du canal du Languedoc au XVII^{e} siècle, sur les projets de canaux navigables entre la Garonne et les Pyréness au XIX^{e} siècle, et historique du canal latéral à la Garonne," Revue de l'Agenais, LXXXVIII (1963), pp. 53-65, 157-69.

6. Deffontaines, pp. 275-87. Agen had over 4000 textile workers at its peak. Serge production went from 10,000 pieces in 1760 to 4000 in 1789 to none in 1809. J. Perier, "Une ville de la moyenne Garonne: Agen," Revue géographique des Pyrénees et du Sud-Ouest, XXII (1951), pp. 106-12; Saint-Amans, pp. 26-30.

7. Luxembourg, pp. 73-76; Saint-Amans, pp. 31-34; Gordon Wright, "Four Red Villages in France," Yale Review, XLI, 3 (Spring, 1952), p. 361.

8. In 1828 there were 15 grain mills employing a total of 100 workers, 64 bottle cork manufacturers with 700 workers, a copper forge (later iron) employing 100 workers at Casteljaloux, paper mills at Casteljaloux and Lisse with 24 workers, 2 glass works with 45 workers, and 10 naval stores factories employing 30 workers; Saint-Amans, pp. 36-43; Luxembourg, pp. 34-36; Lucile Bourrachot, "Les anciennes forges à fer et les martinets à cuivre dans la région de Casteljaloux" Revue de l'Agenais, XCIX (1973), pp. 36-62.

9. Luxembourg, pp. 34-36; Saint-Amans, p. 35.

10. Three grain mills with 35 workers, 8 forges with 92 workers, 2 copper forges (one at Villeneuve, the other at Porte de Penne) each with 10 workers, and 12 paper mills; Saint-Amans, pp. 44-51; August Cassany-Mazet, Essais statistiques et historiques sur le quatrième arrondissement de département de Lot-et-Garonne (Agen: P. Noubel, 1839).

11. The spring of 1977 saw the area devastated by the river once again. Mme. Giscard d'Estaing visited the areas affected by the river's rampage to reaffirm the government's concern for the peasants' plight. During the spring of our research in Agen, the river overflowed its banks and severed vehicular traffic on national route 113 from Bordeaux to Toulouse.

12. Tonnadre, "Technique," Revue de l'Agenais, t. 100, n° 2 (1974), pp. 187-97; Zapata, pp. 12-15; Pierre Caziot, La valeur de la terre en France (Paris: J.-B. Baillière et fils, 1914), p. 324; Tonnadre, XCIX, p. 229.

13. ADLG Series M (n° 46) Statistiques: "Statistiques agricoles quinquennale, 1852"; Tonnadre, pp. 231-32; Saint-Amans, p. 6; Deffontaines, p. 294 fn.

14. Bartayrès, VI, p. 364.

15. Philippe Ariès, Histoire des populations françaises et de leurs attitudes devant la view depuis le XVIII^e siècle (Paris, 1948), p. 125; Maurice Boisvert, L'Agriculture dans le Lot-et-Garonne

(Tonneins: G. Ferrier et cie, 1897), p. 12.

16. Bartayres, VI, p. 89; Saint-Amans, pp. 10-11; they created a special race named the race bovine garonnaise specially adapted for the peasant's needs.

17. Charles Pouthas, La population française pendant la première moitié du XIX^{e} siècle (Paris: 1956), p. 215; Ariès, p. 123.

18. Ariès, p. 127.

19. Tonnadre, C, p. 187; Luxembourg, p. 49. The lifting of tobacco monopoly restrictions during the First Empire allowed the tobacco trade, centered about the city of Tonneins, to regain its pre-1719 prosperity.

20. Deffontaines, p. 196. The prune de robe de sergent, popularly known as the prune d'Agen, has been the pride of the department since the Middle Ages; it has been renowned and requested by name in Holland and Eastern Europe.

21. One third of the wine produced in the department in 1851 was exported. The red wines of quality were the Côtes de Buzet, Côtes de Duras and Saint-Sauveur-de-Meilhan. Countries like the Netherlands ordered the white wines of Clairac and Laparade. The white wines of the landes became the brandies of Haut-Armagnac. Deffontaines, p. 196; Tonnadre, p. 267; Ministère de l'Agriculture, Notice sur le commerce des produits agricoles, tome premier: production vegetale (Lot-et-Garonne) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1906), p. 220.

22. Bartayrès, VI, pp. 84-87; VII, pp. 367-71; Deffontaines, pp. 179-96.

23. Caziot, p. 324.

24. Bartayrès, p. 368.

25. Boisvert, pp. 12-14.

26. The high percentage of métayage in the far west shown in Figure 10 was due to a large percentage (though small in number) of large tracts owned by absentee landlords. Ownership of large areas was the only way to secure profitable production of naval stores and timber from this region; Zapata, pp. 251-53; Luxembourg, Géographie, p. 49; Maurice Luxembourg, "Structure agraire et habitat rural de trois communes de Lot-et-Garonne," Revue géographique des Pyrénees et du Sud-Ouest, XVI-XVII (1945-46), pp. 284-85.

27. Wright, "Four Red Villages," p. 361.

28. Ibid. Examination of the 1851 agricultural census reveals a separate classification of métayer-propriétaire and journalier-propriétaire. A careful classification of the peasantry into distinct occupations, then, becomes very difficult.

29. Etienne Van de Walle, The Female Population of France in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); see also his contribution "French Fertility Decline until 1850," in Charles Tilly, ed., Historical Studies of Changing Fertility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 257-88.

30. Van de Walle, "French Fertility Decline until 1850," p. 276; the Lot-et-Garonne's fertility decline was even earlier and more rapid than the Manche, long regarded as the most precocious area in France for declining fertility:

	Manche		Lot-et-Garonne	
	1831	1851	1831	1851
Overall fertility (per 1000)	23.8	25.5	25.5	20.4
Age first married (years)	27.3	26.6	23.3	22.0
Proportion ever-married	83%	84%	92%	92%

Also note that late marriages and a lower proportion married influenced the low fertility of the Manche; Deffontaines, p. 107 fn;

Birthrate (children/100 women)

Year	Lot-et-Garonne	France
1811	2.90	3.15
1821	2.45	3.17
1851	2.00	2.17
1881	1.74	2.49
1911	1.35	1.86

Deffontaines, p. 109.

31. The term faire un ainé (fayré aïnat in Provençal), though literally meaning "to have an eldest son," became in practice faire un fils unique, "to have an only son"; Deffontaines, p. 103.

32. Caziot, p. 34.

33. Deffontaines, p. 103 fn.

34. Ibid., p. 103.

35. Jacques Bertillon, La dépopulation de la France (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911), p. 108.

36. Arsène Dumont, "La dépopulation dans le canton de Sainte Livrade," Revue internationale de sociologie, (1901), p. 16, cited in

Deffontaines, p. 103 fn.

37. Van de Walle, "French Fertility," p. 286; see also A. Chervin, "Nombre des enfants par famille étudié par arrondissement, canton et commune dans le Lot-et-Garonne," Bulletins de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris t. 2, séries 4 (1891), p. 74.

38. Arsène Dumont, Dépopulation et civilisation (Paris: Lecrosnier et Babé, 1890); Arsène Dumont, "La natalité à Sainte-Pierre-de-Clairac," Revue internationale de sociologie (Paris: V. Girard et cie, 1901), p. 14.

39. Chervin, p. 56; Ariès, p. 127.

40. Roadway in meters/hectare

Year	Lot-et-Garonne	French average
1841	20.772	12.269
1851	20.688	10.679

Statistique générale, 1851; see also Th. Alem, "Le reseau routier de la région agenaise dans son contexte provincial ou national, des origines à nos jours," Revue de l'Agenais, LXXXIX (1963), pp. 53-65, 157-69.

41. Population Density (Inhabitants/square kilometer)

Year	Lot-et-Garonne	French average
1841	65.40	64.87
1846	65.24	67.09
1851	63.75	67.46

Statistique générale, 1851.

43. The Garonne River's length within the department was 261,876 meters.

44. During the period 1847-1852, the official almanacs reported anywhere from two to six communes without a primary school; cf. Annuaire ou calendrier du département de Lot-et-Garonne pour l'année 1848 (1849-52) (Agen: P. Noubel, 1848-52). The Lot-et-Garonne ranked fifty-eighth of eighty-five departments in the period 1851-55 according to the degree of instruction of its military conscripts (Table LXXIV, Section VIII), fifty-eighth in the period 1854-55 in the degree of instruction of its married couples (Table XCI, Section VII) in France, Statistique de l'enseignement primaire, 3 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1883).

45. Instruction of conscripts (1851-55)

	Number examined	Literate	Percentage
Lot-et-Garonne	13,108	7,601	58
France	1,485,183	978,979	65.9

From France, Statistiques de l'enseignement primaire, vol. II (1829-77), Table LXXXI bis.

46. Ibid., Table XXVIII, Section III.

Comparison of Children enrolled in schools of every kind with the childhood population of 5 to 15 years in 1850

	Total childhood population	Number in school	Percentage
Lot-et-Garonne	45,965	25,043	50.1
France	6,443,548	3,322,432	51.6

47. The Journal claimed approximately 1500 subscribers; AN F^{18} 263 "Situation de la presse periodique dans les départements: 1850."

48. AN F^{7} 3408 "Rapports des préfets sur la presse de province 1851-52"; de Preissac to the Minister of the Interior, December 18, 1851.

49. AN F^{18} 263; subscriptions were about 200.

50. Ibid.; the Républicain had a subscription of approximately 800, the Radical only 400.

51. Revue Marmandaise - subscription of 100; L'Echo de Marmande - 100; Journal de Nérac - 100; Le Progrès (Villeneuve) - 150; AN F^{18} 263.

52. There is a cryptic memorial to the brutally slain of Penne on the site of the town's breathtaking church high atop a bluff overlooking the Lot River. To read it is to comprehend the depth of allegiance in the region.

53. Charles Higonnet, ed., Histoire de l'Aquitaine (Toulouse: Eduard Privat, 1971), p. 272.

54. Ibid., p. 273.

55. Ibid., p. 274.

56. André Latreille and André Siegfried, Les forces religiuses et la vie politique: le catholicisme et le protestantisme (Paris: A. Colin, 1951), p. 209.

57. Jean-Michel Hornius, "Un moment difficile des relations entre protestants et catholiques à Clairac au XIX^{e} siécle et la création de l'école protestante consistoriale de Clairac," Revue de l'Agenais, XC (1964), pp. 185-87; figures are for 1815.

A Agen, dit-on, rien ne peut se faire sans base. Si cette maxime n'est pas neuve, elle n'en est pas plus consolante.

Le Charivari du Midi
18 avril 1848

CHAPTER 3: "Everywhere Political Quarrels Are Forgotten"

A thread of confrontation ran through the history of the Lot-et-Garonne. The thousand peasants, artisans and bourgeoisie who risked all -- family, farms and fortunes -- in defense of a promised democratic and social republic that December in 1851 were driven by the same independent spirit that had long dictated their attitudes toward farming and faith, progeny and politics. And the peasant of the Lot-et-Garonne willingly challenged the established order when its views conflicted with his perception of the good life. As the Second Republic unfolded, the demographic, social, economic and political forces of change in the department brought the peasant's vision of a democratic and social republic into increasing conflict with forces of authority. The history of the Second Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne became a feverish pursuit by both the party of order and the demo-socs for the instruments of power and the allegiance of the peasantry. The insurrection of December climaxed over three years of tension and confrontation.

The stage was set before the proclamation of the Republic. In the twilight days of the July Monarchy, France was shaken by a series of disturbances brought about by poor grain harvests. In several regions throughout France, mobs of peasants and townsfolk alike harassed government officials and grain merchants and seized shipments of grain destined for distant ports. The Lot-et-Garonne was one of the most volatile areas in Southwest France. Within the department, sharply differing reactions to the economics of the grain market revealed the gulf between the highland and lowland farmers. This cleavage of economic views would later widen as the Second Republic plodded its uncertain path.

The grain harvests of 1846 were less than two-thirds of the average annual yield; the quality, in addition, was mediocre. Maize alone registered an average harvest, but it was used primarily as animal fodder. But even with a harvest off by one-third, the department would have had ample grain for its own populace had Paris not made abnormal demands for the harvest. The high demand pressures of Bordeaux merchants filling orders for Paris, England and Ireland drove prices to three times their mean price of fifteen francs.[1] By December 1856, the last stocks of recently-harvested grain were bound for Bordeaux. In an attempt to counter those forces driving prices up and to aid those too poor to purchase grain, the prefect ordered farmers to slowly release both older, stored grain and even valuable seed grain into the market. With even the reserves committed, no other weapon remained to stem the mounting tide of prices. Rumored collusion

between bakers and grain merchants profitting by the skyrocketing increases created in turn a very ugly situation.

Numerous outbursts kept the gendarmerie scurrying from one corner of the department to the other. The sub-prefect of Nérac feared the worst at Casteljaloux. A carpenter of Tonneins had a hectoliter of wheat, for which he had paid twenty-eight francs, wrenched from his shoulders and trampled underfoot. In Nérac a woman tried to sell her grain at an unpopularly high price. She was escorted home by a heckling crowd, which only dispersed with the arrival of the local gendarmes. Twelve individuals were arrested. The arrondissement of Marmande was rocked by disorders at Mas, Saint Barthélemi and La Sauvetat, where twenty troublesome individuals were brought before the magistrate. The canal workers in Agen went on a one day strike, while at Villeréal two individuals threatened to stop a grain shipment and scatter its contents as the people chanted "wheat at twenty-eight francs!" "corn at ten francs!" and "potatoes at three francs a hectoliter." Meanwhile, in Saint Cirq a tumultuous crowd of women hampered the dockworkers from loading their boats with grain, protesting its export to distant ports while families in the area languished.[2]

The protests pointed out the growing economic gulf between the peasants of the highlands and those in the lowlands. During the two years immediately preceding the Second Republic, the moyen propriétaire of the mollasses and serres profitted from the rising grain prices. The even dipped into their seed stocks, an extremely risky venture, to fully exploit the seller's market. On the other hand, because the demand for their crops of vegetables, fruits, tobacco and wines had not

risen to compensate for the rising grain prices, the marginal petit propriétaire and métayer of the lowlands were caught in a scissors crisis for subsistence grains. The grain crisis of 1846-47 angered especially the artisans in the towns and canal workers in the lowlands whose constant wage could not match the doubling of grain prices. The crisis provided fertile ground in the lowlands in which the Second Republic would flourish. With the advent of the new Republic the grain prices returned to the pre-1846 levels, winning to the Republic the métayer and petit propriétaire of the lowlands, while alienating the moyen propriétaire. When the Republic's very existence was threatened in December 1851, the crisis of 1846-47 helped determine loyalties.[3]

While Paris was in turmoil during the months prior to the proclamation of the Republic, tranquility reigned supreme in the Lot-et-Garonne. The strong Orleanist national guard of Agen, led by the very popular Jean-Didier Baze, cowed the republicans of the city into meekly refusing to hold banquets similar to those in Paris. A rough balance of political power existed between the Orleanists of Sylvain Dumon and the Legitimists of Vicomte de Richemont, while the official mouthpiece of the government, the Journal de Lot-et-Garonne, constantly attacked with impunity the lone republican representative of the department, Charles Lesseps from Villeneuve. As February 1848 approached, the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne had little reason to believe they would soon witness the dawn of a new Republic.

The Second Republic took the Lot-et-Garonne completely by surprise. The most influential newspaper in the department, the Journal, acknowledged the new government only on February 26. It counseled the

submergence of political differences in an all-encompassing love of country. As news of the proclamation of the Republic spread throughout the countryside, republican brotherhood infected the populace. The Journal reported the advent of the era of good feelings.

> The most heartening news is arriving from every corner of the department; everywhere personal interests are set aside, opinionated quarrels are forgotten and those eager to take part in the great regeneration taking place display a spirit of order and fraternity.[4]

The mayor of Agen and military commander reviewed the popular parade, lead by the national guard, while the bishop ordered a solemn benediction of the new government and blessed the sapling trees of liberty.[5] Public figures of all persuasions rushed forward to publish their letters of allegiance to the newly-proclaimed republic. The chameleon Vicomte de Richemont, who had served as deputy under the July Monarchy and would later represent the Lot-et-Garonne under the Second Empire, proclaimed his "total adherence to this Government, whose program is an assurance of liberty, order and national grandeur for France."[6] Many others heeded the advice of the Journal to "bury the past. An abyss has been created between yesterday and today. Let us march forward without looking back, no justifications as well as no recriminations."[7] The monarchist Mémorial Agenais shrewdly gauged the winds of change and dropped its slogan, "The Monarchic Principle and National Liberties" from its February 26 masthead.[9]

A brief scuffle for the departmental seat of government during the early hours of the Republic revealed a fundamental division within the republican camp that contained a seed of its eventual destruction. With the news of the Parisian coup, a provisional municipal committee

composed of the leaders of the worker-backed Club d'Ordre et du Travail ousted the elected city officials. The committee's base of support rested solely on the republican loyalties of a company of firefighters and several detachments of the national guard. The committee's term in office lasted but a few hours, however, for the remaining companies of the national guard under Commander Baze stormed the city hall and set the committee to flight. The incident revealed the committee's narrow base of support. The workers and artisans who had briefly seized the numicipal government of Agen received no aid or encouragement from their liberal republican brethren of lawyers and businessmen. While the republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne questioned the use of violence to complete the revolution, their opponents had no qualms about the use of force when it was a question of maintaining order. Control of the national guard was the key to local control, and Baze's widespread popular support as its commander insured its use by the men of order.

An inept game of musical administrative chairs by the provisional government destroyed whatever hope the republicans had of reordering the departmental bureaucracy along loyal republican lines. On March 4 the Provisional Government in Paris replaced the prefect of over fifteen years with a provisional commissioner named Gaspard Dubruel. Born in Quercy in 1805, son of Blaise Dubruel, deputy to the Corps legislatif of the First Empire, the new commissioner was a banker in Villeneuve-sur-Lot, where he bankrolled the city's liberal movement. His support had been instrumental in the electoral success of fellow Villeneuvois Charles Lesseps to the Chamber of Deputies in 1846 from what had been assumed was an Orleanist stronghold. Immediately Dubruel set about

reorganizing the departmental bureaucracy to reflect his own moderate republican philosophy. He rewarded the moderate bourgeois republicans Alexis Laffitteau, Rigaudie Saint-Marc and Felix Grenier-Cardenal for their support in the election of Charles Lesseps with the posts of mayor of Agen, sub-commissioner of Villeneuve and sub-commissioner of Nérac respectively. The new commissioner wooed the more radical republican faction by appointing the leaders of the early-hour coup against the municipality, Louis Vivent and Armand Delpech, to the positions of prefectural counselors. But Dubruel was unable to please either side. The moderate republicans were loath to associate with the rabble of artisans and peasants of the Club d'Ordre et du Travail, while the radical republicans condemned Dubruel's conciliatory gestures to the still influential monarchists. The representative from the Parisian Club des clubs, Dauzon, complained to his superiors that "citizen Dubruel possesses an extraordinarily weak character."[9] Despite the endorsement of Lesseps and his own liberal credentials, similar reports of Dubruel's fence straddling filtered back to Paris, prompting his replacement within a month with his assistant Marc Bérard.

As Bérard assumed the post of provisional commissioner, he too sounded the need for reconciliation. But the republicans sadly misjudged his priorities. "Having dedicated all my life to republican ideas, I am firmly resolved to see them triumph. But the success of liberty can only be assured by the union of all sincere republicans and their devotion to the maintenance of order."[10] Even more moderate than Dubruel, Bérard set about reshaping the bureaucracy in a pronounced shift to the right. A new provisional municipal council was chosen.

Louis Vivent and Armand Delpech were forced to resign as prefectural counselors, and Bérard appointed a new commissioner of police and general prosecutor.

With their leaders turned out of their positions of power, the Republican Club d'Ordre et du Travail became the target of Bérard's harassment. While several prominent lawyers and businessmen held the more important posts in the Club, the more vocal artisans and laborers in the Agenais region made up its rank and file. Since the fiasco at the city hall during the early hours of the republic, members of the club often gathered at their meeting hall in the Porte du Pin and set off into the city streets chanting songs extolling the glories of the new republic. With the pretext of maintaining order, Bérard raided the headquarters with loyal national guard troops and sent the members scurrying. As the Journal observed, "there were many honest people in the group, but it unfortunately contained numerous elements of disorder. They inspired legitimate fears among our population."[11]

Bérard's zealous pursuit of the republicans caught the attention of the men of order and their leader Baze. Baze's star had long been rising since his entrance into Agen's legal circles. Seven times elected commander of the national guard and very popular throughout the entire department, Baze capitalized on the eclipse of the old guard of Sylvain Dumon and Vicomte de Richemont to catapult into political leadership in the department. Baze lured Bérard into political alliance with him when Bérard realized that he needed the support of the Journal and the existing political and financial network of the deposed Orleanists to succeed.

Although he now had the support of the leading figures in his department, Bérard came under heavy attack from the more radical republicans. The hue and cry reached Paris, and Bérard was soon replaced -- by Dubruel. The Journal of April 11 maintained that Bérard "knew how to conciliate opinions, reestablish order and confidence, and that, no doubt, was his crime in the eyes of the Minister of the Interior," Ledru-Rollin.[12] But his demotion was due more to his decision to support Baze rather than firmly implant the Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne. Dubruel's return on April 10 to resume the reins of power, however, did not pass without incident. While Dubruel entered the city at the head of a parade of workers and artisans from the Club d'Ordre et du Travail, supporters of Bérard and Baze were marching on Agen from neighboring Puymirol. Only Bérard's last minute decision to relinquish the prefecture peacefully avoided a violent confrontation.

In addition to the debilitating shuffle of the heads of government, the republican cause in the Lot-et-Garonne suffered a second setback with the publication of the circular from the Minister of the Interior Ledru-Rollin. The men of order capitalized on his March 15 directive concerning the upcoming elections of April 23.

> You understand now how great is your task. The education of the country is not easy. You must guide it. Begin meetings of electoral committees in every corner of the department, examine closely the qualifications of the candidates. Select only those who appear to have the best guarantees of republican credentials, the best chances of success [italics in the original]. No deals, no complacency. May election day be a triumph for the revolution.[13]

Outrage at the provisional government's attempt to assure an amenable

assembly raced through the department. The Mémorial Agenais' comment of the following day minced no words in its expression of indignation that the new republican government would stoop to such low tactics.

> We thought the provisional government, whose members never stopped railing against the electoral circulars issued by the now-defunct government, would have been on guard against the same acts of the government of July which each member had condemned so righteously and vigorously; but they continue in the electoral arena with the same errors: on the one hand they invalidate individuals on the bases of fortune and education, on the other they ostracize all who are not genuinely republican.[14]

The Journal of March 23, for its part, printed side-by-side on the front page the circular sent by Minister of the Interior Duchâtel to his prefects in 1845 and that written by Ledru-Rollin in 1848. Except for the change in regime, the texts were virtually identical.[15] The circular weakend the republicans' claim that the February Revolution inaugurated a new era.

The announcement of elections for the Constituent Assembly in April triggered a feverish pace of campaigning for the nine seats allotted the Lot-et-Garonne. Many candidates sought the endorsement of the two most powerful rival political committees. The Republican Committee of Agen became the central organization for the many satellite republican committees throughout the department. This committee became the umbrella organization for the liberal bourgeois republican lawyers and businessmen as well as the more vocal socialist republican artisans and peasants. At its head were the lawyers Louis Vivent and Armand Delpech from Agen, provisional commissioner Gaston Dubruel and former representative Charles Lesseps from Villeneuve and the former mayor of Marmande Paul Vergnes. The leaders opened the

pages of their organ, the Echo du Peuple, to platforms from individuals from all walks of life. Unfortunately, the leaders of the regional republican electoral committees were overwhelmed with candidates imbued with only the best sentiments of republican devotion. In order to present a strong, united ticket, the numerous departmental committees negotiated for a geographically representative slate of the most prominent departmental republicans. The Republican Committee of Agen presented as its official slate Charles Lesseps, former republican deputy from Villeneuve; Gaspard Dubruel, the current provisional commissioner from Villeneuve; Rigaudie Saint-Marc, sub-prefect of Villeneuve; Louis Vivent, Agenais lawyer and president of the Club d'Ordre et du Travail; Paul Vergnes, lawyer and mayor of Marmande; François Peyronny, retired captain from Cocumont; Armand Delpech, Agenais lawyer known for his defense of the lower classes; Frederic Nasse, property owner of Nérac "who stayed above corruption during the previous regime."[16] Unfortunately, these "official" republican candidates had to overcome not only their formidable foes of the party of order but also several stalwart individual republican candidates. Men like the engineer of the Division of Bridges and Roads Charles Phillips, the Tonneinslawyer Alexis Laffitteau and the priests Gillard and Lessence possessed sufficient regional popularity to rob the official republican candidates of crucial votes. These dedicated republicans became the spoilers who may have cost the republicans the election in the Lot-et-Garonne.

All those of political persuasions right of center, on the other hand, sought shelter under the Central Republican Committee, the

creation of Jean-Didier Baze. With the eclipse of the old guard of Dumon and Richemont, the men of order rallied about the new men gathered by Baze. Baze's meteoric rise in departmental political circles accounted for his widespread popularity. Born in Agen January 9, 1800, the son of a woodcutter, Baze had earned his law degree in Paris and returned to the bar of Agen in 1821. By 1830 he had risen rapidly in legal circles to become deputy mayor. Like a Bérard, Lesseps or Noubel, Baze was able to capitalize on the tremendous potential for upward mobility in the Lot-et-Garonne in the first half of the nineteenth century. A propitious marriage to the prefect's niece had opened the doors to the powerful political circles, while his own humble beginnings served him well with the masses. He was elected seven times to command the national guard of Agen, due to his prestige. Described as small, with a swarthy complexion and a strong meridional accent, when he pleaded before the bar, "the eye sparkles, the voice heats up, the lively gestures match his words."[17] The Charivari du Midi, the local satyric journal, proclaimed, "A Agen rien ne se fait sans...base."[18] The Mémorial Agenais, however, attempted to strip away Baze's cloak of republicanism as mere opportunism by declaring,

> And what is M. Baze?...a disguised conservative.... Does he not hide the hopes and desires for an Orleanist regency under the mask of republicanism? Get behind, amphibious candidate![19]

Baze skillfully merged the Cercle du Commerce, the Amis d'Ordre and the Amis du Roi into a formidable electoral machine. His organization was able to exploit the extensive resources of the old Legitimist, Orleanist

and conservative organizations in the department in the coming electoral battle.

In order to bolster his weak image as a true republican, Baze attempted to portray his slate as popularly chosen from regional subcommittees. But his concept of republicanism came under heavy attack from a disgruntled, would-be candidate. Failing an audience in the Journal, he wrote in the Mémorial Agenais that Baze had created the committee; it had met in his salon; he had corresponded with the subcommittees scattered throughout the department; he had chosen or rejected candidates. Every so often he had assembled the committees simply to have them rubber-stamp his decisions. "The sessions are short, without discussion or disturbance; the master speaks his will and the public approves."[20] Baze in fact overrode the popular choice for the number two slot and handpicked a rich propriétaire from Lausnac, Boissié. Bérard, whom Baze had easily won over to the gospel of the party of order, was chosen because his tenure as provisional commissioner and his own military background had raised his name to local prominence. Baze rounded out his slate with the commandant of the national guard for the department, General Tartas; Radoult Lafosse, a retired artillery general; Pierre Mispoulet, a rich property owner from Lacépède, a member of the departmental general council and the lone Protestant candidate; Larroze, lawyer and mayor of Nérac; Irene de Luppé, property owner from Mas d'Agenais; and Fabre, doctor of medicine from Villeneuve-sur-Lot. It was almost as if the Revolution had not taken place for the party of order.[21]

The Baze slate carefully avoided any identification with the deposed manarchist powers in order to keep its republicanism above reproach. "The delegates to the Constituent Assembly should be men of conviction and energy, new men, strangers to old party quarrels and sincerely devoted to the republican institutions."[22] These men of order, through their mouthpiece, the Journal, spelled out to the peasant how to judge the candidates through all their campaign rhetoric. They played on the peasant's own deep-seated drive for self-improvement and success.

> If you are presented men who are inept in their own businesses, or men who have never been able to distinguish themselves by their talents or be esteemed for their morality in their profession, flee them! flee them! flee them!...
>
> If the man is false, an ambitious charlatan who readily changes, boo him or flee him.
>
> If he is a man of wealth, honest, irreproachable, listen to him.[23]

But wealth could very well work against the candidates of the party of order. The newspaper genuinely feared that, in a department of petits propriétaires and métayers, the proselytizing radical republicans could easily sway the peasants. "Soon emissaries will spread out throughout the countryside to fan the flames of discord and preach the most anti-social doctrines. The motto of the Republic is fraternity, but they wish to pit one against the other, poor against rich, worker against master; these men are our enemies!"[24] Ledru-Rollin was pictured as the incarnation of Proudhon's "socialism" and Babeuf's "communism." "We are menaced with civil war, with the bloody phantom of '93."[25] "Do we not have reason to say that

Ledru-Rollin is only the plagiarizer of Babeuf, and Babeuf, the chief of egalitarians, was he not the precursor of communism? Yes. Communism is in power, and it will triumph if a misled France gives its blind approval. The wealth and glory of France will be finished, property, family, all our interests and rights as well. It will be the end of the Republic herself!"[26] And the Journal did not hesitate to smear the republican ticket headed by Lesseps and Dubruel with the same brush of "socialism" and "communism."[27] "The electors are now warned: to vote for M. Lesseps and the candidates who present themselves under his patronage is to vote for Ledru-Rollin; it is to give additional support to his despotic instincts, new force to his subversive doctrines."[28]

The wealthy and powerful men of the Baze slate labored to bridge the gulf between the bourgeoisie and peasant by identifying the bourgeoisie's struggle with the peasant's aspirations for land and security.

> Beware of the unknown apostles who go about sowing their doctrines or their counsel in the workshops or in the fields...
>
> They will tell you that the bourgeoisie is egotistic, that you must beware of them and break with them. But the bourgeoisie is you; it is the people triumphant; it is the poor serf who, by work, resignation, courage and oftentimes bloody struggles divided little by little the last remains of the aristocrats.
>
> It is the bourgeoisie who has been your avant garde, always marching, never retreating, securing guarantees, winning charters, burying privileges and struggling at every step with the masters for land, life and liberty with admirable perseverence.
>
> It is the bourgeoisie that gave birth to you, who enfranchised you, who made you who you are, and by denying them you deny the most glorious memories of the People; you destroy the historic tradition of emancipation...

> The bourgeoisie egoist?...No, it is economical and farsighted because it knows that one must use blood, sweat and tears to win the bread that one eats and the wealth one enjoys. Can you make it a crime if you imitate its behavior? When you have amassed a small treasure in the bank, when you have been able to purchase a house or a field, are you not very cautious? Do you not try to economize still more to increase the modest tract which will serve to raise your children?...
>
> This is the bourgeoisie!...[29]

By singling out the hard work and frugality that characterized both the bourgeoisie and peasant, the party of order hoped to win the peasant to the same conservative platform of the Baze ticket.

> What France wants today is rest, peace, liberty.
>
> What France wants is respect for property and family, menaced by Ledru-Rollin and his emissaries.
>
> What France wants is the improvement of agriculture which lacks direction and is being crushed beneath the weight of taxes.
>
> What France wants is commercial markets and the reestablishment of credit for industry.
>
> What France wants above all is the improvement of the lot of workers, not by an <u>equal</u> salary, but sufficient for each and a retirement account which assures food and rest during the last days of a working life.[30]

The Lesseps ticket, on the other hand, was forced to beat back the <u>Journal</u>'s personal attacks. Lesseps was one of the nineteen deputies who signed the accusation against the ministers of Louis-Philippe on the eve of February 24. The <u>Journal</u> and royalists in the department hated him with a passion for being instrumental in Louis-Philippe's downfall. Baze had long been locked in struggle with him for preeminent popularity in the department. As for the charge the Revolution had rewarded him with the appointment as Counselor of State, Lesseps gave his electors a signed letter of resignation to be used at their discretion. The counter-revolution would not forgive

Dubruel for his close cooperation with the working class and his ouster of Bérard. Contrary to the Journal's charge, Vergnes had turned down the appointment as avocat-général at the Court of Appeals at Agen and Delpech, like Vergnes, refused a high government position.[31]

The Lesseps slate was forced to walk a delicate line to maintain the support of both the liberal and radical camps of the republican party. In order to avoid alienating the more conservative bourgeois republican lawyers and businessmen, the Lesseps ticket condemned socialist and communist doctrines with as much vigor, if not more, as the party of order while reaffirming their support of the worker. As Charles Lesseps told a crowd at Villeneuve,

> Begone icarien communists and all those of the same philosophy! The Nation wants for its leaders citizens who are friends of order, union, property and family, it wants those who are inspired by republican principles...[32]

The republicans' platform included the abolition of the salt tax, "odious to all citizens"; modification of the collection, or personnel, of the indirect tax on beverages; abolition of the octrois, to be replaced with a tax on the communal rolls; reduction of the numberless government personnel and their immoderate wages; financial reform; salaries commensurate with ability, supplemented by merit rewards; freedom of speech, education, conscience, press, association, home, individual and property; a proportional tax to aid workers; reformation of the land tax; encouragement of agriculture; abolition of all state monopolies and state projects.[33] Lesseps emphasized that family and property were to be protected, work honored and the suffering aided by society. Fully cognizant of the role of agriculture in the

Lot-et-Garonne, he praised Agriculture as the foundation of the Republic, the nurturer of Nations, the moralizer of the people. Since 1846 his formula had been "Government of the country, by the country; inexpensive Government: le Gouvernement bon marché."[34]

In reality, the platforms of the forty-nine declared candidates from within and without the two major parties did not differ significantly.[35] Each candidate elaborated on the motto Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité and the sanctity of family, property and religion. Beneath the barrage of words and slogans the first test of universal suffrage in the Lot-et-Garonne revolved primarily around personalities. Lacking sufficient time to mount an extensive campaign, each of the two parties fell back to relying on its traditional allies. The few recorded speeches and the itineraries of the candidates revealed a preference to consolidate existing support rather than win over new converts. The public debates and journalistic mudslinging sought to soil the images of the leading protagonists, Baze and Lesseps. The winner would carry his fellow candidates to victory. Election day would reveal the success of such a strategy.

The first round between the conservatives and the republicans went decidedly to the former. Of the nine seats in the Constituent Assembly allotted to the Lot-et-Garonne, the Baze list garnered seven. Brigadier General Tartas, so popular that he was nominated without issuing a platform, was the department's first choice with 48,504 votes. Pierre Mispoulet, rich propriétaire, conseiller d'arrondissement and former mayor of Lacépède, had enough support from all camps to win 44,573 votes. "The Protestants, his co-religious, were apostles of his

candidature." Paul Vergnes, lawyer and former mayor of Marmande, garnered 43,631 votes. "In the arrondissement of Marmande, he enjoys great popularity and exercises a decisive influence everywhere. Witty, intelligent and an honest man above all else," Vergnes received the most votes of the republican candidates. The lawyer, commander of the Agen national guard and leader of the moderate ticket, Jean-Didier Baze, secured the fourth position with 42,645 votes. "He, almost by himself, was responsible for the election in the department of the Lot-et-Garonne. Of the nine elected, six at least owed their success to him. It is he who chose the candidates, he who promoted them and showed them off...Baze is at the apogee of popular favor, king of the city and arrondissement of Agen and chief of the deputation from the Lot-et-Garonne...a man to watch." Count Clement-Irène de Luppé, a rightward-leaning rich propriétaire from Tonneins, had 42,323 votes. Pierre-Thomas Radoult de Lafosse, the second military officer chosen by the department with 41,979 votes, was retired artillery general from Villeneuve. He was "one of the most honorable and esteemed men of the department...religious, generous, liberal." The commissioner of the Republic, Blaise-Gaspard Dubruel, agent de change from Villeneuve, with 40,599 votes, was the second candidate to triumph from the republican ticket. He relied heavily on his public exposure as commissioner for his victory. Pierre Boissié, a rich propriétaire, former mayor and member of the General Council for fourteen years was next with 40,027 votes. Finally, the ex-commissioner and lieutenant in the artillery, Jules Bérard brought up the end of the list of victors with 39,238 votes. Coming from a poor family, he had risen as a result of

perseverence and work. Although politically astute, his lowly background had an observer remark that "the Agenais will not fraternize long with him."[36]

The election of April 1848 was not a popular mandate for the liberal republic to prosper. As George Fasel pointed out, the final nationwide results were nowhere near the five hundred moderate republicans reported by Charles Seignobos. If anything the election was a triumph of the enemies of the Republic. Instead of five hundred moderate republicans, Fasel calculated only three hundred seventy-eight. Moreover, the claim that many victors were "new men" sympathetic with an egalitarian republic belied the fact perhaps nearly seven hundred of the constituents had paid the requisite five hundred francs to be eligible for office under the July Monarchy. Less than three hundred representatives, in fact, shared in any way truly "democratic" republican ideals before 1848.[37]

The election in the Lot-et-Garonne was a microcosm of the national outcome. The republican sentiments of the candidates on the Baze ticket did not venture beyond proclaiming undying devotion to Liberté, Egalité and Fraternité while steadfastly maintaining the sanctity and inviolability of property, family and religion. Baze, in fact, was renowned for his spirited use of the national guard in crushing republican gatherings and banquets prior to 1848. The Baze ticket capitalized on the department's respect for the military by electing four officers (Tartas, Baze, Lafosse and Bérard). Holding local office provided the edge for Bérard, Dubruel, Vergnes, Mispoulet and Boissié, while identification with Parisian politics may have

hindered Lesseps. Furthermore, popularity throughout the department gave an advantage to candidates from the same region (Dubruel triumphed over Fabre and fellow republican Lesseps from Villeneuve and Baze defeated Vivent and Delpech from Agen).

The republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne shared many of the same handicaps endured by other republicans throughout the nation. The republicans suffered from extremely poor organization. The plethora of well-meaning regional republican candidates proved that the nascent republican organization could not command unity to the same degree as its rival. Moreover, the entire ticket rode on the coattails of Charles Lesseps whose regional popularity was limited to Villeneuve, and whose Parisian connections may have cost the ticket valuable support. Of the nine republican candidates, only Dubruel had immediate departmental-wide popularity, due to his position of provisional commissioner. As for Vergnes, the conservatives were unable to put forth a candidate from Marmande of sufficient stature to counteract Vergnes' immense popularity. Moreover, the republican candidates were saddled with identification with the infamous forty-five centime tax and Ledru-Rollin's virtual "blank check" to his commissioners exhorting republican orthodoxy of the government-backed candidates. The first test of universal suffrage in France was a popularity contest. The struggle over issues would follow.

With only two republican candidates elected, "the result of the election was without a doubt a reverse for the republican party, but after all the various intrigues of our adversaries, we are happy to see the victory of two proven republicans."[38] Irregularities included the

distribution of voting cards with the Baze ticket already marked to a number of electors the day before the election. The Echo du Peuple later printed reports of property owners firing agricultural workers for voting.[39] But protests only fell on deaf ears. The most damaging outcome for the republican organization in the Lot-et-Garonne, according to Dubruel in a letter to Ledru-Rollin, was the electoral defeat of its articulate spokesman, Charles Lesseps. While he received an impressive 35,000 votes, Lesseps was only twelfth on the list.[40]

Even in defeat the republicans had reason for hope. The margin of defeat for two republican candidates had been a mere eight thousand votes, a gap that could have been easily overcome had not so many independent candidates commanded local loyalties. The republicans had to contend with many well-meaning republican candidates like Charles Phillips and Abbé Gillard, who drew valuable support away from the officially endorsed republican candidates.[41] Even in defeat, however, the republicans exulted that "our forty thousand votes belong to us, none are alien votes."[42] The republican leaders realized that the roughly forty thousand vote mean won by the nine official republican candidates, together with the numerous unofficial candidates' votes, gave them a solid foundation on which to prepare for the future.

The initial revolutionary republican euphoria of Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité rapidly ebbed as the rival camps prepared for a verbal war of attrition. For over a month, the Journal railed against Dubruel's replacement as provisional commissioner, Rigaudie Saint-Marc, for his alleged order to disband the national guard of Agen. Because it was an armed citizen militia with police powers, the national guard

had long been the focal point of power struggles throughout France. In the Lot-et-Garonne, Baze had used the guard as a springboard for his own career and a powerful instrument of political repression. In the Echo du Peuple's opinion, "if Baze had found an imitator in each department, France would still shudder under the yoke of the most odious slavery."[43] Only a company of soldiers and a company of fire-fighters of the ten companies of the national guard of Agen were composed of republicans because of Baze's influence and the greater concentration of men of order. The republicans of the cities of Villeneuve, Mas d'Agenais and especially Marmande, because of their proximity to the countryside of petits propriétaires and métayers, boasted undisputed control of their national guards. Such polarization of local police power had ominous consequences for the department as the men of order became more firmly entrenched.

When the new commissioner Saint-Marc realized he could not control those companies loyal to Baze, he ordered the disarmament of the national guard of Agen to neutralize it. The Journal waxed livid with rage, for disarmament would in effect equalize the opposing sides. For months the debate raged, reaching as far as the Ministry of the Interior. Only after Saint-Marc had been transferred to the Vosges did the verbal warfare subside. The lesson was not lost on the men of order, however, as they would later disband the national guards in several towns as one of their first orders of business to wrest local control from the republicans.

More than any other event in the early days of the Republic, the June Days in Paris polarized public opinion in the Lot-et-Garonne. The

camaraderie of the first weeks with their marches, church services and trees of liberty was shattered by the harsh reality of a bloody civil struggle. The cleavage between the party of order and the republicans sharpened. But even more devastating to the republican cause was the split between the moderate republican faction and the more radical democratic-socialists. The events in Paris forced all involved parties to determine how much of the democratic and social republic would be sacrificed on the altar of Order. Many liberal bourgeois republicans, horrified by the bloodshed and fearful of the canaille, bolted the Club d'Ordre et du Travail to establish the Club démocratique. Here they professed a liberal republican revolution of the ballot box. The artisans and workers of the Club d'Ordre et du Travail, however, sympathized with the Parisian workers' plight and seconded the use of violence to achieve an egalitarian revolution. For the republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne the June Days left a painful scar that never healed.

The men of order quickly exploited the trauma of the news from Paris to thoroughly discredit the republicans as enemies of order and property. The Journal called for the immediate dissolution of the national workshops, "those sites of incessant troubles and disorders."[44] The municipal authorities throughout the department followed rumor and hearsay to supposed arms caches, only to return empty-handed and face the opprobrium of the Journal for their sluggard performance.[45] In Layrac, an informant led authorities to "fifty" newly-constructed pikes, which were placed on display for the horror-filled townspeople.[46] The Journal decried the number of vagabonds scattered throughout the

countryside in the aftermath of the June Days and the apparently under-armed national guard.[47]

With the promulgation of the Constitution, the parties squared off once more, this time to wrestle over the choice of a president of the Republic. All the invective laid aside with the close of the April elections was dusted off and tailored to conform to the national scene. While the local elections for municipal governments and general councils in August passed virtually unnoticed by the press,[48] the battle waged among the presidential contenders, through their local proxies, revealed the depth of political passions and the stake each party had in its candidate's triumph.

In early June, the Journal had thought aloud,

> The person who holds in his hand the salvation of France has not yet been revealed. Where is the citizen who will inaugurate Washington's policy of the juste milieu? Where is he who, following the example of the illustrious president of the United States, will show himself firm, resolved, a man of experience and action? Where is the man who will rise to the heroic heights of impartiality?[49]

Although the editor approved the rule of General Cavaignac in the wake of the Parisian riots, the Journal withheld its blessing until the twentieth of November when it declared itself in favor of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte for president. "M. Louis Bonaparte carries a name which has never been unfaithful to the cause of order, a name which, in the eyes of the country, will be a symbol of authority and social conservation...."[50]

Later the editor, reflecting the preoccupation of the merchant and businessman, observed that "we are pleased to see M. Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte preoccupied, before all else, by the reestablishment of order.

Without material order, without order in civil and political relations, there is no security, no liberty, no progress."[51] And in its attempt to woo the rural vote, the same newspaper had recourse to a parable:

> If a tree, yielding good fruit or beautiful flowers, has just been felled by a storm, and that tree has a small sapling at its base, that small tree should receive all your care; you can count on it to save you from a cruel loss.
>
> Very well! The tree of good fruit or beautiful flowers is the emperor Napoleon, broken by the coalition of foreign powers; the precious sapling is the nephew Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, whose name and generous intentions assure a return to order and prosperity.[52]

Virtually ignoring the workers and landless peasants, the Journal trumpeted the benefits businessmen and landowners would receive under Prince Louis-Napoleon's rule.

The moderate republicans, still aghast of the memories of June Days, championed the candidacy of General Cavaignac. Despite the bloodshed, they cheered the general's "salvation" of the republic and the reestablishment of the rule of law. These moderate republican lawyers, teachers and entrepreneurs placed their hope for the success of the revolution in education and law. But even within the Lot-et-Garonne, their moderate republicanism did not address the hunger of peasant and worker for economic and social equality. So while the moderate republicans held high the banner of Cavaignac as the savior of the revolution and the hope for the rule of law, rather than men, the peasants and artisans of the Lot-et-Garonne turned their backs on the "butcher of Paris." For them, the revolution was far from complete.

The democratic-socialist republicans, or demo-socs, under the banner of the Républicain du Lot-et-Garonne, rallied to the candidacy of Ledru-Rollin. The Central Democratic Republican Committee of the

Lot-et-Garonne took into account its failure to address the peasants' suspicions of the cities in the April election. This time the committee attempted to draw peasants and workers into a close alliance of mutual interests.

> Where were you before the Revolution of '89?
>
> Ask your elders. You were serfs of the land, of the lord. You paid the dîme and the corvée...
>
> Today you are property owners and free, your children inherit and the seignorial rights no longer exist.
>
> You say the Republicans want to destroy property -- wrong.
>
> The land is much more than your property, it is your work, your blood; it is you...If you were threatened, we would come to your aid...Come visit the city and find that we are not enemies of the countryside....[53]

While the demo-socs portrayed themselves as champions of property rights, they were also faced with the task of divorcing Louis-Napoleon from the memory of his uncle, the Emperor, in the minds of the peasants. The conservatives were accused of using insurance agents to distribute a pamphlet entitled, "Louis-Napoleon, the young nephew of the grand uncle." But, a peasant objected in the pages of the Républicain, "The nephew is not the uncle. He has the same name and that is all...his head is too small to wear the emperor's crown...You look for glory while he will only deliver derision and contempt."[54] The demo-socs addressed every segment of society, outlining how each would find a champion in Ledru-Rollin. To the priest: The Emperor Napoleon regarded religion as politics, while the Republic is the fulfullment of Christ's law; to old soldiers: Louis-Napoleon is not the Emperor, in fact, the nephew was a registered British constable; to merchants: Le Havre merchants support Ledru-Rollin, while Louis-Napoleon only means

bankruptcy; to farmers: you were outcasts, '89 gave you property, '48 gave you the vote -- "Do not listen to those who say 'Vote for Louis-Napoleon, serf, or you will no longer be my métayer'"; to the rich: Louis-Napoleon guarantees nothing, while '48 only asks for compassion and equality; to teachers: February gave you the vote, the general council of the department wants you returned to tutelage; to the poor: "a race more numerous than the leaves, your misery is known"; to workers: you made '30 and '48, now assure its triumph; and finally to women: "God created you to console the miserable of the world. The Revolution made you veritable equals to men. Reaction means war -- the sacrifice of sons. Pray for the Republic! Remember that with Louis-Napoleon, no mother is sure of keeping her son, no wife certain of keeping her spouse."[55]

The Républicain's adversary, the Journal, while portraying the nephew as the direct link with past Napoleonic glories, attacked the demo-soc candidate Ledru-Rollin as the author of the odious forty-five centime tax and the father of the socialist, or "red," republic. The Journal reported that the victory of Ledru-Rollin would spell only more taxes and bloodshed for the country. The newspaper even accused Ledru-Rollin's campaign workers of printing his ballot with an eagle at its head. "They hope that peasants, who do not know how to read, will allow themselves to be deceived by the glorious emblem, and thus will vote for the illustrious creator of the forty-five centimes. For shame a party would have recourse to such underhanded maneuvers."[56]

The demo-socs responded by emphatically repeating that their presidential candidate was not responsible for the infamous forty-five

centime tax. "They do not understand; the forty-five centimes were approved in spite of him."[57] The Républicain, however, countered with accusations of its own. Rumors abounded that the countryside threatened to rise up if Louis-Napoleon was not elected. Mayors and property owners were conspicuous at polling places to insure success of the party of order's candidate. And the supporters of Ledru-Rollin were publicly vilified as "republicans of the cabaret" and "men of ill-repute."

Even more devastating to the republican cause, however, was the bitter dissension within their ranks. Vergnes' letter to the Republican Club of Marmande stated his abhorrence of the violence in Paris during the June Days. Like many moderate republicans, he saw no need for violence when they had the ballot box and education at their disposal. The Journal exploited the letter as a retreat by Vergnes from the aims of the social and democratic revolution, despite his frequent denials. The other republican representative from the Lot-et-Garonne, Dubruel, was accused of supporting the candidacy of General Cavaignac as well. The Républicain noted, however, that "some friends, of the kind one always has, have been spreading the rumor that M. Dubruel will soon canvass the department in support of the candidacy of General Cavaignac. M. Dubruel does not even dream of leaving Paris."[58] The Journal also tried to discredit Dubruel among his followers by alleging that he was a dues-paying member of the conservative rue de Poitiers caucus. Indeed a Dubruel's name was found on the list -- that of a representative from Aveyron.[59]

Saddled with the incubus of division within the ranks, the Républicain trumpted a call for unity. It acknowledged that everyone

was permitted his opinions, "but the circumstances are very grave: a pretender dares to dream of a crown; he already stretches forth his hand to seize it. Close ranks without preoccupying ourselves with the nuances which could exist among us."[60] But the shock of the bloody June Days had so traumatized the moderate republicans that any attempts at reconciliation and unity were futile.

The margin of Louis-Napoleon's victory belied his supporters' trepidation during the last minute electioneering. The expansive Journal hailed his election as a signal to return to order and prosperity. Nationally Louis-Napoleon garnered the lion's share of the balloting with 5,434,226 votes, or 74.2 percent of all votes cast. His distant runner-up was General Cavaignac with 1,448,107 votes or 19.5 percent. Ledru-Rollin came in third nationwide with 370,119 or less than 3 percent of the total vote. Marx labeled the election as "the day of the peasant insurrection," a time when the rural vote simply crushed the urban demo-soc movement.[61]

The election in the Lot-et-Garonne, however, did not mirror the national results in all respects. While Louis-Napoleon did triumph handily in the department, his margin of victory was one of the eight lowest in the nation.[62] The president-elect received 56,085 votes, or 65.15 percent of the total votes cast -- compared with 74.2 percent nationally. As the following map indicates (Figure 13), his strongest support came from the traditionally conservative highland regions of moyens propriétaires of Beauville (94%), Puymirol (94%), Cancon (95%), Tournon (91%), Monflanquin (90%) and Villeréal (89%). The magic of the



Figure 13
Presidential Election of December 10, 1848;
Percentage Vote for Louis-Napoleon
(Source: "Notes pour servir," Revue de l'Agenais, p. 102)

Napoleonic legend and the promise of order and prosperity kept these regions faithful to the party of order.

The Lot-et-Garonne defied the national polls in its choice of the runner-up. General Cavaignac's national 19.5 percentage became a mere 8.1 percent in the Lot-et-Garonne with 6,955 votes. The map (Figure 14) shows that much of his support came from the cantons with the major urban areas (Agen 23%, Marmande 18% and Villeneuve 17%). These major cities were populated by lawyers and entrepreneurs who still believed in the Republic, but believed, like Cavaignac, that the revolution was completed with the Constitution. In Cavaignac these moderate republicans saw the organic evolution of the Republic through education and legal reform. Besides, both Louis-Napoleon and Ledru-Rollin were perceived by the moderate republicans as a threat to the Republic. The other area of strong support for Cavaignac were the fringe cantons like Mézin (15%), Penne (48%), Lauzun (23%) and Houeillès (12%), known for their strong legitimist sympathies. In these areas, the monarchist dislike for Louis-Napoleon was very strong.

The demo-socs of the Lot-et-Garonne took great pride in the "successful" defeat of their candidate Ledru-Rollin. Compared to the less than three percent secured nationwide, Ledru-Rollin won 18,811, or 21.6 percent, of the votes cast in the Lot-et-Garonne. In fact, the department was one of the eight departments that garnered over ten thousand votes for Ledru-Rollin.[62] Maps of the election results (Figures 15 and 16) show a very high percentage of support for Ledru-Rollin in the river valleys and the areas to the west and south-west. Ledru-Rollin polled more votes than any other candidate in



Figure 14
Presidential Election of December 10, 1848;
Percentage Vote for General Cavaignac
(Source: "Notes pour servir," Revue de l'Agenais, p. 102)



Figure 15
Presidential Election of December 10, 1848;
Percentage Vote for Ledru-Rollin
(Source: "Notes pour servir," Revue de l'Agenais, p. 102)



Figure 16
Presidential Election of December 10, 1848;
Percentage Vote for Louis-Napoleon/ Ledru-Rollin

Lavardac (56%), Damazan (48%), Le Mas (53%), Tonneins (46%), Port-Sainte-Marie (45%) and Mézin (50%), while coming a close second to Louis-Napoleon in Bouglon (48% to 46%).

Again the geographical division between the uplands and lowlands was reinforced in the results of the presidential elections. The overwhelming support for Louis-Napoleon in the remote hillsides of Villeréal, Seyches, Cancon or Tournon was nearly matched by the strong support for Ledru-Rollin in Damazan, Lavardac, Mas and Tonneins. Ledru-Rollin prevailed in those areas of high métayage (Figure 9, Chapter 2), pointing out the correlation between land hunger and the demo-soc movement. Moreover, in areas like Lavardac and Damazan, manual laborers on the canal turned out in large numbers for Ledru-Rollin, champion of the working class. Moderate republican defections to General Cavaignac accounted in part for Ledru-Rollin's poor showing in urban areas like Villeneuve and Marmande. The most striking election result, however, was the virtual standoff of strength between Louis-Napoleon and Ledru-Rollin in many riverine areas. The overall results are a graphic portrait of the degree of polarization between the lowlands and highlands. The peasant and artisan's demand that the revolution be fulfilled through the acquisition of land and the right to work was counterbalanced by the moyen propriétaire and bourgeoisie's call for order and prosperity. There was little room for the conciliatory middle ground offered by the moderate republicans. In many ways the strong demo-soc results in these riverine cantons starkly illustrate the unbridgeable gulf that was developing between the party of order and the demo-socs in the Lot-et-Garonne. Those caught in the

middle were forced to take sides or forfeit all influence in the course of events.

Even as the fires of electoral rhetoric cooled, the demo-socs girded for the coming election for the National Assembly. Ledru-Rollin's strong showing proved that the Lot-et-Garonne had "one of those imposing minorities which shows the deep roots of the democratic idea in the French soil."[63] But the demo-socs had been sorely stung by the equivocation of Vergnes and Dubruel. Therefore, unity in the face of a growing reactionary movement would receive top priority.

The elation of the demo-soc's "victory" proved to be short-lived, however, for the winds of change were blowing in the department. The new year brought a new prefect. Paul de Preissac, former sub-prefect of Fougères, was rewarded for his support of Louis-Napoleon with the prefecture of the Lot-et-Garonne. But the arrival of the new prefect augured more than a mere changing of the guard. With the new prefect came a radical change in tempo of administrative repression that culminated in the confrontation of December 1851.[64]

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER 3

1. ADLG, Séries M: "Police générale: Approvisionement en grain - cherté des grains 1816, 1846, 1855," 20 février 1847, n° 355.

2. Ibid., 22 mars 1847.

3. Ibid., 29 juin 1847; see also Service Historique de l'Armée de la Terre, E^5 156: "Cherté des grains," 23 mars 1847 (hereafter cited as SHAT); 23 mars 1847; AN BB^{19} 37: "Cour de Cassation: Rapports politiques 1846-1847, cherté des grains," 10 mars 1847; SHAT, E^5 156: "Cherté des grains 1839-1847," 8 mars 1847.

4. Journal de Lot-et-Garonne, 29 février 1848; p. 1.

5. Ibid., 4 mars 1848, p. 1.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 11 mars 1848, p. 2.

8. Mémorial Agenais, 26 février 1848, p. 1.

9. AN C 939, "Enquête des évenements de mai et juin 1848; saisies rue de Rivoli n° 16 (Club des clubs), correspondance des delégués dans les départements (Landes - Seine-et-Oise)," 8 avril 1848.

10. Journal, 17 mars 1848, p. 1.

11. Ibid., 18 mars 1848, p. 1.

12. Echo du Peuple, 11 avril 1848, p. 2.

13. André Soulage, "La Révolution de 1848," Revue de l'Agenais LXXIV (1947), p. 239.

14. Ibid., pp. 239-40.

15. Journal, 23 mars 1848, p. 1.

16. Echo du Peuple, 20 avril 1848, p. 1.

17. Fernand Mombet, "Un tribun agenais: Jean-Didier Baze," Revue de l'Agenais XCIII (1967), p. 39.

18. Charivari du Midi, 18 avril 1848, p. 1.

19. Mombet, p. 39.

20. Mémorial Agenais, 17 avril 1848, pp. 3-4.

21. Ibid.

22. Journal, 28 mars 1848, p. 1.

23. Ibid., 21 mars 1848, p. 1.

24. Ibid., 28 mars 1848, p. 1.

25. Ibid., 20 avril 1848, p. 1.

26. Ibid., 17 avril 1848, p. 3.

27. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

28. Journal, 22 avril 1848, p. 2.

29. Ibid., 28 mars 1848, p. 1.

30. Ibid., 12 avril 1848, pp. 1-2.

31. Echo du Peuple, 20 avril 1848, p. 1.

32. Anon., Arrivé des candidats Lesseps, Dubruel et Saint-Marc à Villeneuve-sur-Lot (Villeneuve-sur-Lot: 1848).

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. There were two minor parties created by the monarchists and the clerics, but they "shared" several candidates with the Baze ticket.

36. C. M. Lesaulnier, Biographie des neuf cents députés à l'Assemblée Nationale (Paris: 1848), pp. 237-43; see also Anon., "Notes pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution de 1848 dans le département de Lot-et-Garonne," Revue de l'Agenais LXXIV (1949), pp. 1-4.

37. George W. Fasel, "The French Election of April 23, 1848: Suggestions for a Revision," French Historical Studies (1968), pp. 285-98.

38. AN F^{10} III Lot-et-Garonne 4: "Elections, esprit public; Dubruel à Ministre de l'Intérieur," 28 avril 1848; "Notes pour servir," pp. 101-02.

39. Echo du Peuple, 22 avril 1848, p. 1.

40. AN F^{10} III Lot-et-Garonne 4.

41. Both Phillips and Gillard drew approximately eight thousand votes each, the margin of defeat for two republican candidates.

42. Echo du Peuple, 20 mai 1848, p. 1.

43. Ibid., 25 mars 1848, p. 1.

44. Journal, 24 juin 1848, p. 1.

45. Ibid., 26 juin 1848, p. 2.

46. Ibid., 6 juillet 1848, p. 2; the Mémorial Agenais reported thirteen recently forged pikes topped with tricolors (Mémorial Agenais, 6 juillet 1848, p. 3).

47. Journal, 1 août 1848, p. 1.

48. The party of order held a twenty-one to six majority in the general council. In the elections seventeen monarchists were replaced by six republicans, five of the party of order and five unknown (Préfecture de Lot-et-Garonne, Sessions du Conseil Général pour 1848-1849; Rapports - Délibérations (Agen: 1848), p. 1.

49. Journal, 5 juin 1848, p. 1.

50. Ibid., 20 novembre 1848, p. 1.

51. Ibid., 2 décembre 1848, p. 1.

52. Ibid., 8 décembre 1848, p. 3.

53. Républicain de Lot-et-Garonne, 5 décembre 1848, p. 1.

54. Ibid., p. 2.

55. Ibid., 8 décembre 1848, p. 1.

56. Journal, 2 décembre 1848, pp. 2-3.

57. Républicain, 18 novembre 1848, p. 1; 5 décembre 1848, p. 1.

58. Ibid., 16 novembre 1848, p. 2.

59. Journal, 26 septembre 1848, p. 2.

60. Républicain, 23 novembre 1848, p. 2.

61. Quoted in Roger Price, The French Second Republic, A Social History (London: 1-72), p. 200.

62. Mémorial, 28 décembre 1848, p. 1; the eight departments were the Seine, Bouches-de-Rhône, Lot-et-Garonne, Haute-Garonne, Saône-et-Loire, Nord, Gard and Côte-d'Or.

63. Républicain, 12 décembre 1848, p. 2.

64. Journal, 27 décembre 1848, p. 2; Républicain, 28 décembre 1848, p. 2.

Constitution, lettre mort!
Ces pontifes, gens pleins de sel,
Au vote amputé de la sorte
Laissent le nom universel.
Malgré leur jonglerie agile
On fait dieu réformateur
Et livre saint son Evangile...
Jésus-Christ n'est plus électeur!

E. Pottier, ouvrier

Jésus-Christ rayé des Listes électorale
(Air: Avec ma pipe de tabac)

CHAPTER 4: "La Vente de changement et de destitution souffle"

Change was in the air was the new year began. Louis-Napoleon inaugurated the presidency of the Second Republic. Forecasters predicted a reversal from the widespread economic doldrums. And in the Lot-et-Garonne, 1849 marked the arrival of the new prefect, Paul de Preissac. His appearance on the departmental stage proved to be a watershed in the history of a democratic and social republic in the Lot-et-Garonne. Until he assumed the reins of power, the two opposing camps of the party of order and republicans were in rough balance. With his arrival, however, the full weight of administrative repression was brought to bear against the growing republican forces. In the years to follow the republicans were wronged in a national election and stripped of their role and voice; they would savor the thought of revenge. The insurrection of 1851 became the violent clash of these opposing forces.

The Journal spoke glowingly of the new prefect, son of the former prefect from Bordeaux and the nephew of Léon de Malleville, Minister of the Interior. As the sub-prefect of Fougères, Preissac had suffered harassment at the hands of the administration of Ledru-Rollin, thereby winning the admiration of the Journal.[1] But the Républicain saw little to praise in a new prefect who could merely boast of the proper connections, a charming wife and a large fortune.[2] It took little time, however, for the republicans to feel the full significance of the new prefect's arrival.

The advent of Preissac created a powerful reactionary triumvirate in the Lot-et-Garonne. Ambition dictated Preissac's fervent persecution of the republicans; in many ways he executed ministerial decrees with a vigor and boldness superior to many of his political allies. With him in the promotion of the rule of order was the powerful force behind all departmental politicians, the Noubel family, and in particular the young editor Raymond-Henri Noubel. His father, Prosper Noubel, had also been a new man catapulted into the political limelight as the result of another revolution and Bonaparte a half-century before. Like his father, Raymond capitalized on the power vacuum, an astute political sense and the instrument of the printed word to achieve prominence. As a reward for his faithful service to the emperor's nephew, Raymond Noubel would later become deputy and senator. These two powerful men were joined by Representative Baze, whose popularity and power were already felt in every corner of the department. This triumvirate, driven by personal ambition and deep loathing of the democrats,

cooperated in the eventual destruction of the very Republic that had fueled their careers.

While an outright ban on republican associations had to await the convincing conservative victory in May, the local authorities tried to prove their loyalty and fervor to the new regime with repressive measures that bordered on the ridiculous. But to many republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne, the bans forbade popular manifestation of revelry and fellowship. One of the most odious governmental declarations was the mayor of Agen's proclamation of March 25 outlawing the public display of red bonnets and flags, "considering that the exhibition of the red bonnets and flags only recall the most sorrowful memories" and that "these same emblems only appear at scenes of disorder, are used to propagate the spirit of rebellion and trouble public tranquility."[3] The Républicain found the decree odious, absurd and ridiculous and asked if it was an ex post facto justification for the commissioner of police's violent removal of a red phrygien bonnet from a citizen's head without provocation.[4] Two days later a printer and a worker were arrested in Marmande for publishing and publicly singing a song praising Ledru-Rollin. As the prosecutor harangued the court, "Do you not see that to sing of Ledru-Rollin is to give rise to communism, to Proudhonism, to who knows what?! It is to attack property, family, capital, etc...."[5] In another incident a man was sentence to three days in jail for having sung songs in a tavern without the mayor's authorization.[6] And the Journal shook its head in dismay when it reported that children were marching two-by-two daily through the streets of Calonges with flags and drums crying out "Long live the

Republic! Long live Ledru-Rollin, down with the whites!...No one has yet told the youths that these demonstrations are offensive to public morality."[7] Though seemingly innocuous, these administrative bans and censures were only the beginning of what was to become crushing repression.

The strong republican showing in the elections of April 23 and December 10, 1848, forced the men of order to view their adversaries as a more serious threat than heretofore imagined. The republicans, on their part, learned from their mistakes of the past and prepared for the coming legislative election of May 13 by reestablishing their unity. The bitterness of the presidential contest had fragmented the Club d'Ordre et du Travail into the Cercle des Travailleurs, composed of artisans and workers who backed Ledru-Rollin, and the Cercle démocratique of lawyers and businessmen, closely associated with the management of the Républicain and supporters of Cavaignac.[8] The initial overture of reconciliation occurred at the February 24 banquet commemorating the proclamation of the Republic.[9] With nearly six hundred attending the fraternal reunion, the air rang with toasts to Agriculture, the Mother Nurturer and "to those who suffer, the disinherited masses of our great family who toil their entire lives and die in misery!"[10] The most significant and warmly-received toast, however, sought to bridge the gap between the two rival factions. For the first time, republicans publicly, though cautiously, acclaimed the democratic and social republic. As the speaker explained, "I do not adopt this toast in a very wide sense. The democratic Republic implies social changes, which should always remain in harmony with the respect

due to property, family and religion -- the unshakeable bases of all civilized societies."[11]

From this banquet the Democratic Electoral Committee of Agen was created, comprised of the leadership of both the Cercle des Travailleurs and the Cercle democratique. Word of the reunification spread throughout the department, and similar Democratic Electoral Committees sprang up in the major towns and villages, with major centers in the lowland cities of Marmande, Villeneuve, Mas d'Agenais, Nérac and Casteljaloux. The committee of Marmande set the standard for the party's electoral program in its March 30th manifesto to the people of the Lot-et-Garonne. The Republican party of the Lot-et-Garonne, composed of moderate republicans and radical demo-socs, demanded a balanced budget, reimbursement of the forty-five centime surtax, a decrease in the real estate tax, rents adjusted to incomes, abolition of the tax on drinks, abolition of hunting restrictions, revision of the patente law, reduction of the bureaucracy, free primary and professional education and a reduction of the armed forces. It should be noted that this program did not bear any strong "socialist" markings. This was due in large part to the control exercised by the more liberal elements within the committee. Workers and artisans received support for a right to work and adequate provisions for disability and old-age.

The most radical provision was a ringing declaration of "war against improperly acquired fortunes." While it brought cheers from socialist workers and liberal bourgeoisie alike, the word "improperly" freed the more moderate republicans from an odious egalitarian redistribution of wealth as the more radical demo-socs envisioned. The

Journal, however, saw nothing but red in the Marmandais manifesto, especially its declaration of "war on improperly acquired fortunes." "How did one decide what was an improperly acquired fortune? Do they want a red republic, the social republic?" And as far as the proposed tax revisions, from where would the money come?[12]

It became increasingly evident from the tone of the two major newspapers that the republicans had learned from their mistakes and found in unity the self-assurance that placed the party of order on the defensive. In some instances the local electoral committees created special sub-committees specifically to propagandize the rural communities. The republicans realized that their electoral defeats of April 23 and December 10 were due to their sole reliance on the support of the workers and artisans of the urban centers. Inspired by the revolutionary messages from Paris, the republicans had virtually ignored the economic and social foundation of the Lot-et-Garonne -- agriculture. Between their December 10 defeat and the February 28th banquet, they had come to realize that an electoral program must take root in native soil. Moreover, they knew all too well that victory, in the face of mounting conservative oppression, could only be achieved through the unity of city and countryside, as well as of the rival republican camps.

The Journal perceived the shift in the republicans' electoral approach and sent out an alarm; the conservatives' alliance with the peasant was being threatened. But the Républicain exulted in the new electioneering philosophy and its successful reception in the countryside. "An unexpected spectacle is occurring presently that will mark a memorable date in history. The countryside is opening to political

life. The republican spirit is penetrating it...It is the end of all slavery and ignorance!...."[13] In the same breath, however, the Républicain warned its brethren that their task in the countryside would not be easy. "One does not easily trap Jacques Bonhomme, the French peasant." The "gros bonnets" (conservatives) were everywhere trying to kill freedom of expression, but "all the attempts of our adversaries in the countryside still fail. What is better, the countryside will not accept any influence if it is not of good sense and truth. That is why we have complete confidence for the election of the 13th of May."[14]

In addition to drawing city and countryside into closer contact, the republicans carefully planned to thwart any possible charges of undemocratic candidate selection. The leaders were keenly aware that candidate choices by an elite would shatter the fragile truce between the two factions. The republicans were aided by the letters printed in the Républicain complaining that the conservatives' Central Republican Committee of Agen supported only a minority view dominated by representative Baze, and that the Agenais candidates on the Baze ticket outnumbered those from the arrondissements of Villeneuve and Marmande (although they had two-thirds of the population). The republicans decided to hold a primary congress at Aiguillon on April 17.[15] The Républicain, in an effort to democratize the campaign even further, began a subscription drive to help defray the electioneering costs.[16] Eighteen individuals were nominated by the delegates for the seven positions. After three lengthy sessions questioning the candidates, followed by open discussion, the 491 voting delegates chose

Frédéric Nasse, lawyer from Houèilles, with 473 votes; Gaston Dubruel, representative to the Constituent Assembly and former provisional commissioner from Villeneuve, with 463 votes; Paul Vergnes, representative to the Constituent Assembly and former mayor of Marmande, with 463 votes; Henry Fournel, lawyer from Agen, with 429 votes; Charles Lesseps, representative under the July Monarchy from Villeneuve, with 430 votes; Armand Delpech, lawyer from Agen, with 392 votes; and François Peyronny, retired colonel from Marmande, with 279 votes. The leadership and direction of the republican movement in the Lot-et-Garonne was reaffirmed; all seven candidates chosen by the delegates had been part of the slate for the election of April 23, 1848. Those omitted -- the moderate republican Lucien Cazenave and Louis Vivent, the apostle of the workers -- showed the concern for reconciliation and balance. Dubruel and Vergnes' support of Cavaignac was forgotten, as the delegates strove to present a strong and united front before their opposition. Despite the workers' loss of Vivent, they still had Nasse, Fournel and Delpech as their advocates. The system of delegate selection and open voting from a wide variety of candidates ensured that few disgruntled republicans would strike out on their own and weaken the party's chance for electoral success in May.[17]

No fanfare greeted the declaration of the conservative slate of Baze, Bérard, Boissié, de Luppé, Mispoulet, Radoult de Lafosse and Tartas. The seven had been victorious in April 1848 for the party of order. They had every reason to believe they would triumph again. The list was chosen in an even more clandestine manner than in 1848. The conservative list was not released publicly until May 2, even though

the Central Electoral Committee had chosen the seven on March 24. "The lists were established in the six departments [of the Southwest] by the notables and the men of the July Monarchy -- universal suffrage was nothing more than disguised censitaire suffrage."[18]

The strategy of the party of order was to exclude any old Orleanist to avoid alienating votes. In fact, all extremists were eliminated -- those too legitimist, too Bonapartist, too republican or too young (less than thirty years old). All the conservative candidates were relatively new to the national political arena, though not necessarily to local politics. Many like Baze and Bérard were self-made individuals, and all were financially secure. While they continued to pledge allegiance to the Republic, all but Bérard and Boissié were royalists, and they were rising Bonapartists.

As for the program of the Baze list, little was discussed in the pages of the Journal, save a brief outline on May 10. The planks of their platform judiciously avoided extremes and remained vague: reduction of the land tax, revision of the patente law, development of public instruction, decrease of the tax on drinks, reduction of hunting fees, encouragement of agriculture, suppression of exorbitant salaries, improvement of mortgage rates and reduction of representatives' salaries. While at first glance the platform resembled that of the republicans, the conservatives called for neither the abolition of the tax on drinks and hunting fees, not for the end of usurious mortgage rates.

The campaign rapidly degenerated into the Journal's attempt to smear the republicans with the scarlet brush of "communism." "The

ultra-democrats await the Social Republic as a legal means to appropriate the wealth of others, an organized plucking to the detriment of former owners turned away from their land and capital in whatever forms...."[19] The spectre of the "partageux" was constantly conjured up. Moreover, the Noubel newspaper used every opportunity to assail the republican candidates personally. Dubruel was attacked for his frequent absences from the Constituent Assembly (even though he was bedridden with gout); Lesseps was held up to ridicule for his brief editorship of two Parisian newspapers (although he increased their readership) and his carpetbagger political status (despite the facts that his taxed residence was Monflanquin and that he was elected to the Conseil général over his objection); Nasse was lambasted for allegedly supporting societies of women and declaring that "four hundred heads would roll" if the republicans won; Vergnes was reminded that he once supported Louis-Philippe (in 1832).

The administration followed the Journal's lead. The prefect, Paul de Preissac, left little to chance to ensure a government victory. His actions are a case study in electoral intimidation and manipulation. The national guard of Mas d'Agenais, deemed too radical, was disbanded, and the town's mayor, demo-soc Petit-Laffitte, was removed from office.[20] The national guard of Marmande, long eyed with suspicion by the conservative Agenais, suffered a similar fate. Several public school teachers accused of teaching subversive socialist doctrines were replaced and three supervisors on the lateral canal construction project were relieved of duty.[21] Just days before the election the Républicain was seized at the printer and its circulation curtailed

temporarily for an alleged attack on the President of the Republic.[22] The day before the election the tribunal at Nérac lodged charges against Etienne Darnospil, a contractor on the lateral canal, and three others for an alleged attack on the principle of private property, excitation of civil war and outrages against the President of the Republic during a republican banquet. (All charges were conveniently dropped after the election.[23]) The most troublesome areas were Laroque, Layrac, Port-Sainte-Marie, Astaffort and Laplume (arrondissement of Agen); Marmande and Mas (arrondissement of Marmande); Barbaste, Casteljaloux and Buzet (arrondissement of Nérac); Sainte Livrade, Villeréal, Castillonnès and Frespech (arrondissement of Villeneuve). Most were located in the populous lowlands along major lines of communication. These areas rapidly became focal points of demo-soc strenth as governmental repression increased.

The Républicain cried out in rage over the repression, calling it an "electoral terror." A soldier reading the wrong newspaper was punished; the recalcitrant clergy were chased from their pulpits; teachers were suspended, relocated or fired. "Proof abounds in our department that the entire teaching hierarchy has suffered the terror." Municipal government offered no shelter; republican mayors were suspended, while those who distributed ballots of December 10 for Louis-Napoleon remained in office. To the reports that the republican candidates favored the sharing of wealth and women, the Républicain reminded its readers that the republican candidates were trustworthy property-owners, four of whom were held in such high regard as to be

conseilleurs généraux of the department. The newspaper wryly warned that all who had dealings with a republican should seek a lawyer.

Upon first inspection, the Baze ticket claimed an unequivocal victory. All of the candidates of the party of order secured over 47,000 votes (of 90,297 cast). All seven conservative representatives were returned to the National Assembly, while the two republican representatives, Dubruel and Vergnes, were forced to retire. But the party of order's celebration rang hollow. The margin of victory was a mere eight percentage points -- fifty-four to forty-six percent. The gap between Louis-Napoleon's sixty-five percent and Ledru-Rollin's twenty-five percent in the presidential election of December 1848 in the Lot-et-Garonne had narrowed considerably. Nationally, where many demo-soc and moderate republicans failed to form a cohesive opposition to the party of order as in the Lot-et-Garonne, the demo-socs received thirty-five percent and the moderate republicans twelve.[24] That the rural demo-soc vote surpassed the traditionally stronger urban demo-soc vote in many areas proved the growing acceptance of the demo-soc gospel by the peasantry.[25]

The improved republican picture in the Lot-et-Garonne rested on several factors. A key element was the unification of the two previously warring factions of moderate republicans and demo-socs. The lessons of the narrow defeat of April 1848, due to a plethora of well-meaning republican candidates, and the fratricidal division in the presidential election of December 1848 were not lost to the members of both factions. The republican ticket did not merely speak of unity but included former supporters of Cavaignac (Dubruel and Vergnes) as well as

Ledru-Rollin (Delpech and Nasse). A case in point of this successful strategy was the canton of Penne d'Agenais, whose plurality of forty-eight percent voted republican -- the same margin won by Cavaignac in December 1848. Moreover, the communal and cantonal delegate selection and the Aiguillon convention insured popular participation in candidate selection. This was an important consideration in an election dealing with local personalities and issues. And while the conservative ticket boasted such departmental luminaries as Tartas and Baze, the republicans could boast of a slate that was geographically balanced with almost two candidates from each arrondissement.

The election results in the Lot-et-Garonne revealed both the long-standing dichotomy between the highlands and lowlands and the wisdom of the republicans' united front. As in past elections, the riverine areas and the lowlands to the west and southwest continued their support for the republican cause (Figures 17 through 19). The high percentage of métayage, the higher incidence of literacy and the avenues of communicaton, especially along the river valleys, combined to reinforce the demo-soc message among the métayers and artisans. They had suffered during the grain crisis of 1846-47 and still hungered for land and security, made even more urgent by the increasing immigration from the highlands as well as from outside the department. The promised social and democratic republic would inaugurage easy access to property through improved agricultural credit and an end to all privilege.[26] When the election results for May 13 are compared with the results for the presidential election of December 10, 1848 (Figures 15 and 16, Chapter 3), the growing reception of the demo-soc message among



Figure 17
Election to National Assembly, May 13, 1849;
Percentage Vote for Party of Order
(Source: Drouin, p. 77)



Figure 18
Election to National Assembly, May 13, 1849;
Percentage Vote for Democrat-Socialists
(Source: Drouin, p. 79)



Figure 19

Cantons in which the Democrat-Socialists triumphed over the Party of Order

peasantry in the highlands is revealed. Beauville and Laroque-Timbaut, both resting on the rich wheat-maize serre plateau, had long been two of the staunchest conservative areas. In the presidential election, they awarded ninety-four and eighty-two percent of the votes respectively to Louis-Napoleon. Yet, in the election of May 13, the party of order's share of the vote plummetted to thirty-seven and thirty-four percent respectively (the demo-socs garnered forty-five and fifty-three percent). Anger with usurious interest rates, hunger for more land or alarm over the emigration to neighboring Agen may have played a part in the radicalization of these former conservative areas.

Two areas remained staunchly conservative -- the northern mollasses with Cancon as their center and the southern region about Nérac. The strong conservative following in the north was the result of numerous factors. As a region primarily of large-scale wheat-maize production, the northern highlands had profited handsomely during the grain crisis of 1846-47. The advent of the Second Republic had destroyed the abnormally high grain prices. Moreover, a poor network of communications cut this region from the rapid exchange of information and ideas. It is worth noting that the two major roads to Paris from Marmande and Villeneuve left the cantons of Cancon and Castelmoron isolated. Nérac, on the other hand, had long been a bastion of the conservative notables. This conservative strength accounted, in part, for the detour about the city the insurrectionists from Damazan took on their march on Agen on December 4, 1851. As for the strange position of Sainte Livrade, long known for its fervant tax revolts, its strong

Protestant settlements, especially about Clairac, may have won this canton to the conservative Mispoulet, the lone Protestant candidate.

Unfortunately, the extensive planning and propagandizing by the republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne were not sufficient to overcome many peasants' desire for order and prosperity, as well as the repressive and fraudulent measures taken by the party of order and the administration. All the republicans needed was a shift of 3,000 votes, but the party of order triumphed in the end due to four months of intimidation. Workers were threatened with loss of their jobs -- "the right to vote has succumbed to the necessity to live." Rumors spread that new, bloody "June Days" would erupt the night before the election. Many métayers and workers were escorted by their superiors to the poll. "Orleanism, Legitimism and Bonapartism, not to mention terror, intimidation and calumny have coalesced against the republicans."[27]

The Républicain issued an appeal to its readers asking them to report any instances of repression or voting irregularities; the republicans planned to ask that the election be invalidated. The result of the newspaper's petition was a large dossier detailing the administrative acts of repression and fraud throughout the Lot-et-Garonne. The republicans presented their case to the Legislative Assembly. The prefect Preissac censured the sub-prefect Manin of Marmande and fired several republican mayors "whose anarchistic tendencies or troubled minds were such that their words, their actions, their audacity or their blamable indifference exercised a deplorable influence."[28] The justices Fournel of Agen (labeled a walking candidate of the red republic") and Deytou of Villeneuve were fired.

Twelve teachers of the Marmande arrondissement alone were hailed before the Committee on Public Instruction and two popular teachers were replaced.[29] Several workers of the Division of Bridges and Roads were fired, while a captain of the police was reassigned to Toulouse, all due to republican sympathies. The national guards of Marmande and Mas were dissolved. Even the clergy failed to escape his repression; the abbé Saigne, pastor of Marmande, had to quit his post because the church hierarchy had found his opinions too "red."

Intimidation reached into the ballot box. Clergy threatened voters under the pain of sin to vote for the Baze ticket. Propriétaires threatened workers with the loss of work or bread; some propriétaires attached the "correct" ballot (read conservative) to the inside of the peasant's coat and accompanied him to the ballot box. "Every rural commune in the department must be cited." In Marmande a company of soldiers arranged itself in battle formation behind the lattice fence which separated the city hall from the polling place and proceeded to load their weapons in the presence of the electors. A lawyer from Agen seized his gardener by the throat, destroyed his republican list, gave him a Baze list and accompanied the gardener to the ballot box.[30]

The most damaging maneuver to the republicans' cause was a poster entitled La Verité, published by Prosper Noubel for the Central Committee of Agen. The broadside portrayed the republican candidates as "communists" preaching the sharing of lands and women. This propaganda was especially likely to influence voters in the Lot-et-Garonne because the Icariens had established a communal farm in the neighboring department of Dordogne. But even more damaging was the

fact that the placard was affixed on municipal walls alongside the official proclamation of the election day during the early morning hours of the election -- before the republicans could reply and with the approval of municipal authorities. In those cases when the mayor did not comply with the prefectoral directive, the justice of the peace superseded the mayor's authority.[31]

Thirty-three communal petitions accompanied this indictment of the election of May 13 in the Lot-et-Garonne to the Legislative Assembly. The Assembly, however, voted along party lines and defeated the petition to review the election in the department 560 to 199.[32] The republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne noted with pride, however, the over 42,000 votes they had won and remarked that "left to itself and given an equal chance, democracy would have been one hundred times victorious."[33]

While the republicans found renewed strength in the unity between demo-socs and moderate republicans, the results of the election of May 13, 1849, revealed a deep and growing polarization throughout the Lot-et-Garonne. It was the only department in the Southwest that did not have a third party -- a separate republican party to act as a buffer between the disenchanted demo-socs and the powerful conservatives. Those caught in the middle were driven to the poles either by radical doctrines to the left or administrative repression to the right. Many moderate republicans valued order and prosperity over social and economic justice. For them reform meant liberal, constitutional reform within the framework of the existing social and economic structure. As long as the ruling oligarchy of Dumons and Richemonts was displaced to make room for their ascendancy, they were content. On the other hand,

the presidential election of December 1848 had taught many moderate republicans that a third, moderate republican party only served to weaken the republicans in the face of mounting conservative strength. Individuals like Lesseps, Vergnes and Dubruel realized that any move to strengthen the Baze ticket by maintaining a third party jeopardized their political futures. Their campaign speeches lacked any radical rhetoric (save "the distribution of improperly acquired fortunes") to avoid alienating fellow moderate republicans, while trying to identify themselves as the sole champions of the worker and peasant. Men like Lesseps, Vergnes and Dubruel regarded the republican party as a fitting vehicle for their personal advancement, as long as the rank and file was under their control. Unfortunately, their influence over the rank and file suffered greatly as a result of the Election Law of May 1850.

Historian Jean-Claude Drouin's assertion that the Vergnes list was not truly <u>démocrate-socialiste</u> was unfounded. He was correct in pointing out that there were no workers, artisans or peasants on the list -- four were lawyers, all were comfortable property owners and three objected strongly to socialist doctrines. But then, few peasants or workers were demo-soc candidates nationally. Yet all the republican candidates subscribed to what Proudhon described as respect for family, work and property without usury or abuses and the triumph of rights, not privileges. Moreover, during the nominating convention, a place was reserved for a worker as nominee.[34] Furthermore, it should be remembered that it was Ledru-Rollin who received twenty-three percent of the vote in December 1848 in the Lot-et-Garonne, not Cavaignac. So, although some candidates on the republican ticket were liberal bourgeois

lawyers and politicians, their constituency was overwhelmingly demo-soc. The demo-soc workers, artisans and peasants needed the moderate republicans' financial power and political expertise, while the moderates counted on the demo-socs' numbers. Though defeated, each felt they had fashioned a powerful organization that would triumph in 1852. Unfortunately, increasing administrative repression, climaxing in the Election Law of May 1850, rent the alliance over the question of means to the democratic and social republic.

While they were reassured by their victory in the May 13 election, the conservatives realized that they had to take stronger measures to beat back the growing tide of demo-soc sentiment in the department. The men of order turned to a sympathetic administration. The prefect Preissac eagerly cooperated with a thorough program of club closings, teacher firings, newspaper seizures, preventive arrests, trials and imprisonments aimed at cutting the demo-soc leadership from its rank and file and silencing any voice of opposition.

But the administration miscalculated. When they brought the leaders to trial, the authorities did not count on the deep sense of individualism and justice held by the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne. In August 1849, sixteen municipal councilors of Villeneuve, led by the former deputy Lesseps, signed a public declaration refusing to pay further taxes until the government withdrew its troops from Italy.[35] The administration portrayed the action as an obvious prelude to civil war, but in the ensuing trial all but Lesseps were acquitted.[36] Juries in the department were notorious for their stubborn refusal to cooperate with the administration.[37] The administration comprehended

fully the crucial role teachers played in the spread of the demo-soc gospel. For Preissac, they have "abused the influence of their positions to foment political passions and hatreds...This scandalous propaganda demands prompt and severe repression."[38] The repression was so severe that almost fifty teachers were either fired, suspended without pay, warned or asked to leave during an eight-month period in 1850 alone.[39] But the Républicain countered with a subscription drive for the teachers that yielded over twenty-five thousand francs.[40] Hardly a week went by without the Républicain being seized by the authorities, forcing the newspaper into eventual bankruptcy and receivership in December 1849 and again in August 1850. On its ashes arose the Radical du Lot-et-Garonne, although it was to last a mere three months.

These and other instances of demo-soc club closings, municipal councils dissolved, houses searched and clergy transferred only served to anger and embolden the more hostile demo-socs to talk of armed resistance as the only means available to end the growing administrative repression and create the democratic and social republic. As these voices grew louder in the republican organization, the more liberal, bourgeois, moderate republicans abandoned their more radical brethren for the security offered by the men of order. The Election Law of May 1850 finally rent the two factions, transforming mere demo-soc talk into actual preparation for a possible armed showdown with the government. And the vehemence with which the demo-socs denounced the law only served to hasten the flight of the moderate republicans into the conservative camp.

Universal suffrage had long been the bane of the conservatives; they attributed their waning influence in the countryside to it. "If in the future we had to begin the battle again under the same conditions, the party of order would certainly falter everywhere. Universal suffrage, as currently constituted, can only hasten society's ruin, and the new assembly should modify it."[40] The enfranchisement of the masses of workers and peasants threatened the political edifice the elite had constructed so carefully during the July Monarchy. The Journal saw universal suffrage as "the will of numbers substituting for that of intelligence, the hopeless poor placed in opposition to the rich."[42] But the Républicain quickly warned that "to demand its confiscation is to provoke a terrible battle."[43]

The attacks on universal suffrage might have remained within the realm of heated debate had it not been for the by-election of Eugène Sue from Paris to the National Assembly on May 1. The demo-socs of the Lot-et-Garonne regarded his success at the polls as undeniable proof of the ever-growing demo-soc strength, despite increasing governmental repression. The Journal, on the other hand, saw only that "the election of Eugéne Sue is the death warrant for universal suffrage...If universal suffrage is not abolished, society must perish."[44] The demo-socs of the Lot-et-Garonne, however, believed the proposed bill to limit suffrage deprived four million men hard-earned rights and "reestablishes the right of insurrection, plants a seed of hatred and a need for vengeance in the hearts of the disenfranchised, and in a word, places a gun in the hands of those who found neither justice nor pity in the reaction...."[45] The Républicain published in bold type on the front

page of seven issues article 110 of the Constitution sanctioning the right of resistance.[46] For many, civil war loomed on the horizon.

The bitterness and anger of the demo-socs, bordering on a call to arms, is understandable when statistics of the purged voting rolls that resulted from passage of the Baroche bill are closely examined. As Figures 20 and 21 show, the Lot-et-Garonne lost one-third of its electorate as a result of the law.

The area of greatest voter decrease followed previously outlined patterns of settlement and politicization. The lowlands and river valleys suffered a greater purge than did the hillsides and plateaus. (Exceptions like Villeréal, Fumel and Tournon may have been due to immigration from neighboring Lot.) The precipitous drop was due in large part to the modification of the residency requirements within a canton from six months to three years. The lowlands and river valleys, with their developing fertile farm lands and major urban centers like Agen, Villeneuve, Marmande and Nérac drew settlers from the highlands as well as from beyond the department.

The law had been aimed specifically at disenfranchising "the vile multitude" of Thiers' epithet -- the numerous nomadic artisans, seasonal workers, day laborers, colporteurs and vagabonds who formed the network for the diffusion of demo-soc information and ideas. Journaliers made up a greater part of the highlands population, where the wheat-maize crops on large tracts demanded an abundant source of day laborers. Only the vineyards about Buzet and tobacco fields about Tonneins were as labor-intensive. In the Lot-et-Garonne, however, the conservatives succeeded in striking directly the demo-soc rank and file by



Figure 20
Election Law of May 31, 1859; Number Disenfranchised
(Source: Journal, 19 octobre 1850, p. 2)



Figure 21
Election Law of May 31, 1850; Percentage Disenfranchised
(Number Disenfranchised/ Number Registered to Vote)
(Source: Journal, 19 octobre 1850, p. 2)

disenfranchising the métayers and artisans of the river valleys and lowlands. They had come to the lowlands in search of individualism and prosperity, only to be denied their only instrument for a peaceful social and economic revolution. It is not surprising that their anger knew no bounds.

The news of the electoral law shattered the uneasy alliance within the republican organization. Many moderate republicans, former supporters of General Cavaignac, genuinely feared the unwashed and unlettered multitude. As the power of the peasants and workers grew, some moderate republicans increasingly saw the wisdom in a restricted franchise to safeguard their liberal republic from socialist encroachment. Others, while mourning the passing of universal suffrage as a cherished ideal, urged moderation and a gradual reconquest of universal suffrage through the ballot box, in particular May 1852. But the demo-socs scorned talk of moderation. They only saw mounting repression and a much stronger conservative opposition before them in the May 1852 election. And the May 1850 electoral law had disenfranchised many demo-soc supporters, especially in the lowlands where demo-soc strength was most formidable.

As the tempo of administrative repression increased, especially in the wake of the electoral law, the demo-socs transferred their casual politicking at the local inn or market to a clandestine, underground network of secret "societies." There they prepared to defend the democratic and social republic, even if it meant resorting to armed violence. The gaping wound that the republican organization had suffered as a result of the June Days of 1848 was torn open once again.

As in the months after June 1848, moderate republicans and demo-socs engaged in a fratricidal debate over the means to be used to bring about the democratic and social republic. This deep and vicious division was in part responsible for Louis-Napoleon's success of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne.

Though the evidence is incomplete, demo-soc secret societies did exist in the Lot-et-Garonne prior to the insurrection of December 1851. A remarkable similarity existed among the various depositions of those arrested detailing rites, oaths and memberships. Similar uses were put to knives, pistols and crucifixes during the initiation rites of a number of members. Several members, upon interrogation, confessed being lured into the society by the same "friend," holding meetings in the same abandoned farmhouse, having the same leaders or swearing the same oath.[47] The editor of the Républicain noted that the directors of the newspaper greeted him with a familiar Masonic greeting upon his arrival to the department. The same handshake was shared among members of various secret societies in the department.[48] While several conflicting testimonies would prove that those charged created the "secret societies" in response to the authorities' promptings in order to mitigate their punishment, the striking similarity of the testimonies points, if only circumstantially, to the existence of secret societies in the Lot-et-Garonne.

The secret societies of the Lot-et-Garonne were not shadow armies, as portrayed by Ted Margadant for the lower Midi, but rather local social groups that formerly met in the local inn for wine, fellowship and political discussion over the local journals. Now these groups

were forced to continue their camaraderie and politics underground as a result of the administration's crackdown on clubs.[49] In several cases the "ringleader" of a secret society was none other than the local innkeeper himself. Although the administration (in its attempt to legitimize the coup d'état) portrayed members of these secret societies as pledged to a bloody campaign of death and destruction if their Republic of May 1852 was not realized, in all reported cases, members of the secret societies in the Lot-et-Garonne pledged, blindfolded, kneeling with a crucifix in one hand and a gun in another, to protect and defend the Constitution and the democratic and social Republic and march at first call should they be violated. The rapidity with which the news of the coup d'état spread throughout the department and the large numbers of peasants, artisans and townspeople the heralds called forth are also circumstantial evidence of a vast communications network of politicized cells throughout the department. While not the shadow army of the lower Midi, nor the bloodthirsty and rapacious jacques of official accounts, there did exist "secret societies" in the Lot-et-Garonne during the latter days of the Second Republic. They were driven underground by administrative repression, inspired to violence by the mutilation of universal suffrage and prematurely released by the coup d'état.

The anger and frustration of the demo-soc members over the defection of many liberal moderate republicans and the failure of their own pusillanimous "leadership" to support their demand for preparations for armed insurrection in the wake of the May 1850 electoral law broke into full public view with the Plot of the Southwest. The Plot of the

Southwest, otherwise known as the Newspaper Editors' Plot, became a cause célèbre throughout the region. The government maintained that the plot was striking proof of the existence of secret demo-soc societies bent on destroying the Republic. The Plot of the Southwest was a subsidiary to the nationally famous Plot of Lyon, uncovered in late October 1850. According to government reports, the gendarmerie's timely raid of the Lyon headquarters of former Constituent delegate Adolphe Gent thwarted a planned insurrection on its very eve.

The people of the Lot-et-Garonne learned of its department's involvement in the distant Plot of Lyon when several leading demo-socs were arrested and escorted to Lyon to stand trial before its military tribunal. Among the ten accused of taking part in a plot to overthrow the government were Charles Lesseps, former deputy from Villeneuve, counselor of state, frequent contributor to the Républicain du Lot-et-Garonne and then editor of Le Vote Universel of Paris; Charles Desolmes, editor of the Républicain de la Dordogne; Pierre Marlet, editor of the Réformateur du Lot; and Paul Gauzence, former editor of the Républicain du Lot-et-Garonne and then editor of the Radical du Lot-et-Garonne.[50] The editors were linked to Gent and the Plot of Lyon through an itinerant wine merchant, Barthomieux, and the road and bridge contractor and later leader in the December 1851 insurrection, Etienne Darnospil. From their correspondence, the demo-soc editors sought more than a verbal barrage of protest to the May 1850 law. Gauzence reported to Desolmes, in prison on an earlier charge,

> Our department is one of the most devoted to the Republic; we have a formidable majority: the arrondissements, cantons, communes, all are organized.

> We are ready to assist in a general plan of resistance, or substantially strengthen it. We only ask for definite orders....[51]

Desolmes replied that "we do not have need of marching orders from the capital [since] Paris has already paid its debt...the provinces [therefore] would take up the struggle for Paris. Once the Baroche Law is enacted, we move."[52] The other members reported that their respective regions would join in; "they are ready for battle; they burn with ardor" -- if only bold and resolute leadership could be found.[53]

Even though Gauzence alone was found guilty of the charges of conspiring to overthrow the government, the trial was devastating to the demo-soc organization.[54] Fierce internal feuds and wounded vanities were laid bare for public scrutiny. The rank and file demo-socs scathingly attacked the moderate republicans as the "burgraviat" and "jesuites rouges." When the Républicain folded from the weight of administrative repression, the moderate republicans used all their influence to thwart the creation of a new republican voice -- the Radical. It too succumbed, in less than three months, overcome by moderate republican as well as administrative pressures. The moderate republicans could not tolerate an editorial policy that advocated armed insurrection to enact social and economic change. "Our Burgraves will consent to be republicans on condition that it will not cost them anything and that the Republic will defend itself," wrote Lesseps.[55] The demo-socs regarded the moderate republicans as "virtual blight on the tree of liberty...these jesuites rouges are more dangerous than the jesuites blancs...the break is complete between these comedians and the proletariat."[56] The two republican factions attacked each other more

viciously than attacking their sworn enemy -- the party of order. As the Conciliateur reported, the trial revealed that

> The republican party, once portrayed as so united, so compact, is perhaps of all the political parties the most profoundly, the most radically divided. This party, like the party of order, has its burgraviat, its aristocracy, its important people, its ambitious...The division is such... that all understanding appears impossible.[57]

The Electoral Law of May 1850 reopened the festering wound between the moderate republicans and the demo-socs. From the early days of 1849 to the passage of the Electoral law, the two factions had made a concerted effort, in the face of mounting administrative repression and conservative hostility, to preserve the fragile unity of the republican organization. But like the bloody June Days, the Electoral Law forced the two factions to choose sides. For the moderate republicans, promised social and economic reforms perished when the rank and file clamored for the gun. The moderates preferred a peaceful revolution of the ballot box, yet did not stir when suffrage was again restricted. Their socialism had been a thin veneer calculated to win the support of the masses for their own personal aggrandizement. The same moderates who had abandoned the Parisian workers to General Cavaignac's troops now abandoned the demo-soc artisans and peasants as they prepared to reclaim the vote and institute the democratic and social republic, by violent means if necessary. The rank and file, for their part, no longer had need of "leaders" who abandoned them as a possible violent confrontation loomed on the horizon. Rid now of the pusillanimous "Cavaignaquists," the demo-socs of the Lot-et-Garonne prepared for the May 1852 reckoning.

The Electoral Law of 1850 not only shattered the uneasy coalition of moderate republicans and demo-socs but also crippled the Républicain to such an extent that it folded in August 1850. The debate over whether the newspaper would support the use of violence to secure hoped-for social and economic reforms rent the management of the Républicain. Prominent moderate republicans abandoned the paper, which soon succumbed to mounting administrative harassment. Paul Gauzence, former history teacher from Toulouse and editor of the Républicain, struggled to resurrect a new paper on the ashes of the old. Only this time he guarded against oligarchic editorial control by selling one franc shares in the newspaper and drawing up a constitution that provided for a popularly elected board of directors and editor. But the Radical du Lot-et-Garonne, as it became known, was rent by the same divisions as its predecessor. A number of influential democrats strenuously objected in public to the inclusion of the word "socialist" in making the journal "the organ of the interests of the democratic-socialist party." These men, led by Paul Vergnes of Marmande, asked if the socialism Gauzence preached was the same as that of the rebels of June 1848. These republicans were willing to work for the emancipation of the proletariat and the just distribution of "property unjustly distributed," but they broke with Gauzence and the more fervent demo-socs when the liberty of the citizen to dispose of the fruits of his labor, his thrift and his property was jeopardized.[58] The moderate republicans were willing to lead the peasants, artisans and workers in their struggle for the right to work, pension benefits, tax reforms, easy credit, abolition of privileges, promotion by merit and even the

redistribution of "unjustly acquired" wealth. All such reforms had to be the fruits of the ballot box. But the moderate republicans bristled at the mention of the word "socialist," with its images of forced redistribution of wealth and angry, violent "jacques." The moderate republicans abandoned the Radical, contentedly watching the administrative wolves bring it down three months later. With its demise, the republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne were without a voice.

Not only were they forced to wrestle with the repressive administration, its powerful ally, the party of order, and the fratricidal moderate republicans, the demo-socs were faced with a cancer from within the organization. Paul Gauzence, in his autobiographical One Year of Journalism and Nine Months in Prison, has given us a penetrating study into the very heart of the demo-soc organization during the very turbulent final months of the Second Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne. He had been lured by the management of the Républicain to quit Bordeaux for Agen and the editorship of the newspaper. Immediately Gauzence became the center of a storm of controversy. He strenuously objected to members of the management using the newspaper to further their own personal political careers. The people had need of servants, not lords. Gauzence discovered with Charles Lesseps, one of the department's most popular demo-soc leaders, the cancer that was destroying the demo-soc organization in the Lot-et-Garonne. In Lesseps was found the premier example of the cult of the individual. Gauzence reported that Lesseps saw himself as loved, if not adored, by his fellow countrymen. His portrait was found in homes; women embroidered the number seven or a vinestock on a scarf.[59]

Gauzence concluded pessimistically,

> I examined the question from a democratic point of view, and I was humiliated to think that a rich and proud city [Villeneuve] could be made into a rotten borough, delivered over to the exclusive cult of an individual.[60]

Lesseps was able to exercise considerable pressure on the rest of the department from his "vice-royalty" of Villeneuve. And he was one of many demo-soc leaders who regarded the rank and file merely as instruments for his personal success. While moderate republicans fled the organization with its increasing demands for a violent reaction to the Electoral Law and administrative repression, the rank and file grew suspicious of their own demo-soc leaders. And the demo-soc leaders, for their part, sensing this discontent, abdicated their role during the crucial days of December 1851 when faced with the mounting spectre of losing personal control of an armed mob of peasants and artisans.

The numerous consequences of the Electoral Law of May 1850 are important in understanding the eventual disintegration of the republican organization in the Lot-et-Garonne, the causes for the insurrection in December 1851 and its eventual demise. The Electoral Law reopened painful wounds between the moderate republicans and demo-socs over the means and ends of the democratic and social Republic. The demo-soc organization was forced to create a clandestine network in preparation for a possible insurrection in May 1852 to reclaim universal suffrage and inaugurate the democratic and social republic. Several demo-soc leaders, editors of republican newspapers in the Southwest, could not wait until May 1852 and plotted a coordinated insurrection

with the demo-soc organizations in the Rhône Valley and the lower Midi for November 1850. Their plot was speedily crushed by the government. Their correspondance revealed the sharp division between the "burgraviat" or "jesuites rouges" of moderate republicans and the demo-socs. Bringing the division into full public view served to only widen the gulf. The rank and file, tired of political rhetoric, broken promises and self-serving leaders, was ready, even eager, to act. They merely lacked a signal. But when the signal unexpectedly arrived, it was the very fragmented leadership that spelled doom for the insurrection of December 1851. When the signal sounded, the peasants inherited not one but many different leaders lost among their own political vanities, confused social and political goals and genuine fear of a potentially uncontrollable following. The Electoral Law of May 1850, by forcing a choice of means, triggered the irreparable split between moderate republicans and demo-socs. The Plot of the Southwest revealed that the provinces would no longer look to Paris for direction; the initiative had to come from within the department. And the Plot, the failure of the Radical and Gauzence's autobiography revealed the depth and breadth of internal division within the demo-soc organization that had to be healed before any concerted defense of the Constitution and inauguration of the democratic and social republic, whether in May of 1852 or December of 1851, could be successful.

In the final weeks of 1851, tensions between the party of order and the demo-socs increased. The demo-socs were girding for a possible coup d'état that was welcomed by the Journal as early as January 1850.[61] On the other hand, authorities in the Lot-et-Garonne believed that the

demo-socs were preparing for an armed uprising for May 1852 to reinstall universal suffrage as the cornerstone of the social and democratic republic. May 1852 would complete the unfinished revolution of February 1848. The Minister of the Interior instructed his prefects to increase the number of house searches, preventive arrests, etc. -- "all means available are permissible to defuse the insurrection."[62] But the sub-prefect of Marmande ruefully acknowledged that closing one cabaret only forced the members to a neighboring one; a check of arms manufacture yielded nothing since virtually every house had a hunting rifle; munitions were hard to trace since they were widely scattered.

On the very day of the coup d'état in Paris, however, the sub-prefect reported discovering a very large association whose goal was armed resistance against the execution of the May 31 election law in the eventuality it was still in effect during the elections of May 1852. The members were preparing to regain universal suffrage with the widest popular base by recruiting peasants as well as artisans. The membership drive had already gathered large numbers, especially in the centrally located riverine towns of Tonneins, Mas, Clairac and Aiguillon. These principal towns hoped to ally with the "reds" of Marmande because for two days members from Aiguillon and Tonneins had been arriving to confer with the socialist party leaders of Marmande.[63] It is important to note that this report spoke of frequent conferences among the demo-socs occuring before the news of the coup reached the department. Similar meetings were reported taking place in Agen as well. Unfortunately, the demo-soc leaders of the Lot-et-Garonne, while meeting to prepare for their struggle in May 1852, were confronted with

the need to respond prematurely to Louis-Napoleon. The abortive insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne followed.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER 4

1. Journal, 3 janvier 1849, p. 2.

2. Républicain, 5 janvier 1849, p. 2.

3. Ibid., 24 mars 1849.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 26 mars 1849, p. 2; Armand Delpech, lawyer from Agen and soon-to-be announced republican candidate for the election of May 13 to the Legislative Assembly, defended the pair; the singer was sentenced to a prison term of fifteen days, while the printer was freed.

6. Journal., 5 mars 1849, p. 2.

7. Ibid., 27 mars 1849, p. 2.

8. Ibid., 26 février 1859, p. 2; the Cercle des Travailleurs had 450 members and the Cercle démocratique 120 (ADLG, Séries M4: "Cercles et societés [de] jeux; Polices, circulaires, instructions, correspondance: XIX^{e} siécle," Maire d'Agen au préfet, 20 janvier 1849.

9. Journal, 1 mars 1849, p. 2; Républicain, 16 février 1849, p. 2; the toasts had to be submitted before hand to the mayor for his approval.

10. Républicain, 27 février 1849, p. 2.

11. Ibid., 28 février 1849, p. 2; emphasis was that of the speaker.

12. Journal, 2 avril 1849, p. 1.

13. Républicain, 27 avril 1849, p. 1.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 30 mars 1849, p. 2; the choice of Aiguillon was due in part to its central location and its safe distance from the influences of Baze, Noubel and Preissac (2 avril 1849, p. 1).

16. Ibid., 7 avril 1849, p. 1.

17. It is worth noting that a positive attempt was made to include the working class on the ballot with the inclusion of Ducourneau jeune, a supervisor in the Division of Bridges and Roads, as well as a very popular priest, the abbé Lessance. Ducourneau secured twelve votes, while Lessance garnered fifty-five (Républicain, 18 avril 1849, p. 1).

18. Drouin, p. 57.

19. Journal, 22 mars 1849, p. 1.

20. Ibid., 28 avril 1849, p. 2.

21. Républicain, 1 mai 1849, p. 2; 8 mai 1849, p. 1; Drouin, p. 252; AN F^{1C} III Lot-et-Garonne 4: "Elections, esprit public;" Preissac à Ministre de l'Intérieur, 25 avril 1849.

22. Journal, 7 mai 1849, p. 2.

23. Ibid., 20 avril 1849, p. 2; 10 mai 1849, p. 1; Républicain, 8 mai 1849, p. 1; Drouin, pp. 251-61.

24. Jacques Bouillon, "Les démocrates-socialistes aux élections de 1849," Revue française de science politique VI, 1 (janvier-mars 1956), p. 78.

25. Ibid., p. 88.

26. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

27. Républicain, 18 mai 1849, p. 1; Rouin, p. 252. The official results were as follows:

Tartas	48,314	Vergnes	42,288
Bérard	47,912	Dubruel	42,208
de Luppé	47,888	Lesseps	41,710
Lafosse	47,836	Nasse	41,706
Baze	47,802	Fournel	41,597
Boissié	47,757	Delpech	41,544
Mispoulet	47,484	Peyronny	41,231

(ADLG, Séries M: "Elections de représentants à l'Assemblée Legislative; Instructions, procès-verbaux," 1849).

28. AN F^{1C} III Lot-et-Garonne 4; Drouin, p. 252; Barsalou-Fromenty from Casteljaloux, Petit-Lafitte from Mas, Goulon from Layrac and Lanaude from Barbaste.

29. Ibid.; Dayre of Aiguillon and Drouillet, inspector from Agen.

30. AN C 1332: "Election de mai 1849: actes de naissance, protestation"; the dossier from the Lot-et-Garonne protesting the election of May 13, 1849, was the largest and most detailed example of electoral intimidation and fraud for that election found in the National

Archives. Below is a summary of the charges:

I. A false official dispatch warning of bloody riots if the demo-socs triumphed was ordered affixed on town walls next to the announcement of the election in the early hours before the polls opened. Mayors who refused to post the dispatch were overruled by the justics of the peace and reprimanded (areas of interest: Layrac, Astoffort, Villeréal (mayor suspended), Sainte Livrade, Prayssas, Poudenas (distributed by Baze supporters), Tonneins, Mézin (demo-soc posters detroyed in the process), Feugarolles, Buzet and Puch -- all known demo-soc strongholds).

II. Persons intimidated:

A. Prosecutors of the Republic of Agen and Villeneuve and the sub-prefect of Marmande replaced.

B. Justice of the Peace of Astaffort relieved the day before the election.

C. On the Division of Bridges and Roads: six forced to change residences as election approached, one fired; two workers from Agen fired election day, one threatened while the supervisor had workers write up the Baze list for distribution.

D. The sub-prefect of Nérac threatened a member of the instructional committee with violence.

E. Teachers at Layrac, Port-Sainte-Marie, Fals, etc., suspended or fired.

F. Three tobacco sellers' licenses from Tonneins revoked the day after the election.

G. Mayors of Layrac, Mas Allemans, and Casteljaloux suspended.

III. Administrative favoritism: mayors used public buildings for partisan politics; moderate employees praised while republicans penalized; prosecutor of the Republic from Villeneuve read publicly an article defaming republicans.

IV. Intimidation by administrators:

A. Tax collector threatened taxpayers with immediate prosecution.

B. Mayors sent Baze list with carte d'élection in Birac, Damazan, Sos, Sempé, Saint Jean de Thurac, Pondenas, Réaup, Clermont, Dessus, Foulayronnes, Feszansac, Rournon, Saint Julien, Bon Encontre, and Montpezat.

C. Notary found republican lists with a farmer; had the farmer arrested after he divulged his supplier.

V. Clerical interference:

A. Curé at Seyches gave out bulletins morning of the election at parish house, preaching that "all must vote well or France is lost"; he oversaw voting at the polling place.

B. Clerical admonitions at Couthures, Marcellus, Gontaud, Saint Pierre de Nogaret, Mauvezin, Perricard, Thézac, Agnac, Castelmoron, Lalandusse and Meilhan.

C. Parishioners of Couthures and Marcellus threatened under pain of sin to vote for Baze list.

VI. Intimidation by propriétaires at Sauveterre, Bruch, Feugarolles, Buzet, Mézin, LaPlume, Damazan, Aubiac, Pont du Casse, etc.

VII. Voting irregularities:

A. Voting without authorization.

B. Ballot boxes unlocked or covered merely with paper.

C. Ballot box unguarded for three hours.

D. Two ballot boxes where one was authorized.

31. Journal, 1 juin 1849, p. 1; 12 juin 1849, p. 3; Républicain, 31 mai 1849, pp. 1-2.

32. Républicain, 6 juin 1849, p. 1.

33. Ibid., 16 mai 1849, p. 1.

34. Ibid., 18 avril 1849, p. 2.

35. Ibid., 14 juin 1849, the publisher of the newspaper was taken to court for its attacks against the president but acquitted.

36. Lesseps was sentenced to eight days in prison, a three hundred franc fine and court costs.

37. These repeated failures prompted the replacement of the chief prosecutor for being "too soft" (AN BB^{18} 1490^{A}: "Presse: Cour d'Agen").

38. ADLG Prefecture, Session du Conseil Général pour 1849-1850 (Agen: 1849), p. 83.

39. This was from a total of three hundred nineteen primary public schools (ADLG Préfecture, Sessions du Conseil Général pour 1850 (Agen: 1850), pp. 98-99).

40. Républicain, 20 novembre 1849; 15, 16 janvier 1850; 20, 25 mars 1850; Journal, 1, 3 août 1849; 4, 26, 29 avril 1850.

41. ADLG, Séries M: "Rapports de Police 1848-1853;" Sous-préfet de Marmande au préfet, 23 mai 1849.

42. Journal, quoted in the Républicain, 2 novembre 1849, p. 1.

43. Républicain, 2 novembre 1849; article number four of the statutes of incorporation of the Républicain proclaimed that the newspaper would "support the complete and constant application of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, whose fundamental base is universal suffrage" (Républicain, 8 décembre 1849, p. 3). Unfortunately, they did not spell out which measures would be taken should universal suffrage be threatened.

44. Journal, 1 mai 1850, p. 1.

45. Républicain, 24 mai 1850, p. 1.

46. Ibid., 14 mai 1859, p. 1.

47. ADLG, Séries M4: "Cercles et sociétés [de] jeux"; ADLG, Séries M2: "Cercles et sociétés; Police, états, tableaux, correspondance 1840-1853"; ADLG, Séries M: "Rapports de Police 1848-1853," 15 juillet 1850, ff; ADLG, Séries U, liasses 14-18, nos 23-30: "Cour d'Appel, Parquet général, Coup d'Etat 1851; Tribunaux d'Agen, Marmande, Villeneuve et Nérac, Rapports et correspondance entre le Procureur général, les procureurs et divers enquêtes, poursuites, arrestations 1851-1852."

48. Paul Gauzence, Une année de journalisme et neuf mois de prison (Agen, 1851), p. 55; see also Républicain, 20 avril 1849, p. 1; Vivent, a leading demo-soc of Agen, was the "grand-Prêtre" of the Masonic lodge in Nérac (ADLG, Séries M4: "Cercles et sociétés [de] jeux," Sous-prêfet de Nérac au préfet, 1 février 1849); the Masonic lodge in Villeneuve was politicized by Lesseps and his followers contrary to the Order's rules; they were later expelled (ADLG, Séries M5: "Loge maçonniques; Etats, renseignements, XIX^{e} siécle").

49. Cf. Margadant, "Modernization and Insurgency," and Agulhon, La République au village.

50. AN BB^{30} 392^{B} p. 192, Cour d'Agen: "Poursuites de complot contre les provinces de la catégorie du Sud-Ouest"; AN BB^{18} 1488: "Complot de Lyon et Sud-Ouest"; Anon., Appendix à l'affaire du Procès de Lyon; Cour d'Assises de Lot-et-Garonne, Complot contre la surété de l'Etat (Paris, n.d.); Conciliateur Agenais, 14 juillet - 13 octobre 1851; the others arrested, but later released for lack of evidence, were Joseph Moreau, hairdresser from Marmande (and a leading demo-soc at odds with the more moderate Paul Vergnes); François Pouzet, process-server from Villeneuve-sur-Lot; Auguste Laborde, merchant from Villeneuve; Bernard Duffau, veterinarian from Port-Sainte-Marie; Jean Clédat, unemployed, from Montignac (Dordogne) and a fugitive; Armand Caduc, lawyer from La Réole (Gironde).

51. AN BB^{18} 1488, Gauzence à Desolmes, 14 mai 1850 (emphasis the prosecutor's).

52. Ibid., Desolmes à Gauzence, 20 mai 1850.

53. Ibid., Pouzet à Lesseps, s.d.

54. AN BB^{30} 392^{B} p. 192, Procureur de la République au Ministre de la Justice, 18 septembre 1851; the Minister of Justice Faure "deeply regretted Lesseps' acquittal." Desolmes and Lesseps were freed by a seven to five vote, Duffau six to six. Gauzence was found guilty but with extenuating circumstances.

55. Appendix à l'affaire du Procès de Lyon, p. 18.

56. Ibid., p. 16.

57. Concilateur, 19 juillet 1851.

58. Gauzence, pp. 73-74.

59. Lesseps was phonetically interpreted as "le sept" (seven) or "le cep" (the vinestock).

60. Ibid., p. 67.

61. Journal, 24 janvier 1850.

62. ADLG, Séries M4: "Cercles et sociétés [de] jeux."

63. ADLG, Séries M: "Rapports de Police," 2 décembre 1851 (emphasis mine).

"Notre département est un des plus dévoués à la République...nous sommes prêt à seconder une système général de la résistance...."

Gauzence à Desolmes
14 mai 1850

CHAPTER 5: "Au premier signal..."

Bone-chilling apprehension, like the thick fog that enveloped the evening countryside of December 2, hung suspended between the two opposing camps of conservatives and demo-socs as the final month of 1851 began. The demo-socs, long-suffering under the repressive yoke of the Baze-Noubel-Preissac triumvirate and deeply wounded by the moderate republican desertion, anxiously anticipated the advent of the new year and the promise of vindication. The party of order, on the other hand, could take little satisfaction from its record of intimidation and repression, for in spite of driving a wedge between the moderate republicans and demo-socs, hounding their meetings and destroying their press, the demo-socs were gaining strength in the Lot-et-Garonne. The conservatives awaited with apprehension the upcoming election of May 1852, with its vision of a vengeful jacquerie drawing society up in a cataclysmic whirlwind of death and destruction. In the last weeks of November 1851, gendarmes scoured the countryside for rumored arms caches or clandestine nocturnal meetings of armed revolutionaries to no avail.

So fixed were the protagonists' gazes on the forthcoming legislative elections of May 1852 that the news of the coup d'état caught all ill-prepared and disorganized. The drama that unfolded in the Lot-et-Garonne in the first week of December 1851 revealed for the final time the anguish and equivocation the leadership of the demo-soc organization suffered when confronted with questions of means. As for the party of order, they were afforded the pleasure of dealing the coup de grâce to a formidable opponent.

While the actual coup d'état occurred in Paris during the early morning hours of December 2, news of the event did not reach Agen until one o'clock that afternoon. To a curious multitude assembled outside the prefecture, Paul de Preissac announced that France had been saved by the swift and timely action of Louis-Napoleon. The demo-socs in the crowd scurried back to their meeting houses to discuss the meaning of the announcement.

The demo-socs were troubled and apprehensive concerning the dispatches, and for just reason. The telegraph system was often rendered useless or inaccurate by poor weather or political turmoil.[1] Moreover, many towns and villages did not learn of the coup until eight o'clock that evening. And many times, what was often left unsaid had as much significance as the dispatch itself. The army's "swift and resolute action" very often masked a violent revolution. It was no wonder that the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne viewed any government dispatches with extreme skepticism. The fragmentary news of the coup d'état was especially distressing to the inhabitants because no mention was made of the president's fate, the deployment and attitude of the

troops, or, more importantly, news of the Parisian populace rising up to thwart the attempt. Moreover, the demo-soc leaders expected some word that the provinces surrounding Paris had risen. Faced with the uncertain situation over three hundred kilometers away, the leaders of the democratic and socialist movement of the department assembled in Agen assumed that the people had risen against Louis-Napoleon and began preparations for their show of strength.

From cantons as distant as Damazan, demo-socs streamed into Agen to decide on a course of action. Police surveillance of the Cercle des Travailleurs meeting place and the Cercle de la rue Paulin (formerly the Cercle démocratique) reported considerable agitation outside the houses and an unusually large number of individuals arriving from other parts of the department (many covering themselves to remain unidentified). Beneath a Cercle des Travailleurs window, a police agent overheard, "Tomorrow we will have six or ten thousand men; perhaps at this very moment the president of the Republic is in prison, or he has proclaimed himself emperor."[2] Around eight o'clock that evening members streamed out of the meeting houses, spreading the message throughout the countryside that the President of the Republic was an outlaw and that the People of France must oppose the coup by force of arms. As events unfolded, the planned insurrection was to consist of two armed columns converging on Agen from the arrondissements of Nérac and Villeneuve. Insurgents from the arrondissement of Marmande were to rendezvous at Marmande and march down the river to link with the insurgent forces from the Gironde. As they headed into the ominous darkness, one was heard crying out, "We will settle all accounts

tomorrow morning," while others echoed his thoughts with chants of "Tomorrow! Tomorrow!"[3]

While the demo-socs of Agen continued preparations for their confrontation with the authorities, messengers spread the word throughout the countryside that the Constitution had been violated, the president arrested, the army deployed in Paris and other numerous rumors filled with half-truths. Article sixty-eight of the Constitution was invoked to prove that President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte was guilty of high treason. Therefore, the armed insurrection of the people against such a treasonous figure was not only legal but necessary to safeguard the Constitution and the Republic.

And yet, as the testimony of those arrested following the insurrection showed, there existed a kaleidoscope of reasons why individuals joined the insurrection. Many more prominent participants, oftentimes leaders or their immediate lieutenants, seized their hunting rifle, pitchfork, sabre or pike to defend the Constitution and the Republic as they had sworn on their knees in an abandoned farmhouse in the shroud of night. These participants never spelled out what the promised social Republic meant for them, but constantly harked back to the oath they had sworn and the death threat if they did not follow.[4] But the ranks were swollen with many peasants, their wives, sons and daughters who were lured by the spectacle of a parade, the promise of booty or sheer curiosity. Official testimony and final sentences single out numerous bumptious youth and doddering elderly drawn into the insurrection by vague reasons or pure curiosity. By arms,

temperament and aims, it was a motley group that took up arms in December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne.[4]

The first area to answer the call to arms was the arrondissement of Nérac -- in particular the lowlands area centered about the cantons of Damazan and Lavardac. These two areas had long been demo-soc strongholds, due in great part to the presence of the numerous métayers and canal workers. And the individual most responsible for the area's impressive resonse was Etienne Darnospil, former teacher and contractor on the Division of Bridges and Roads. In the Plot of the Southwest, he had been the department's contact point with the Plot of Lyon. A fellow demo-soc described him thus: "His well-known energy, the ardor of his republican convictions, the condemnations that his political convictions had made him suffer and the influence that they had given him throughout the countryside justified this choice as leader."[5] About his base in Barbaste, Darnospil rallied the peasants and workers from the surrounding communes. Those armed with their hunting rifles headed the column, while those with pikes, pitchforks and sabres brought up the rear.[6] The core of his "army" was his own workers from the canal, for "they knew how much they could count on their chief."[7] Darnospil spent most of December 3 arming and training his rag-tag lot for its march on the prefecture.

At 7 a.m. of December 4th Darnospil's army set off for Nérac and Agen. As they approached the outskirts of Nérac, word arrived that the mayor had assembled a number of citizens to defend the city. Darnospil respected the very conservative mood of the people of Nérac and realized that the city would not yield without a protracted struggle. Moreover,

the plan called for his arrival on the outskirts of Agen in conjunction with the forces from Villeneuve. Accordingly, to avoid bloodshed, the group was granted safe passage through the city without the least disturbance.[8] The band then continued its march on Agen.

Meanwhile in Agen, emissaries from the countryside arrived at the Cercle des Travailleurs and Cercle démocratique to confer with the leaders of the movement -- Louis Vivent, lawyer from Agen, president of the Cercle des Travailleurs and former candidate to the Constituent Assembly; Armand Delpech, lawyer from Agen, vice-president of the Cercle des Travailleurs and former candidate to the National Assembly; Frederic Nasse, lawyer from Houeillès and former candidate to the National Assembly; Henri Fournel, lawyer from Agen and former candidate to the National Assembly. An earlier denial by the prefect that he had received a dispatch was interpreted as meaning that Paris had indeed risen to defend the Constitution, since lack of news from Paris was oftentimes interpreted by the provinces as a sign that Paris was plunged into chaos. The delegation from the two Cercles then created an Insurrectional Committee to coordinate activities with the countryside and prepare itself to assume the reins of power.

But the day did not bode well for the democrats of Agen. Although a handful of men arrived in Agen from the immediate vicinity, the demo-socs of Prayssas, Laroque-Timbaut, Astaffort and Laplume refused to leave their towns' confines. The fate of the strong demo-soc enclaves of Port-Sainte-Marie and Puymirol (as well as Darnospil's band) was unknown.[10]

Villeneuve, in the meantime, had quickly become a demo-soc fortress. The municipal council, already under the majority control of the democrats, voted at eleven o'clock the evening of December 2 that the President was an outlaw and that the city would defend the Constitution. The sub-prefect did not react for fear of plunging the city into anarchy. On December 4 the council reconstituted the national guard, which had been dissolved by prefectoral decree the year before. When the sub-prefect tried to counter the growing demo-soc strength by rallying the support of "all the men of order and good will who have the courage to oppose by force of arms attacks," so few appeared and the clandestine action so angered the populace that the sub-prefect was forced to take refuge in the nearby prison of Eysses. When news reached the city that the prefect had requested reinforcement from Agen, barricades sprang up instantly throughout the city. A provisional committee was created, but the people refused to reinforce the demo-socs in Agen, despite their entreaties. As news arrived of harsh government repression and the establishment of a state of siege, the revolutionary ardor cooled to despair. By December 13th the barricades came down before the prefect and government troops. The leaders sought refuge in Belgium and England.

This failure of the leaders of the demo-socs in Villeneuve to budge was fatal to the entire insurrection. Despite entreaties by the leadership of Agen, the Villeneuvois elected to barricade the bridge and fortify the central city rather than march on Agen. The demo-socs in Agen had been counting on a two-pronged attack -- southwest from

Nérac and northeast from Villeneuve -- to divide the government forces. The latter forces never arrived.

It is uncertain why the Villeneuvois elected to remain entrenched within their city. Speculation might point to the constant rivalry between Agen and Villeneuve for political leadership of the department. The Villeneuvois Dubruel, as provisional commissioner, was not well received in Agen by conservatives and demo-socs alike. Moreover, Villeneuve was regarded as a moderate republican stronghold, and its leaders, Lesseps and Dubruel, distrusted the demo-soc enclave in Agen. A case in point was Lesseps' flight to Paris in October 1850 to create the newspaper Le Vote universel when he realized he was losing control of the demo-socs in the department. Or the Villeneuvois might have reasoned that to march to Agen's aid would have left their city totally defenseless against government retaliation. Or the insurrectionists' overwhelming concern to protest within their preconceived limits may have stymied them. As in their tax revolt in 1842, their refusal to pay taxes to protest the Italian campaign in 1849 or their refusal to vote in the municipal elections of 1850 to protest the election law of May 31, 1850, the demo-socs may have established a self-serving legal boundary beyond which they considered themselves beyond the law. To declare that the president had violated the Constitution and was guilty of high treason was one thing, to march on the prefecture was another. With their narrow parochialism, the Villeneuvois destroyed any formidable, concerted departmental action.

With no word from Nérac or Marmande and such disappointing news from Villeneuve and the surrounding cantons, the leadership in Agen was

faced with the question of the fate of the insurrection. When they separated the fact from the rumors, the leaders realized that neither Paris nor the countryside was responding as they had hoped. The Parisian radicals, bled white in February and June of 1848 and distrustful of their leaders, failed to rise up in substantial numbers; no republican general was marching on Paris at the head of a loyal republican army; the provincial protests were by and large weak, scattered, uncoordinated and ineffective; Louis-Napoleon was still in power, stronger than ever. But most enervating to the demo-soc leadership was the President's promise to restore political power to the people by returning universal suffrage. For some demo-socs the return of universal suffrage would restore their instrument of change. Social and economic reforms would be carried out through the ballot box, rather than the gun. Moreover, the liberal bourgeois republicans could maintain their leadership role of the rank and file. But many demo-socs had lost faith in the resolve of their leaders and chafed under the mounting administrative repression. Now that they had taken up the gun, there was no turning back.[11]

Once again, as in June and December 1848 and May 1850, the leadership snuffed out the rank and file's ardor when it issued the following directive at eight o'clock the evening of December 3:

> We, members of the [Insurrectional] Committee, having been chosen to advise the citizenry during these grave political circumstances, request everyone who has marched on Agen to return to his home and avoid all violence, since it will only result in senseless suffering.
>
> Agen, December 3, 1851
> 8 o'clock in the evening[12]

So the demo-soc leadership of Agen, disappointed by the parochialism of Villeneuve, stymied by vague reports from the countryside and realizing that provincial resistance was futile if Parisian resistance was crushed, signaled their followers that continued resistance was foolhardy.

Unfortunately, Darnospil and his rag-tag army had not been apprised of the decision. In the early morning hours of December 4 the motley band arrived on a hillside about one kilometer from Agen. While the administration fortified the Place du Palais with loyal national guard troops, the demo-socs rushed through the streets crying, "To arms, les rouges! Down with les blancs!" Before long two phalanxes stood facing each other across the Place du Palais -- the administration's well-armed national guard and gendarmerie versus a rowdy group of citizens armed with cutlasses, sabers, bayonets, hachets, hammers, rifles and pistols. While a stalemate was developing, broken only by taunts and insults, the mayor dispatched a detachment of gendarmes to blockade the stone bridge leading from Nérac with the city's only pair of cannon.

It was here that the commitment of the Villeneuvois had been critical. The plan drawn up by the Insurrectional Committee of Agen during that frantic December 2 called for the contingents from Villeneuve, Prayssas, Laroque-Timbaut and the cantons to the northeast to enter the city from the northeast by the Porte du Pin. Meanwhile, the Néraçais would converge on Agen from the southwest. As these two groups were approaching the city limits, the insurrectionists within Agen were to set fire to the building adjacent to the mayor's office.

The flames and billowing smoke would signal the two groups to begin their drives to the central city and thus draw away enough troops to permit the Agenais demo-socs to seize the city hall. Because of their anticipated overwhelming numbers, the demo-socs hoped that little blood would be shed.

Panic seized the demo-soc leaders; they realized that they must quickly defuse the explosive situation. Vivent sent word to Fournel, who stood at the head of the insurrectionists on the Place du Palais, to avoid a clash with the gendarmes. Meanwhile he sent Nasse and Suzanne Armstrong, an Englishwoman long involved in the demo-soc struggle in the department, by carriage to ask Darnospil and his group to retire.[13] Nasse and Armstrong, with the government's permission, visited the band encamped on the hillside and informed them that cannons awaited them at the bridge. Furthermore, the majority of the inhabitants of the city were ready to tenaciously defend the city, transforming what the band had thought was to be a triumphant liberation into a fratriciadal bloodbath. Darnospil's band rapidly disbanded, evaporating into the countryside like the early morning mist. Roadside ditches were littered with the insurgents' arms, as men, women and children disappeared into the brush.

Meanwhile, tensions continued to mount to the breaking point in Agen. By midday, the potentially violent situation had become ugly. The mayor and his assistant had been seized by the surly crowd, released only through the personal intervention of Vivent, dressed in his uniform of commander of the Seventh Company of the National Guard. When a police agent, however, told Vivent to fetch the plume for his

helmet, a cold chill shot down Vivent's spine -- he believed the agent knew the demo-soc signal. (The demo-soc members of the national guard were to don their plume-adorned helmets as a signal to begin the battle.) Visibly shaken, Vivent left the Place du Palais and the insurgent forces quickly evaporated. That evening Vivent, Nasse, Delpech and Fournel were seen departing by coach for Villeneuve.

Bloodshed replaced mere confrontation in the arrondissement of Marmande. The arrondissement had been the most radical of all the arrondissements, especially the cantons of Mas d'Agenais, Tonneins and Marmande. In this area come together those crucial ingredients of fertile soil, riverine communications, labor-intensive tobacco and wine and a high percentage of métayage. It is little wonder, then, that mere shouts and insults boiled over into the exchange of gunfire and the shedding of blood. Whether it was due to a pusillanimous demo-soc leadership that succumbed to a handful of firebrands' threats or a calculated tactical move to defuse an explosive situation that backfired, the demo-socs of Marmande became one of a handful of groups throughout France to battle violently with Louis-Napoleon's authority. Although an excellent account has painstakingly detailed the insurrection of Marmande and its aftermath, its full import cannot be gauged unless viewed within the departmental picture.[14]

News of the coup d'état arrived at Marmande inexplicably late on Wednesday, December 3. Immediately the city was plunged into confusion as to the meaning of the cryptic dispatch, its veracity and whether fellow Parisian demo-socs had risen to defy the presidential coup. A hostile crowd gathered outside the city hall demanding all dispatches.

Representatives of the crowd, Petit-Lafitte, former mayor of Mas (fired by Preissac) and a métayer, and Séré, a barrelmaker from neighboring Samazan, broke into the meeting of the Municipal Council to demand that the Council condemn the action of the president. The Council responded with a declaration to the people stating:

> The measure taken by President of the Republic to dissolve the National Assembly is a crime of high treason ...By this act the President surrenders his functions; citizens are required to refuse obedience; the executive power by right passes to the National Assembly....[15]

The crowd received the declaration with cheers. Petit-Lafitte tried to capitalize on the revolutionary fervor by haranguing the crowd with "if troops arrive, we will receive them with lead." But Peyronny, former military officer and former republican candidate to the National Assembly, realized that reports of popular uprisings or troop movements had not been verified. Then again, Peyronny may have thought that armed resistance to regular troops was foolhardy and sought to defuse a potentially violent situation. As events were to prove, Peyronny was much more cautious than his demo-soc leadership might have implied. He mrely exclaimed "what a lot of hot air!" and urged the crowd to retire until further developments.

News that barricades had risen in Paris spread like wildfire through Marmande, filling the streets with a tumultuous crowd. Several prominent men of order, when they witnessed the increasingly ugly mood of the populace, turned to Paul Vergnes, president of the Municipal Council, former mayor and former republican delegate to the Constituent Assembly "to avoid a bloody and protracted struggle among fellow citizens." The Municipal Council immediately reestablished the

National Guard, which had been dissolved by prefectoral decree since early 1850. Its command devolved on Peyronny, despite the fact that "he possessed no military qualities that recommended him as head of an army. He lacked all civic courage and burning conviction."[17] On the other hand, the government later blamed Peyronny for fanning the flames of violence; "all night long the cries [from the guard] for the Holy Guillotine and Ledru-Rollin echoed through the streets and spread alarm among the inhabitants."[18]

An incident on the morning of the 4th showed the administration's respect for Vergnes and the demo-soc controlled National Guard. The mayor had issued a call on December 3 for men of order to assemble about him to defend the government. The response was so feeble, he extended his call to the neighboring communes. On the morning of the 4th twenty-five National Guardsmen from the commune of Cocumont arrived at the gates of Marmande. But, due to an agreement between the mayor and Vergnes to safeguard the tenuous peace, the guardsmen were required to leave their rifles stacked outside the city limits. Before the sun set, the guardsmen had returned to Cocumont with their arms and without incident. The mayor did not dare use these volunteer forces to regain control, so powerful were the demo-soc forces in Marmande.

By mid-day on Friday the 5th the uneasy truce between the administration and the demo-soc leaders was disintegrating. Ferment among the rank and file demo-socs swelled, fed by the influx of peasants and artisans from neighboring cantons. Angry murmurs demanding armed battle were heard, but Vergnes tried to maintain peace by emphasizing that the tide was turning slowly against the insurgents.

"What good would a struggle be? The dispatches, on the contrary, tell us that Bonaparte's success is complete and that the rest of France -- Rouen, Lille, Amiens, Bordeaux, etc. -- appear to remain peaceful."[19] As the crowd grew uglier and more threatening, Vergnes surrendered to its demands.

> All right, my friends, since you want it, resist. We will not stop you, go! You will always find me in the breach defending our liberties. But I repeat, our call to arms is useless and perhaps murder. The die is cast! Let us organize, citizens, for the defense of the law![20]

Immediately men, women and children prepared for the coming battle by rounding up rifles and assembling shot and cartridges. The mayor and his assistants fled city hall for the sub-prefecture. In the breach, Vergnes created and headed a three-man provisional municipal commission. "We are constituted and have assumed these powers to defend the Constitution."[21] When Vergnes approached the sub-prefect, he elected flight to Bordeaux (to summon military aid), rather than submit to the provisional commission. Both the city hall and sub-prefecture were emptied of arms.

But Vergnes, Peyronny and the other demo-soc leaders realized they were walking a narrow line between destroying the revolutionary fervor they had taken pains to instill in their followers and the threat of a bloodbath. Wherever they spoke, the leaders emphasized their struggle to control the masses and maintain law and order while remaining true to the Constitution. As Peyronny stated in his defense,

> Marmande did not have any pretension to conquer the Republic by arming itself; it only wanted a legal protest. The arms were to guard Marmande and the arrondissement against the bands of pillagers and wretches who used the pretext of saving the Republic to attack people and property.[22]

Even when the firebrands suggested barricading the bridge over the Garonne River, Peyronny vetoed the move as being stupid because any damage would result in higher taxes for the countryside. When heckled by radicals during a National Guard review, Peyronny was heard saying, "Who is speaking of pillage here? I will run him through with my saber,"[23] and again, "if anyone commits any act against the property of the inhabitants, I will demand that he be brought before a military tribunal and shot."[24] To preserve the fragile peace within Marmande, then, Peyronny had the National Guard (and radical hangers-on) spend most of December 5 and 6 parading about town and preparing shot.

By late evening December 7, however, the festive mood with its parades, songs and dancing rapidly turned ugly. News began to filter in from all sides of demo-soc reverses. The Parisian resistance had been checked and the provinces, especially neighboring Bordeaux, exhibited a stunning lethargy. The march by Darnospil and his men had been turned away from Agen and Villeneuve had refused to budge. But the most horrifying were the reports that, because of Bordeaux's passivity, cavalry and infantry of the 12th Division were freed to march on Marmande.

When news of the troop movement reached the insurgents, the city was thrown into a panic. Women and children ran through the streets crying, "To arms!" while the radical demo-socs scoured the city for their traitorous leaders. Peyronny was found resting at Vergnes'. All Vergnes' efforts to calm the crowd were futile. He assured them that the municipal council had resolved that any resistance would only result in a useless bloodbath. Séré of Samazan placed a loaded pistol at

Peyronny's throat and cried out, "You are a coward! If you do not march, we are going to shoot you!"[25] Rather than have Marmande become a battleground, Peyronny ordered the rabble to march. The motley group of over one thousand men and boys marched out the city gates at three o'clock on the morning of December 8 with Vergnes and Peyronny at its head to do battle with the government troops.

Full of revolutionary fervor, the demo-socs marched into the chilly, fog-shrouded night singing the Marseillaise and Chant du départ and crying out "Long live the Republic!" Reports were that the infantry was to travel by boat to La Réole, where it would join the cavalry to march southeastward to Marmande. Accordingly, the demo-socs made their way to Sainte Bazeille, six and one half kilometers downstream. They had only gone two to three kilometers when many faint-hearted were swallowed up by the darkness, their republicanism cooled by the chilled night. The fog was so thick that visibility was limited to thirty paces. No sooner had the band exited Sainte Bazeille when their forward scouts spied what appeared to be advancing cavalry. Peyronny shouted out two or three times "Who goes there?" only to be answered by gunfire. Several insurgents returned fire, unleashing a fearsome barrage lasting two minutes. When the smoke cleared three horses had been killed and a handful on each side, Peyronny included, suffered minor wounds. The government forces beat a hasty retreat, leaving two of its wounded officers to the insurgents' mercy. Although menacing gestures were made over one lieutenant, he lost only his boots and saber.

The insurgents made their way to the hillsides outside Castelnau to the northeast in hopes of securing reinforcements. But "a good

number among them who had never seen gunfire in combat were shaken with terror at the first shots, and bitterly regretted having left their warm beds."[26] By the time Vergnes, Peyronny and their band arrived at Caubon, approximately eight kilometers northeast of Sainte Bazeille, only fifty men could be counted among the stouthearted. By daybreak the band had evaporated.

Peyronny believed erroneously that the band had tangled with the cavalry advance guard of the army sent from Bordeaux. Rather, the insurgents had exchanged gunfire with a squad of gendarmes led by the sub-prefect and his assistant. By daybreak the gendarmes met the government troops with the mayor at their head. Together the forces of law and order triumphantly reentered a city already in the throes of recrimination and reprisals. The insurgents, on the other hand, were seen making their way for the hillsides. Peyronny was captured a week later as his dinghy stole into the harbor near Bordeaux. Vergnes, on the other hand, evaded the authorities to take refuge in Belgium.

Although Villeneuve would continue to be under demo-soc control for several days more (due simply to the distances involved), the department of the Lot-et-Garonne returned to a peace and order imposed viciously by the army. The entire department was placed in a state of siege. Anyone caught building or defending a barricade was shot on sight, and those individuals harboring insurgents were arrested. The most burdensome decree required the populace to quarter the troops. Paul de Preissac proclaimed, "Anarchy is definitively conquered. The armed bands which had menaced or overrun our cities are in flight; the

hour of justice has arrived; for the criminal authors of these disorders, it will be terrible...."[27]

And the government's justice was terrible indeed. The dragnet swept through cities and villages, even scouring the underbrush. Cities and towns known as demo-soc bastions like Marmande and Mas were subject to house-to-house searches by as many as fifteen soldiers. Well over one thousand men and women were incarcerated as alleged participants in the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne, suspected members of a secret society or simply individuals known for their republican opinions.[27] Curfews emptied streets in the early evening hours and cafés and inns long suspected as republican haunts were closed. Mayors from virtually every village and commune, to prove their wholehearted support of the coup d'état, flooded the prefecture with lists of suspects and witnesses of the most vague charges. Indeed, it was the prefect's opportunity to exact personal vengeance. Lists maintained by chiefs of police and mayors since the dawn of the Second Republic bore their bitter fruit. For many of the party of order vengeance was indeed sweet.[29]

Unfortunately for the victims of the administration's departmental purge of republicanism, their suffering had just begun. Officials in Marmande voiced concern that their prison, built to hold a maximum of one hundred sixteen men, had become intolerable with one hundred sixty. "Cases of dysentery are discovered each day, and, since they cannot be given any opportunity to leave their cells, their accidents have become very dangerous."[30] Eventually those found guilty of the most insubstantial charges were transported by riverboat to the fortress at Blaye near Bordeaux to await deportation. At least in the prisons of



Figure 22
Plebiscite of December 20, 1851;
Percentage NON Ballots per Total Votes Cast
(Source: ADLG, Séries M: "Elections")

Marmande, Eysses and Agen the prisoners were in familiar surroundings. But Blaye was a virtual hell-hole. One hundred sixty prisoners from the Lot-et-Garonne protested their treatment and conditions at Blaye to the authorities to no avail. Incarcerated well over sixteen meters below ground level, sometimes in six to eight centimeters of standing water and thick mud, lacking covering to ward offf the February cold and breathing the little air not consumed by smoking torches and far too many fellows, many prisoners left Blaye physically marked for life.[31]

Only one individual was afforded a full trial to defend himself. Soon after his arrest December 20 as he attempted to flee by boat, Peyronny appeared before a special military tribunal in Bordeaux. Despite his numerous statements that he had assumed command of the National Guard of Marmande merely to maintain order and defend property, Peyronny was sentenced to expulsion from France.[32]

Over eight hundred fifty other prisoners did not receive their days in court. During the month of January, in order to expedite the swift sentencing and transfer of the arrested, a three-man military commission was empowered to interrogate the prisoners and present preliminary judgements as for their sentencing. The general prosecutor was responsible for sifting through the mountains of police reports and eyewitness accounts to afford the judges swift judgements. In some cases, the reports of the military commission read like police reports, for example:

> 254 Delpech (Pierre Armand) age: 43; lawyer; born: Lectoure (Gers); home: Agen; married; one child; one of the chiefs of the party since 1848; candidate to

the Constituent and National Assemblies; elected December 3rd from the Circle of Workers as a member of the Superior Committee of Resistance who ordered the insurrection of the communes and sent for them -- Has had an insidious influence on the party since 1848.

668 Petit-Lafitte age: 4?; unemployed métayer; born: Mas; home: Mas; married; implicated in the Plot of Lyon; true chief of the insurrection; more than any other directed the movement in the arrondissement of Marmande; principal organizer of a secret society; recruiter; considered to have done the greatest evil in the countryside.

768 Serey (or Seré) (Simon) age 26; barrelmaker; born: Samazan; home: Samazan; married; 1850 - one month of prison for disorderly conduct; unbridled agentof the secret societies; dangerous propagandist; an extreme fanatic; participation in all the disorders; promoter of the most violent measures; tenacious and incorrigible demagogue This was the individual who reportedly pointed a pistol at Peyronny's throat and demanded that the group march to meet the troops.

826 Vergnes (Paul) age 53; lawyer, married; born: Tonneins; home: Marmande; leader of the party for a long time, director of all the movements; persevering and indefatigable recruiter; President of the insurrectionary commission; ambitious, an extrovert, and drawn by the tides which he has created and cannot control.[33]

Although these were the most outstanding individuals to take part in the insurrection, similar detailed histories were established of men, women and children singled out for even alleged demo-soc sympathies. This indeed was a time when Bonapartists and monarchists alike pooled resources to clear the department of the vexatious and threatening democrats. As the transcripts of the interrogations revealed, many lesser-known individuals were sentenced to expulsion from the department on a "reputable" individual's vague recollection of the accused taking part in seditious or violent activity. Nor was there any record that the accused was permitted to confront his accusers.[34] Many were wrenched from family and homeland for several

years on a political opponent's spiteful testimony or an ancient police report.

Several individuals were worthy of special note. In at least twenty cases, individuals arrested were from the same family -- the most notable having been the Maubouguet family -- father, four daughters and a son-in-law. The three Souberan brothers as well as three from the Imbert famly were arrested.[35] At least two Catholic priests were arrested. The most notorious was the Abbé Lessence, who had run for a seat in the Constituent Assembly in April 1848.[36] The Protestant pastor Jacquier from Clairac was arrested and transferred about the country, despite constant entreaties and petitions for his reinstatement from an overwhelming majority of his former congregation. And the mayor of Puymiclan, Verdun-Lagarde, who had placarded his town with condemnations of Louis-Napoleon's actions, evaded the police net and fled to Belgium, where he died a few days afterward -- he willed his ten thousand franc fortune for the establishment of an agricultural school.[37]

By mid-January, however, friction was developing between the military commission and the civil authorities. Both the prefect and the prosecutor, burning with vindictiveness, wanted to take part in the sentencing. They had long kept a watchful eye on many threatening individuals to whom the military triumvirate was giving only cursory treatment and mild sentences. The prosecutor requested that he and the prefect be permitted to append their own opinions to the commission's verdicts and to try in civil court those arrested whom the

administration had long sought to crush.[38] Only cases like Peyronny's, tried in Bordeaux, would escape the civil authorities in Agen.

To placate the civil authorities, the government issued the circular of February 3, 1852, creating the infamous mixed commissions. In the Lot-et-Garonne, prefect Paul de Preissac, general prosecutor Sorbier and brigadier general Tatareau comprised the commission. Few if any guidelines were given to these individuals or their staff by which to pass judgement on the accused. They were ordered simply to allow the degree of guilt, private and political background and family position to guide them.[39] Ten possible sentences were permitted: (1) return murderers to Councils of War; (2) transport habitual offenders to Cayenne; (3) transport to Algeria for seven or more years; (4) transport to Algeria for less than seven years; (5) expulsion from France; (6) relocated temporarily outside the department; (7) internment in a specified area of France; (8) returned to prison; (9) police surveillance; (10) freedom. Unlike the military commissions, the mixed commissions did not cross-examine the accused; the commissioners relied solely on prefectoral and police reports in addition to the military commission's reports. What was certain was that individuals similarly charged received dimetrically opposed sentences. Was this due to caprice? maliciousness? Perhaps such discrepancies were the result of the sheer number of dossiers these three men were required to read and pass judgement upon. By February 11, they had examined three hundred dossiers. A month after the commission had been established, the commissioners had passed judgement on all 887 accused, sentencing nearly one half of them to Algeria.[40]

Even those with less harsh sentences like internment or surveillance did not escape the government's oppression. Those sentenced to internment in other departments had to follow a series of bewildering administrative procedures to even visit their families for a mere fifteen days.[41] For those under police surveillance, a requirement to report to the prefecture every week became a daily report by prefectoral decree. Travel within the department required the prefect's authorization; travel beyond the department that of the Minister of Police. If one did travel without authorization, he could be subject to ten years in Algeria.

Those destined for Algeria left the fortress of Blaye on April 8 on the Isly. After four days, the debarked at Mers-el-Kébir. "We were then registered like the most vile women; we were classed, registered and matriculated like galley slaves or prostitutes."[42] Later they were scattered throughout the interior to work for a pittance "wage."

While individual commutations were granted to persistent individuals whom the police regarded as harmless, the majority of the insurgents had to await one of several public commutations or pardons by Louis-Napoleon. The first occurred in early October 1852 during the president's tour of the Southwest. At each major city he announced commutations of the sentences of several local insurgents, totaling one hundred seven for the department.[43] The second round of clemency was announced with the emperor's marriage on February 2, 1853. Those pardoned totaled two hundred forty-seven. In a four year period immediately following the insurrection, only three hundred twenty-two, less than half, had been given full pardons.[44] The other insurgents,

regarded as too great a threat to the regime, were offered only commutations of sentences. Even as late as 1856, conditions had to be met to receive full pardon. With the birth of the Prince Imperial (March 16, 1856), clemency was offered to all those proscribed of December 1851 who made their submission to the empire -- few from the department accepted the offer.[45] The most prominent individuals like Vergnes and Dubruel returned from exile only after the amnesty proclamation of July 11, 1859.[46]

There are few yardsticks available to the historian to measure the public reaction to the trauma the entire department underwent from the first days of December 1851 throughout the year 1852. While the Journal reveled in its deliverance from the hands of the bloodthirsty mob by its savior, Louis-Napoleon,[47] there were faint indications that the spirit of rebellion and unity among the people was not extinguished with the rout of the insurgents. One individual, as he was being transported from Marmande to the prison at Eysses, recounted that "we were well-received by the people" at Castelmoron.[48] The volatile Séré of Samazan remained at large for two months because of a sympathetic public, despite the directive that all individuals giving aid to the insurgents would be imprisoned.[49]

The gauge of the public's acceptance of the coup d'état has generally been the plebiscite of December 20, 1851. By casting a "yes" ballot, the individual was giving his approval of the dissolution of the National Assembly and the continuance of Louis-Napoleon's presidency. A priest from Marmande wrote the Journal:

> To reject Louis-Napoleon, or even to abstain, in the supreme peril we now find ourselves, would be to become accomplices in the savage horrors which the foul and barbarous socialism committed...The elections to which we have been called will decide the fate of France. To abstain would mean deserting the cause of society. Your vote, we do not doubt, will be a thunderous protest against the barbarous scenes which have just afflicted our country....[50]

The result was an overwhelming victory for Louis-Napoleon. Of the 8,116,773 votes cast throughout France, 7,439,216 approved the continuation of Louis-Napoleon's presidency (91.7%), while 640,737 (or 7.9%) disapproved. (A total of 36,820 were invalidated -- 0.5%.) As in the presidential election of December 1848, the Lot-et-Garonne did not echo the national acclaim for Louis-Napoleon. Of the 87,842 votes cast, Louis-Napoleon received 79,576 affirmative votes (90.5%) to 7,909 negative votes (9.0%). (A total of 407 ballots were invalidated -- 0.5%.) The Lot-et-Garonne gave Louis-Napoleon a higher percentage of negative votes than the nation (9.0% to 7.9%), but there was also a slightly higher percentage of absenteeism (18.5% to 18%). The combined negative and absenteee percentage for the Lot-et-Garonne was far below areas like the Bouches-du-Rhône (61.9%), Seine (57.4%) and the Hérault (55.1%). This may have been a reflection of prefect Preissac's thoroughness in uprooting the last vestiges of democratic-socialism in the Lot-et-Garonne. Moreover, no publication of note, save the Journal, continued publication after the insurrection. The monarchists' Conciliateur Agenais, which had spoken out for the republican editors in the Plot of the Southwest, succumbed to administrative pressures in early December 1851. The Lot-et-Garonne was still under a state of siege. Many households were required to quarter soldiers. In Marmande,

groups of soldiers distributed the ballots. House-to-house searches were still being carried out, and authorities arrested individuals who publicly condemned the president or the coup. Therefore, it is difficult to state how accurately the plebiscite reflected the popular sentiment in the Lot-et-Garonne.

And yet, within the department itself, the same pattern of division between highlands and lowlands is once again reaffirmed in the results of the plebiscite of December 1851. The following maps (Figures 22 and 23) reveal resistance to Louis-Napoleon in virtually the same cantons once held to be demo-soc strongholds, in spite of the thorough and brutal repression. The areas along the rivers (Monflanquin, Villeneuve, Port-Sainte-Marie, Tonneins and Marmande), together with the lowlands to the west (Damazan, Lavardac and Casteljaloux) kept alive the demo-soc tradition of resistance. The struggle for the democratic and social republic still lifed in the lowlands and river valleys of the Lot-et-Garonne, despite governmental harassment and repression. A ringing "Non" was sounded in areas still experiencing the full weight of the state of siege. The only exception was the canton of Mas d'Agenais, perhaps due to the arrest of the very popular former mayor Petit-Lafitte, as well as the high percentage of people arrested per ten-thousand population (see Figure 28, Chapter 6). Meanwhile, the cantons of the mollasses to north (Lauzun, Cancon and Castillonès), the serre plateau to the east (Beauville, Penne and Laroque-Timbaut) and the monarchist stronghold of Nérac continued their support for order and prosperity with an affirmative vote. (While the percentage of abstentions was slightly above the national percentage,



Figure 23
Plebiscite of December 20, 1851;
Percentage Non and Absentee Ballots per Total Votes Cast
(Source: ADLG: Séries M:"Elections")

it does not prove to be a significant factor, since the departmental average for voter abstention in the Lot-et-Garonne for previous elections had also been near eighteen percent.[52])

The prefect's success in crushing the last vestiges of the demo-soc organization and his thorough clean-up of individuals with even the vaguest republican sympathies may have been instrumental in the relatively low negative results in the Lot-et-Garonne when compared with other demo-soc strongholds. It is difficult to explain otherwise how a department that had approved Louis-Napoleon's presidency so weakly in December 1848 would so strongly approve its continuation, especially in light of the response to the call to arms in December 1851. Even the combined results of Louis-Napoleon and Cavaignac in December 1848 could not have equalled the 90.5% affirmative vote for Louis-Napoleon in December 1851. It came as no surprise, then, when Paul de Preissac was named the Officier of the Legion of Honor on January 22, 1852, for his zealous pursuit of enemies of the State while prefect of the Lot-et-Garonne.[53]

The plebiscite one year later on the proclamation of the Second Empire again revealed the administration's virtual extirpation of the demo-soc movement from the Lot-et-Garonne. The results (Figures 24 and 25) show a dramatic drop in the percentages of negative votes. The government's improved reception among the inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne may have been due to the mollifying effects of time, the return of prosperity or the passage of Louis-Napoleon through the department and the hundreds of commutations. Or perhaps, with all effective opposition silenced, mayors more effectively pressured their



Figure 24
Plebiscite of December 2, 1852;
Percentage NON Ballots per Total Votes Cast



Figure 25
Plebiscite of December 2, 1852;
Total Percentage NON and Absentee Ballots per Total Votes Cast
(Source: ADLG, Séries M: "Elections")

constituents to vote in an "acceptable" manner. In the intervening year the administration had thoroughly pruned the demo-soc tree of liberty of its leaders.[54]

The Bonapartist juggernaut continued to sweep through the department during the years that followed, aided ably by its mouthpiece, the Journal. Only on March 27, 1852, was the state of siege lifted in the department. By then the prefectoral broom had swept the department clean of those long suspected of troublesome republican tendencies, and an election for three deputies to the Corps Législatif had reinforced the Bonapartist control of departmental politics. The election of February 29, 1852, brought easy victory to all three Bonapartist candidates: Henri Noubel, editor of the Journal; Charles Laffitte, former prosecutor for the Republic; and Louis de Richemont, former deputy in the July Monarchy. Each was singled out for official support because he had supported Louis-Napoleon's call in 1851 for a constitutional revision to extend the presidential term of office.[55] The Bonapartists even garnered victories on the local level, as they crushed their Legitimist and Orleanist opposition for the General Council by margins of 1168 to 440 and 1050 to 560.[56]

From all indications, the coup d'état of Louis-Napoleon had triumphed in the Lot-et-Garonne. The insurrection was handily crushed, the leaders deported, those long-suspected of noxious republican tendencies were finally caught up in an extralegal net and removed, resounding electoral successes were won for Louis-Napoleon personally in the plebiscite and for his hand-picked candidates on the national and local scene, and order, confidence and prosperity had been restored.

To that remnant still faithful to the dream of a democratic and social republic, the future may indeed have looked hopeless. But the demo-soc gospel had taken firm hold in hearts and minds of the peasant and artisan in the river valleys and lowlands of the Lot-et-Garonne. The spirit of democratic individualism and social improvement was too deeply rooted to die. When the call for a new republic was later issued, the peasants and artisans of these same lowlands and river valleys would once again lead the struggle.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER 5

1. The department was served by a semaphore telegraph system at this time.

2. ADLG, Séries M: "Rapports de Police 1848-1852," 2 décembre 1851.

3. Ibid.; tomorrow meant December 4th.

4. ADLG, Séries M4: "Cercles et sociétés [de] jeux"; ADLG, Séries M2: "Cercles et sociétés; Police, états, tableaux, correspondance 1840-1853," 15 juillet 1850, ff.; ADLG, Séries U, liasses 14-18, nos. 23-30: "Cour d'Appel, Parquet général, Coup d'Etat 1850; Tribunaux d'Agen, Marmande, Villeneuve et Nérac, Rapports et correspondance entre le Procureur général, les procureurs et divers enquêtes, poursuites, arrestations 1850-1852"; AN BB^{30} 396 p. 440: "Evénements de décembre 1851, réponse su circulaire de 29 décembre 1851."

5. Décembre-Alonnier, Histoire des Conseils de Guerre de 1852 ou précis des événements survenus dans les départements à la suite du coup d'état de décembre 1851 (Paris, 1869), p. 215.

6. Anon., "Notice sur les événements qui se sont passés en 1852 (sic) notamment dans le canton de Lavardac et communes en dependant," Revue de l'Agenais t. 101, a. 102 (1975), p. 382.

7. Décembre-Alonnier, p. 215.

8. Anon., "Notice," p. 382; the mayor was later censured for his weak response.

9. The insurrectional committee of Agen was composed of Delpech, lawyer; Nasse, lawyer; Davarzec, typographer; Dauzon, lawyer; Barzat, baker; Gardette jeune, retired soldier.

10. It was later learned that Aiguillon had had three hundred individuals ready to march (ADLG, Séries M: "Rapports de Police").

11. ADLG, Séries M^{10}: "Coup d'Etat du 2 décembre; Dossiers des condamnés," Castinel.

12. ADLG, Séries U, liasse 14: "Cour d'Appel, Parquet général, Coup d'Etat 1851, Département de Lot-et-Garonne; généralités."

13. Suzanne Armstrong, 46 year old wife of a French army officer, had been involved in the republican movement in the Lot-et-Garonne since her arrival in the 1830's.

14. J.-Alfred Neuville, 2 décembre 1851: Proscriptions de Marmande (Lot-et-Garonne) (Agen, 1882).

15. Ibid., p. 23; "The crowd received the news with indescribable enthusiasm" (Décembre-Alonnier, p. 218).

16. Neuville, p. 24.

17. Décembre-Alonnier, p. 218.

18. Ibid., p. 220.

19. Neuville, p. 45.

20. Ibid., p. 46.

21. Ibid., p. 51; ADLG, unclassified poster; ADLG, Dépot O (Communale) Séries I^2 Marmande: "Surveillance de la haute police, accidents de travail, expulsions, colonisations, cercles, grêves des boulangers, coup d'état de 1851; 1851-1905."

22. Premier conseil de guerre de la 14^e division militaire séant à Bordeaux, Insurrection de Lot-et-Garonne -- Affaire Peyronny (Paris, s.d. [1852?]), p. 5.

23. Ibid., p. 9.

24. Ibid., p. 10.

25. Ibid., p. 25; Neuville, p. 84.

26. Neuville, p. 89.

27. Ibid., p. 131.

28. ADLG, Séries U, liasse 14: "Cour d'Appel"; over 1500 were arrested in all; over 500 later released.

29. Simone Portail, ed., Le coup d'état du 2 décembre 1851 et ses victimes en Lot-et-Garonne (Agen, 1957), p. 45; this was a class project of the students of the Ecole Normale of Agen.

30. ADLG, Séries M: "Rapports de Police."

31. Neuville, pp. 250, 315; Dr. J. Lepargneur, "L'itinéraire d'un proscrit Lot-et-Garonnais du 2 décembre 1851" Revue de l'Agenais t. 58, a. 59 (1932), pp. 54-61.

32. Premier Conseil; at his trial Peyronny declared, "If the coup d'état of the Prince President can give glory, security and happiness to my country, I would be the first to bless him; I say that without hesitation and without any feeling of weakness" (p. 2).

33. ADLG, Séries M n° 41: "Listes des personnes poursuivies à l'occasion du coup d'état de 1851; Décisions de Commissions Mixtes." The numbers are the individuals' respective order in the official report.

34. ADLG, Séries U, liasse 14: "Cour d'Appel"; ADLG, Séries M^{10}: "Coup d'Etat du 2 décembre; Dossiers des condamnés." There were several instances of individuals convicted on testimony like the following: "I heard a voice that sounded like Monsieur...."

35. Pascal Duprat, Les tables de proscriptions de Louis Bonaparte et ses complices (Liège, 1852), p. 289.

36. ADLG Séries M: "Plebiscite de décembre 1851; Proclamations de l'Empire, addresses à l'Empereur, résultats, 1851-1854."

37. Duprat, p. 289.

38. AN BB^{30} 397 d. 575: "Séries politique 1850-1860; exécution du circulaire de Ministère de la Guerre, 18 janvier 1852."

39. Neuville, p. 470; Portail, p. 39; Tatareau had replaced General Grammont, who when he learned that the individuals had been arrested for protesting the violation of the Constitution, replied, "It is their right!" (AN F^{16} 170^{25}: "Dossiers des préfets: de Preissac").

40. AN BB^{30} p. 583: "Séries politique (1850-1860): Commissions mixtes; dossier général; Cours d'Agen et d'Aix." The sentences broke down thus:

Cayenne	3
Algeria (seven or more years)	201
Algeria (less than seven years)	210
Expulsion	12
Temporary removal	125
Interned	74
Surveillance	182
Freedom	80
	887

The insurgents from the Lot-et-Garonne received harsher treatment than the nationwide average:

	Lot-et-Garonne	National
Cayenne	0.2%	0.9%
Algeria (seven or more)	22.6	16.9
Algeria (less than seven)	23.6	18.7
Expulsion	1.4	3.6
Removal	14.1	2.4
Internment	8.4	10.5
Surveillance	20.5	19.3
Freedom	9.0	21.8

41. An internee was required to write a request to the prefect where he was interned, who forwarded the request to the internee's home prefect; if he approved, this prefect had to request authorization from the Minister of the Interior for a short-term passport.

42. Lepargneur, p. 59.

43. Portail, p. 123; Agen - 9; Nérac - 43; Marmande - 51; Villeneuve - 4.

44. Neuville, p. 343; he claims only 252 individuals were given full pardons.

45. Ibid., p. 408.

46. Dubruel, in fact, returned to France only after the proclamation of the Republic in 1870.

47. Journal, 3 décembre 1851, p. 1.

48. Lepargneur, p. 54.

49. Benjamin Gastineau, Les transportés de décembre 1851 (Paris, 1869), p. 79.

50. Neuville, p. 145.

51. Gisela Geywitz, Das Plebiszit von 1851 in Frankreich (Tübingen, 1965), pp. 270-72; Portail, p. 53.

52. December 10, 1848 - 18%; May 13, 1849 - 16%; December 21, 1851 - 18.5%.

53. AN F^{1b} 170^{25}: "Dossier des préfets: de Preissac"; An example of his thoroughness was his lobbying to have the Electoral Law of May 1850 cover changes of residences of communes, rather than cantons, as the law maintained (AN F^{1c} II 97: "Elections: 1848, 1850").

54. Several demo-socs, never to be reconciled, simply cut out the OUI on their ballots (AN BB II 1180: "Votes populaires: plebiscite de 1852").

55. AN F^{1c} III Lot-et-Garonne 4: "Elections, esprit public," de Preissac au Ministre de l'Intérieur, 17 janvier 1852; AN C 1337: "Elections de 1852"; in Preissac's reply to the Minister of the

Interior's inquiry of the individuals loyal to Louis-Napoleon and, therefore, possible candidates, Preissac failed to mention Noubel at all. As for Jules Bérard, the sole Bonapartist to emerge from among the departmental representation to the National Assembly, Preissac did not recommend him because, although very popular throughout the department, he was without a fortune.

56. AN F^{1c} III Lot-et-Garonne 4.

Epitaph on a tombstone in the small cemetery of Sainte Eulalie, commune of Cauzac:

Geyssely, Jean -- political deportee as a result of the coup d'Etat of 1851. Agen -- Bordeaux -- Blaye -- Africa -- 15 months of prison without a known motive or a trial

"So this is what becomes of the victims of ambition and despotism! FRIENDS, in duty, pardon all of this but, in prudence, do not forget, Never!!"

CHAPTER 6: The Legacy of a House Divided

The Lot-et-Garonne was but one of several departments in France whose populace rose up to protest the coup d'état of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. Some areas were better organized -- sending virtual armies against the government's troops; several areas experienced a more protracted and violent insurrection; other departments had a far greater number of individuals arrested. As a result, historians have focused on the lower Midi and the Limousin as principal areas to study the causes of the insurrection of December 1851. The Lot-et-Garonne, however, has not been scrutinized, despite the fact that more individuals were arrested in the department than any other area outside the lower Midi and the Limousin. In fact, only five departments had more individuals arrested than the Lot-et-Garonne. Moreover, unlike the previously examined regions, the Lot-et-Garonne was an island of

tumult in the Southwest, registering almost twice the number arrested as its neighbor, the Gers. Furthermore, the insurrection in Maurice Agulhon's Var, Philippe Vigier's Alpine region, Ted Margadant's Drôme and Hérault, Albert Soboul's lower Midi and John Merriman's Limousin does not necessarily describe all of France. Despite these excellent studies, none has addressed adequately the economic, social, political or geographical forces peculiar to the Lot-et-Garonne.

While economics played an important role in the call to arms in December 1851, the economic interpretations of other regions do not hold for the Lot-et-Garonne. Albert Soboul believed that the insurrection was one of a series of reactionary peasant protests against the destruction of communal lands due to the rapid capitalist transformation of agriculture. But the Lot-et-Garonne had long been linked to the national and international markets of wheat, tobacco, wine, prunes and various fruits and vegetables. Moreover, the 1851 agricultural survey showed few communal areas remaining in the department. Since the Lot-et-Garonne was an intensely individualistic region where the commune played a very insignificant role, conflict over the capitalist encroachment on communal lands was not a factor in the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne.

Nor did the insurrection resemble the reactionary tax revolts, grain riots or jacqueries of the past. Despite the unsubstantiated rhetoric spewed forth by the rabid sycophants of Louis-Napoleon, the Lot-et-Garonne recorded no acts of violence, pillage or rape beyond the exchange of gunfire outside Sainte Bazeille (and there was reason to believe that the police fired first in response to Peyronny's "Who goes

there?").[1] In those towns and villages where the demo-socs overran the town hall, a guard was posted over the tax receipts to insure against a charge of looting.[2] Resistance to taxation in the Lot-et-Garonne had been strongest in the north and northeast of the department, yet these areas, outside Villeneuve, were quiescent.[3] As for a link between the grain troubles and the causes of the insurrection, René Gossez's map of the crisis of 1846-1847 showed the preponderance of trouble in the north of the department, far from the tumultuous river valleys and lowlands.[4] The insurrection of the Lot-et-Garonne, therefore, was not a reenactment of past reactionary revolts.

While peasants and artisans in the lower Midi, like those in the Lot-et-Garonne, were driven by intense land hunger, there does not appear the same degree of anxiety and unrest toward the usurious moneylender in the Lot-et-Garonne as Philippe Vigier witnessed in the Alpine region. While both the republicans and the party of order of the Lot-et-Garonne made low-cost mortgage money a part of their electoral platforms, only once did one launch into a diatribe against the "usurious Jew," never to be repeated.[5] Moreover, the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne occurred in the river valleys and the lowlands, areas of high métayage. It was generally the peasant who overextended his indebtedness to increase his landholdings, however, who protested most vehemently usurious interest rates. Yet we saw in the Lot-et-Garonne that those possessing large land holdings, the moyens propriétaires of the mollasses and serres, were the most conservative and quiescent during the Second Republic. Therefore, Vigier's model of

the insurrection as a protest against high interest rates as well does not apply to the Lot-et-Garonne.

Maurice Agulhon's thesis that the propagation of the republican gospel was due to tightly-knit, interdependent communal organizations does not hold entirely true for the Lot-et-Garonne. While circumstantial evidence points to the existence of "secret societies" in the department, the very pattern of settlement in the Lot-et-Garonne opposes Agulhon's model of sociability. The commune, so important to Agulhon's model, did not hold a key position in the social organization of the department. The republicans of the Lot-et-Garonne had to overcome the extreme dispersal of settlements and the strong individualism which characterized the department. Proximate avenues of communications, and not strong communal organization, spelled success for the demo-socs in the Lot-et-Garonne.

On the other hand, Ted Margadant's study on the Drôme and Hérault expands on the intercommunal solidarity in the lower Midi in pointing out the crucial role played by the underground organizations in the insurrection. He saw in the conspiratorial network throughout the lower Midi a highly-trained and well-organized shadow army, ready to wrestle power from the government. But the Lot-et-Garonne contained no para-military organizations, while its "secret societies" were nothing more than the political circles of the local inns driven to secrecy by the administration's repressive measures. The peasants and artisans of the Lot-et-Garonne responded rapidly to the call to arms in December 1851, but the sight of such a motley group singing songs and brandishing pikes, scythes, pitchforks, sabers, knives and hunting rifles would

convince any onlooker that this was no well-trained army. Moreover, the alacrity with which the bands from Nérac and Marmande dispersed dispel any myth of a bloodthirsty mob.

Even studies of the insurrection in neighboring departments have not been able to shed light on the situation in the Lot-et-Garonne. Albert Charles' book on the Gironde during the Second Republic devotes most of its pages on the political wars within Bordeaux. The discussion of the insurrection is perfunctory since the metropolis of Bordeaux fell silent, freeing the army to crush the more vocal protests in the Lot-et-Garonne and the Gers. Jean Dagnan's studies of the Gers, on the other hand, portray the revolt as the work of well-organized conspirators. In this respect his thesis reflects Margadant's interpretation of the lower Midi. But Dagnan fails to uncover the deeper causes which drove the conspirators to take up arms. Even with Charles' and Dagnan's works, an understanding of the causes of the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne remains veiled.

A close examination of the national and departmental statistics for those arrested in the wake of the insurrection reveals how the Lot-et-Garonne differed from the nation. Throughout France over twenty-seven percent of those arrested had declared rural occupations (cultivateur and journalier). On the other hand, in the Lot-et-Garonne only fourteen percent of those arrested stated publicly that farming was their primary occupation. When the percentage of white collar occupations (rentiers, lawyers and teachers) and the percentage of shopkeepers (innkeepers and négotiants) are included with the farmers, the Lot-et-Garonne shows over seventy percent of those arrested had

artisanal occupations (compared to sixty percent nationally). On first inspection, these statistics question the portrait of the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne as a peasant insurrection.[6]

But the insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne was a revolt of the peasants and artisans of the river valleys and lowlands, areas where métayage and small towns were more prevalent. On the list of possible occupations declared by those arrested, métayer was conspicuously absent. And yet métayage was widespread in the very area of disturbances (Figures 26, 27 and 28). The lowlands were also the regions most heavily populated by artisans who left the stagnating highlands for the promise of employment and land in the rapidly-expanding lowlands and river valleys. Moreover, many barrelmakers, bakers, ironsmiths or weavers, justly proud of their craft, preferred to declare their artisanal occupation rather than that of métayer when interrogated by the examining officer. In a department whose inhabitants prided themselves on land ownership, whose communal centers were sparsely populated and widely scattered, and whose rich alluvial lands of the river valleys were greatly subdivided, it is highly probable that the artisan was also a métayer or journalier, especially those having seasonal trades. So, although statistically farmers made up a smaller percentage of the insurrectionists in the Lot-et-Garonne than in France as a whole, the settlement patterns in the lowlands may have afforded many carpenters, bakers, shoemakers and weavers the opportunity to also work the land as métayers.

At the forefront of these peasants and artisans were the liberal bourgeoisie, drawing up plans, issuing marching orders and eventually



Figure 26
Noted Areas of Disturbance - December 1851



Figure 27
Number Arrested per Canton



Figure 28
Number Arrested per Ten Thousand Population

calling retreat. In Agen the Insurrectional Committee that met the evening of December 2 to draw up the plans for a two-pronged attack on Agen was headed by Louis Vivent, Armand Delpech, Fredéric Nasse and Henri Fournel, all lawyers. It was Fredéric Nasse who informed the column from Nérac that to march on Agen was foolhardy and counseled retreat; Louis Vivent led the demo-socs on the Place du Palais and hastily retreated when he thought the administration knew their plan of attack. Etienne Darnospil, who led his "army" from Barbaste to Agen, was a former teacher and a contractor on the Division of Bridges and Roads. Villeneuve was led by an engineer, Charles Philips, and a banker, Gaston Dubruel, while Marmande marched to the orders of the lawyer Paul Vergnes and the retired army officer Jean-Baptiste Peyronny. During the Second Republic, several of these moderate republicans like Dubruel and Vergnes eschewed the more radical demo-socs who espoused the gun instead of legal reform of the ballot box. A passion for universal suffrage and equal protection under the law drove many of these lawyers, teachers and businessmen to take their place in the vanguard of the insurrection. But in Agen and Villeneuve, these bourgeois republicans backed away when confronted with the spectre of a truly bloody conflict. While in Marmande, the leaders succumbed to the inflamed radicals' demand to march, against their own judgement, for fear they would lose control of the rank and file.

But were these goals of the return of universal suffrage and the inviolability of the Constitution and the Republic shared by the rank and file of peasants and artisans, or are the government's reports that France was saved from a most horrifying fratricidal bloodbath to be

believed? The government portrayed the insurgents as looters, rapists, murderers and arsonists driven by vengeance and visions of an easy life. One insurgent testified that the leaders of the insurrection "wanted to finish with the whites; the guillotine was too gentle, not expeditious; they would have to gun them down en masse."[7] Workers on the canal were reportedly promised an end to misery and the beginning of a new era where they would lack nothing.[8] Townspeople of Agen and Marmande allegedly heard shouts of "Down with the whites!" echo through the streets as the demo-socs were called to arms.[9] As the chief of police of Agen wrote to the prefect after the insurrection, "something totally providential" saved them from a situation in which "we would have been all shot and slaughtered on the spot."[10] But these reports oftentimes reflected what the government wanted to hear. To ingratiate himself with his superior, a police officer, sub-prefect, prosecutor or prefect naturally corroborated or even enhanced the official version of the insurrection as a blood-thirsty jacquerie. And the accused hoped to alleviate his sentence by reporting what his inquisitors hoped to hear.

The actual words and actions of the insurgents, however, discredit the administration's portrait of them. While the administration saw the insurrection as the work of a well-armed and organized network of secret societies bent on the destruction of French society, testimony contradicted this. Circumstantial evidence points to the existence of "secret societies" in the Lot-et-Garonne prior to the insurrection. Several of the lesser members of these groups singled out the same leaders, the same meetings and the same initiation rites. Many peasants and artisans were drawn into the group by a brother or a friend; the

secret societies were so attractive "because of the irresistible force of mystery, which all men without education like, the good feeling of pronouncing a terrible oath and the joy of having been judged worthy to keep an important secret. All of this makes one dizzy, drunk and lose all morality."[11] And when the news of the coup reached the towns and villages, these same members gathered at the local inn (the innkeeper was often the leader) to decide in which directions to send the news.

These "secret societies," however, were not the insidious conspiratorial networks portrayed by the administration. Rather they were merely the political discussion groups of the local inns driven into hiding by administrative repression. Some members were required to pay minimal dues to purchase political journals. And in most cases of individuals joining a so-called secret society, the new members were required to pledge to rise up and defend the Constitution and the Republic on the first signal.[12] In the end, it is difficult to know whether these individuals responded to the call to arms in December 1851 because of their oath to defend both the Constitution and the Republic, their desire for adventure with their fellow paysans or the threat of death should they not join the rag-tag column.

If we are to believe the testimony of the accused, they took up arms in December 1851 to defend the Constitution and the Republic, as historian Charles Seignobos maintained. As Maurice Agulhon holds, it is unfair to assume that the peasants and artisans who participated in the insurrection were not as politically astute as the bourgeois leaders to be willing to defend such liberal programs as universal suffrage, a constitution or a republic. But the individuals involved never

specifically enunciated what the Constitution or the Republic meant to them and why their preservation were so crucial. Many bourgeois republicans were willing to fight for universal suffrage; some, like the newspaper editors of the Southwest, were willing to plot for its return by force of arms. Others, like Paul Vergnes, in the platform of the Democratic Club of Marmande, saw in the Republic the opportunity to abolish all privileges and "unjustly acquired fortunes." Universal suffrage would guarantee justice and liberty for all.

But closer to the peasant and artisan, the more fundamental causes for the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne come into view. While calls for universal suffrage, promotion by merit, war on unjustly acquired fortunes, justice and liberty lured the more liberal republicans to take up arms, an insurgent's letter to the editor revealed the crucial factor for many rank and file. "Without money, the poor are without justice or liberty; nothing for nothing. Justice is money; the poor are denied both."[13] The most timely exposition of the aims of the rank and file insurgents was a proclamation found on the walls in Barbaste on December 4th calling the peasants and artisans of the countryside to arms.

People!

> People of France, arise! Now is the moment! Your masters have disappeared; to whom do you belong? Whose prize have you just been? Napoleon's? that bastard Chambord's? the Count of Paris, son of a damned race? No! Each had his chance. Today, you are the masters! Do not let this opportunity slip away. Despotism is diseased; it has fallen to pieces, leaving the field vacant. Let us shake hands -- tyranny is caught in the vise. It may be necessary to use the guillotine, that avenger of the rights of man, that holy instrument of justice (so that the oppressor never rises again).

> While you, your wife and your children die of hunger and misery, the rich gorge themselves with good times and delights!! While you are overcome with hardships, they are overcome with congratulations..for you -- sadness and tears, for them -- joy; for you -- nothing, for them -- everything! This abuse by force and privilege must end today; you are the masters!
>
> Is it not infantile babbling that the rich snare the treasures which provide the existence of twenty families? It is a crime against humanity. Humanity must reclaim its rights. We are one hundred against one; we are united; they and their families are divided -- they are at each other's throats. Their accursed race should be destroyed.
>
> Courage, people! Arise and proclaim from the heights these misunderstood rights of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The obstacle to conquer is the love of riches. Crush it, so that riches, the root of all evil, will be divided among the poor who have always worked and suffered.
>
> People, on the first signal, like a single man, arise! Down with the infamous rich! Down with the hated oppressor! Everyone with more than two thousand livres of rente is an outlaw of society.[14]

The rank and file who took up arms wanted justice and liberty, safeguarded by an inviolable Constitution and Republic, but unlike their leaders, they knew that talk of justice and liberty was empty if they could not share in the wealth of the countryside.

In the Lot-et-Garonne the wealth of the countryside meant land. The local representative to the Club des clubs of Paris, the lawyer Jean Dauzon, in his final report to Paris after the election of April 23, 1848, best described the overwhelming passion of the peasant in the Lot-et-Garonne.

> The Lot-et-Garonne is one of the regions of France where property is found most evenly divided. Everyone owns some [or], more importantly, everyone aspires, by each holding his individual job, to win a parcel of land where he will be able to peacefully retire. This describes, above all else, the rivalry that exists....[15]

It was the hunger for land that drove the insurgents of the Lot-et-Garonne to take up arms. For them, land was the realization of the promise of the Republic.

So strong was the desire to secure that parcel of land where he could retire and later leave to his heir undiminished that a peasant or artisan of the Lot-et-Garonne limited the size of his family. Because of the unfavorable inheritance laws, the land for which a peasant had struggled and sacrificed his entire life was in danger of subdivision among his heirs. Therefore, to maximize his well-being and that of his progeny (and as a testament to the importance of land in the peasant's mind), the peasant of the Lot-et-Garonne was one of the first groups of France where family planning had a significant impact. But the attempt to limit family size was not a product of misery. As Etienne Van de Walle states, "the richest departments, as far as landed income is concerned, are those where birth control has made the most inroads, or affected fertility first."[16] The dramatic demographic shift in the Lot-et-Garonne during the first half of the nineteenth century attests to an early awareness by the peasants of the Lot-et-Garonne of the relationship between family size and the maximization of well-being, a trait evidenced by modern societies. Furthermore, their attempt to limit the number of offspring testifies to the depth of the peasants' hunger for land in the Lot-et-Garonne.

The first half of the nineteenth century in the Lot-et-Garonne witnessed not only the start of a net decrease in the total population of the department, but the start of widespread internal migration from the highlands to the lowlands.[17] The conversion of some highland wheat

fields into open grazing, the reclamation of the frequently flooded river banks and the opening of the horizons of opportunity around the cities and towns of the lowlands drew peasant and artisan from the highlands into the lowlands and river valleys in search of their own parcel of land. Métayage would be for many the first stage in their quest for land ownership. But this migration from the highlands to the lowlands also set the stage for the tensions that would later rock the department.

The insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne marked the dramatic split between the highlands and the lowlands that had been brought to a head during the Second Republic. As the maps illustrate (Figures 26, 27 and 28), the cantons of the lowlands and river valleys experienced the greatest disturbances in terms of number of disturbances, number arrested and number arrested per ten thousand population. The most prominent among the areas are the cantons of Mas d'Agenais, Bouglon, Damazan and Lavardac on the west bank of the Garonne River. These regions also had the highest percentage of métayage in the department. Moreover, canal construction was being carried out in Damazan and Lavardac, where Darnospil recruited his most ardent followers.

Several other factors contributed to the widening gulf between the highlands and the lowlands. The demo-soc movement flourished along the avenues of communication. The most prominent thoroughfare was the Garonne River valley, where demo-soc propaganda travelled northwestward from Toulouse to Bordeaux through republican centers like Agen, Aiguillon, Port-Sainte-Marie, Tonneins, Mas and Marmande. The second

route followed the Lot River valley through Clairac, Sainte Livrade and Villeneuve. And the workers on the lateral canal and métayers along the Baïze River brought their demo-soc beliefs to the western lowlands. And the response of the towns of Lauzun and Villeréal, though located in the conservative North, was due to the demo-soc message travelling along the national routes from Paris on its way to Marmande and Villeneuve. Moreover, the river valleys and lowlands had a rich Protestant heritage that separated this region even more from the highlands. While not all Protestant regions supported the insurrection (witness Nérac), Protestant regions like Port-Sainte-Marie and Sainte Livrade were in the forefront of resistance to the government of Louis-Napoleon. Furthermore, the lowlands also boasted of a higher literacy rate as well. The social and economic environment of the lowlands and river valleys of the Lot-et-Garonne lent themselves more readily to the propagation of the demo-soc message. Here the system of land exploitation and extreme parcelization, together with the high rate of literacy and numerous avenues of communication, set the lowlands apart from the highlands in the Lot-et-Garonne and set the stage for the confrontation between the demo-socs and the conservatives.

The history of the Second Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne was one of confrontation, division, repression and rebellion. The euphoria of the February Revolution rapidly evaporated as the party of order and the republicans squared off over three times in electoral confrontations, and in these contests the dichotomy between highlands and lowlands became more apparent. The republicans hampered their own efforts by the ever-widening division between the liberal bourgeois republicans

and the more radical demo-socs. Not only was the form of the Republic in question, (a liberal, constitutional Republic of the Cavaignaquists versus the democratic and socialist Republic of the followers of Ledru-Rollin), but increasingly the means to be used to bring about their republics. The bloody June Days of 1848 and the presidential election of December 10, 1848, had so rent the republican party of the Lot-et-Garonne that future attempts at a reconciliation would merely hide the festering wound.

The zealous administration of Paul de Preissac, with the support of the conservative representative Jean-Didier Baze and the Bonapartist newspaper, the Journal de Lot-et-Garonne of Raymond-Henri Noubel, exploited the rancor and divisions among the republicans of the department to carry out widespread and thorough repression of the republican movement in the Lot-et-Garonne. Mayors, teachers, engineers, civil servants -- none escaped the administration's purge. The administration's handling of the election of May 13, 1849, for the National Assembly is a case study in electoral intimidation and harassment. Moreover, those indicted for the Plot of the Southwest spent nine months in preventive arrest even before being brought to trial -- a move that brought even the monarchists to condemn Preissac's harsh rule. But the most repressive act to the demo-soc movement came from Paris in the Electoral Law of May 1850. With that law one-third of the department's voters were disenfranchised, most from the river valleys and lowlands -- the strongholds of the demo-soc movement in the department.

Preissac's administrative repression only served to win more adherents to the demo-soc cause (witness the increasing demo-soc strength in Beauville, Laroque-Timbaut and Penne in the May 1849 election), but the Electoral Law of May 1850 drove the demo-socs against the wall. Now they were faced with the difficult choice of the ballot box or the gun. Many moderate republicans, with vivid memories of the June Days and talk of widespread expropriation in the promised demo-soc republic, bolted the movement to await the election of May 1852. But too many demo-socs, the métayers, journaliers and artisans of the river valleys and lowlands, put little trust in the upcoming election of May 1852 and prepared to return France to the path of universal suffrage, the Republic and the fulfillment of the revolution by force of arms.

The insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne was more than several hundred peasants and artisans marching to protest the coup d'état of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. The coup became a mere catalyst for the explosive forces long developing in the Lot-et-Garonne between demo-soc and conservative, métayer and propriétaire, lowland and highland. The shifting demographic patterns of settlement, the ethic of self-improvement and bien-être evidenced by the dropping reproductive rate, the avenues of communication, the rich religious heritage, the dichotomy of literacy rates and the political turmoil of confrontation, repression and rebellion reveal a definite cleavage between the highlands of conservative propriétaires and the lowlands of demo-soc métayers. All are pieces in the puzzle of the insurrection of December 1851 in the Lot-et-Garonne.

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER 6

1. Neuville, p. 101; the only things seized were lead and powder; several stolen chickens were eaten democratically, pp. 97-99.

2. Ibid., p. 57.

3. René Gossez, "La résistance à l'impôt: Les quarante cinq centimes," Etudes; Société d'histoire de la Révolution de 1848 XV (La Roche-sur-Yon, 1953), p. 132. The areas about Villeneuve and Sainte Livrade were also racked with a tax revolt in 1842.

4. René Gossez, "A propos de la carte des troubles de 1846-1847" in Ernest Labrousse, ed., Etudes; Société d'histoire de la Révolution de 1848 XIX (La Roche-sur-Yon, 1956), p. 1.

5. Républicain, 10 avril 1849, p. 1.

6. AN BB^{30} 424: "Insurrection de décembre 1851; Statistique;"

Table I

		Lot-et-Garonne			National	
		N°	%	Rank	N°	%
1.	Aubergiste	38	4.3	5	990	3.7
2.	Avocat	11	1.2	18	225	0.8
3.	Boulanger	31	3.5	7	415	1.5
4.	Charpentier	35	4.0	6	217	1.0
5.	Cordonnier	52	5.9	4	1,107	4.1
6.	Cultivateur	91	10.3	2	5,423	20.2
7.	Forgeron	25	2.8	10	467	1.7
8.	Instituteur	15	1.7	15	261	1.0
9.	Journalier	29	3.3	9	1,850	6.9
10.	Maçon	34	2.7	11	733	2.7
11.	Menuisier	22	2.5	13	888	3.3
12.	Négotiant	11	1.2	17	427	1.6
13.	Rentier	67	7.6	3	1,570	5.8
14.	Serrurrier	12	1.4	16	428	1.6
15.	Tailleur	23	2.6	12	688	2.6
16.	Tisserand	30	3.4	8	462	1.7
17.	tonnelier	17	1.9	14	198	0.7
18.	Divers	125	14.9	1	2,352	8.7

7. ADLG Séries M^{10}: "Coup d'Etat du 2 décembre; dossiers des condamnés," Cheyre; AN BB^{30} 396, p. 440.

8. AN BB^{30} 396, p. 440.

9. Ibid.

10. ADLG Séries M: "Rapports de police 1848-1853."

11. ADLG Séries U, liasse 14: "Procureur de la République à procureur général," 8 janvier 1852.

12. ADLG Séries M^{10}; ADLG Séries U, liasse 16: "Cour d'Appel, parquet général, coup d'état 1851, tribunal de Marmande"; the oath read, "I swear to arise at the first signal to combat all political and social tyrannies and to obey when they [the leaders] command me." ADLG Séries U, liasse 18: "Cour d'Appel, parquet général, coup d'état 1851,

tribunal de Nérac"; another oath was sworn, "I swear with my hand on the dagger -- hatred for kings, despots and tyrants; I swear to defend the democratic and social Republic with my life."

13. ADLG Séries M^{10}.

14. Ibid.

15. AN C 939: "Enquête des évenements de mai et juin 1848; saisies rue de Rivoli n^{o} 16 (Club des clubs)."

16. Van de Walle, "French Fertility," p. 286; see also A. Chervin, "Nombre des enfants," p. 74.

17. Despite early family planning, the population peaked in 1841, due largely to immigration.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Works on the Revolution of 1848 and the history of the Second Republic are numerous. An excellent point of departure is the bibliography compiled by Peter Amann, "Writings on the Second French Republic," Journal of Modern History (1962). Besides being an excellent account of the social history of the Second Republic, Roger Price's The French Second Republic; A Social History (London, 1972) has an excellent bibliography as well.

As for the insurrection of December 1851, a complete bibliography is more difficult to find because of the many regional studies involved. The best bibliography for the insurrection is found in Maurice Agulhon, "La résistance au coup d'état en province, esquisse d'historiographie," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (janvier-mars, 1974), pp. 18-26. Not only is the bibliography complete (save recent works by Merriman, Margadant, et al.), but Agulhon compares and contrasts various interpretations as they are influenced by historical trends of thought. Another work worth consulting is Clude Levy, "Notes sur les fondements sociaux de l'insurrection de décembre 1851 en province," Information historique (1954), pp. 142-45. The premier regional articles are reviewed and contrasted. A point de départ for the study of the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne (in fact, the only one readily available in this country) is Jean Tonnadre, "Le coup d'état et

le fortress de Blaye," Revue historique de Bordeaux (1968), pp. 16-19. The bibliography helps orient the researcher before the long trek to the departmental archives.

The departmental archives of the Lot-et-Garonne have been virtually untouched by historians of nineteenth and twentieth century France. The Séries A through L have served as resources for many monographs of the history of the department to 1815. The most important archival material for the nineteenth century historian rests with the multi-faceted Séries M. In tracing police surveillance of the demo-soc cercles and possible secret societies, Séries M_2: "Cercles et sociétés [de] jeux; Police, états, tableaux, correspondance 1840-1870"; Séries M_4: "Cercles et sociétés [de] jeux; Police, circulaires, instructions, correspondance XIX^{e} siècle"; Séries M: "Rapports de police; 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851-53"; and Séries M: "Seconde République; Proclamation de la République; rapports des préfets 1848-49" were used extensively. Filed in chronological order within each dossier, the documents have no other system of retrieval.

Electoral results can be found in Séries M as well. Séries M: "Elections des répresentants du peuple à l'Assemblée Constituante de 1848; Instructions, tableaux" has a very incomplete listing of the number of electoral bulletins distributed and no breakdown of the electoral results according to canton or candidate. Séries M: "Listes électorales; élection legislative, 13 mai 1849," on the other hand, gives a detailed listing of the occupation of the electors. Unfortunately, it deals only with the most prominent communes. The electoral results are complete. Séries M: "Plebiscite de décembre

1851; Proclamation de l'Empire; Adresse à l'Empereur; Resultats, 1851-1854" contains very valuable reports of police commissioners, mayors, justices of the peace and other functionaries detailing local responses to the insurrection.

Statistical data are found in Séries M as well. The most helpful in developing a picture of the Lot-et-Garonne in the period 1848-51 are Séries M: "Statistique agricoles quinquennale, 1852" and Séries 9M: "Rencensement -- Listes Nominative, 1851." The spotty reports of the former for some communes makes the creation of a complete agricultural picture for the department difficult. The latter lacks a summary, necessitating referring to each of the over three hundred communes. The crucial report for Villeneuve, as well as several communes, are missing. Séries M VII: "Statistique; Mercuriales 1845-52" has lacunae for the important years 1846-47; Séries M III: "Statistique industrielle et commercielle (no. 28) 1850-60" is meager due to the weak industrial base of the department. By this period most of the iron and copper forges were closed. One must turn to secondary sources for pre-1850 industrial statistics.

Perhaps the most valuable resource of the departmental archives detailing the insurrection in the Lot-et-Garonne is the Séries U, liasses 13-18: "Cours d'Appel, Parquet Général; Coup d'Etat 1851; Tribunaux d'Agen, Marmande, Villeneuve et Nérac; Enquêtes, poursuites, arrestations 1851-52." Not only does it detail the movements of the various insurgent groups but also contain the interrogations of many of the leading participants. The sworn statements also reveal the level of literacy of the individuals arrested.

The deliberations of the Conseil Général, found in the bound volumes Sessions du Conseil Général (Agen, 1847-52) are invaluable in mapping the numerous shifts in political power within the department as well as learning of the economic, educational and political concerns of the leaders of the department. For the only available source of measuring literacy rates for this period, Séries R: "Liste du tirage au sort des jeunes gens de la classe de 1851" lists the number of recruits for each canton as illiterate, able to read and able to read and write. Bothe Séries M: "Cercles et sociétés; Sociétés de sécours mutuels" and Séries M5: "Loges maçonniques" shed little light on the possibilities of these organizations having served as foundations for secret societies.

The most valuable document found in the archives was located purely by chance. Séries M, n^{o} 41: "Listes des personnes poursuivies à l'occasion du coup d'état de 1851; Decisions des Commissions Mixtes" was thought to be lost. The document is the original transcript of the mixed commission for the Lot-et-Garonne ennumerating the birthplace, residence, age, profession, previous arrests, opinion of the commission and its verdict for each of the individuals arrested. Uncovering this document and literally piecing it together again made the research worthwhile.

The National Archives served to fill in several gaps left by the research in the departmental archives and to give a national perspective to the insurrection. Moreover, here one learned what the departmental officials did indeed report to Paris.

While the departmental archives has a printed transcript of the court case in the Plot of the Southwest, the National Archives has several letters seized at Gauzence's and used against the defendants in BB^{18} 1488: "Complot de Lyon et Sud-Ouest." Additional documentation is found in BB^{30} 392^{B} p. 192: "Cour d'Agen; Poursuites de complot contre les provinces de la catégorie du Sud-Ouest." These documents detail the tactics of delay employed by the prefect and the general prosecutor.

The monthly reports by the general prosecutors and prefects for the period 1847-1850 were rather sketchy (BB^{30} 333: "Ministère de la Justice; correspondance du Cabinet, affaires politiques A-Z 1848"; BB^{30} 358, dossier 2: "Cour d'Agen; Troubles postèrieures à la Révolution de Février 1848, jusqu'à 1850"; BB^{30} 370, dossier 1: "Cour d'Agen; Rapports mensuels 1849-50"; BB^{30} 368: "Extraits des rapports politiques des procureux généraux novembre 1849-52"). The most valuable collection in the BB^{30} series is BB^{30} 396, p. 440: "Evénements de décembre 1851; reponse à circulaire de 29 décembre 1851" in which the prefect and numerous functionaries submitted detailed reports on the insurrection.

Reports on disturbances prior to 1851 are few and speak more to government responses (troop movements, trials, etc.) than to the underlying causes: for the grain disturbances of 1846-47 see BB^{19} 37: "Cour de Cassation; reports politiques 1846-47; cherté des grains"; for the census disburbances of 1842 see BB^{18} 1395^{A} d. 2251: "Cour d'Appel d'Agen; Troubles sur le rencensement"; for the forty-five centime surtax see BB^{18} 1462 d. 5561: "Troubles sur le quarante-cinq centimes impôt";

and for rumored return of the dîme during the election of April 1848 see BB^{18} 1463 d. 5724: "Troubles à Tournon sur les dîmes."

Election results found in Séries C are superficial for the Lot-et-Garonne. Séries C 1245: "Elections de 1840-46; Lot-et-Garonne, actes de naissances des candidates" affords insight into the background of Charles Lesseps. Séries C 1327 and 1337 detail the electoral results for April 1848 and March 1852 respectively; they fail to break down the results according to cantons. The most valuable document in the C series is 1332: "Election de mars 1849; actes de naissances, protestations." Here the demo-socs carefully spelled out the myriad ways the administration of Prefect Paul de Preissac manipulated the election. The C series also contains the reports of the local representatives of the Club des clubs to the Parisian headquarters in Séries C 939: "Enquête des événements de mai et juin 1848; saisies rue de Rivoli n^{o} 16 (Club des clubs)." While most of the reports deal with the representatives' numerous requests for additional funds, several valuable sketches of local republicans are there as well.

Séries B II contains numerous ballots invalidated because of unauthorized comments (B II 1003: "Votes populaires; élection présidentielle 1848," B II 1091: "Votes populaires; plebiscite 1851," B II 1180: "Votes populaires; plebiscite 1852"). They serve as one of the few means available to discern the true popular perceptions of the candidates. Further insight into the elections can be had by referring to Séries F^{1C} IV, Lot-et-Garonne 4: "Elections, esprit public," and F^{1C} II 97: "Elections, 1848, 1850." The former is especially valuable, for it gives the prefect's perceptions of the candidates, especially

Charles Lesseps in 1846 and those proposed by the prefect for the March 1852 election.

Much of the information concerning those arrested for their participation in the insurrection of December 1851 found in the departmental archives is duplicated in the National Archives (Séries F^{7} 2587: "Commissions militaires; Listes des individus transportés en Afrique par suite des événements de décembre 1851"), but it is not as legible. The documents dealing with commutations and pardons are more detailed than the departmental collection (BB^{30} 470: "Condamnés des commissions mixtes; grâces 1852-56; dossier 11: Lot-et-Garonne," BB^{22} 135: "Grâces accordées par le Prince à l'occasion de son passage dans le département de Lot-et-Garonne 6 octobre 1852"). The statistics for the insurrection in BB^{30} 424: "Insurrection de décembre 1851; statistiques" provide a convenient breakdown of those arrested into professions and sentences for every department as well as nationwide.

The archives of the Ministry of the Army provide numerous correspondances concerning the dispatch of troops to troubled areas throughout the department. Séries E^{5} 149: "Troubles dans les divisions militaires à l'occasion du recensement" and Séries E^{5} 156: "Cherté des grains, 1839-1847" complement AN BB^{18} 1395^{A} d. 2251 and AN BB^{19} 37 respectively. For detailed exposition of troop deployment during the insurrection of December 1851, consult Séries G^{8} 191 through 193. But the most valuable document in this archive is MR 1273: "Mémoires et Reconnaissances après 1790; Lot-et-Garonne." Here military scouting parties in 1828 recorded in detail the topography, agriculture, industry and inhabitants of the Lot-et-Garonne in view of a possible

future brush warfare. The document is important to understanding the department and its inhabitants during the first half of the nineteenth century. No other primary record of the region by outside observers exists.

Another primary source utilized was the Fonds maçonniques found in the Bibliothèque Nationale. While the collection details membership rolls for the period, no record of the meetings were kept. Moreover, the membership of the lodges in almost all cases reads like a Who's Who of prominent conservatives and monarchists. The two radical lodges of Nérac and Villeneuve came under attack from within and without and failed to materialize as a center of demo-soc agitation.

While the major cities of Agen, Marmande, Nérac and Villeneuve had newspapers, only those of Agen remain in any number. The Journal de Nérac, Echo de Marmande and Le Progrès of Villeneuve were primarily journals of literary, commercial and agricultural announcements. The archives of the Lot-et-Garonne have bound volumes of the Journal de Lot-et-Garonne (governmental), the Républicain de Lot-et-Garonne, Le Radical de Lot-et-Garonne, L'Echo du Peuple (all republican), the Mémorial Agenais and Concilateur Agenais (both Legitimist). The collection lacks several initial issues of the Radical and the last issues of the Conciliateur. If one is accustomed to the particular brand of French political humor, the archives even have the Charivari du Midi with excellent political jibes and lithographic cartoons.

Secondary Sources

The secondary literature on the Second Republic and the insurrection of December 1851 is rich and multi-faceted. The best easy-to-read overview of the rise and fall of the Second Republic is found in that invaluable Que sais-je? collection by Philippe Vigier, La Seconde Republique (Paris, 1975). For the social history of the period, none surpasses Roger Price, The French Second Republic; A Social History (London, 1972). No other general work gives such a detailed account of the coup d'état and its immediate aftermath. Meanwhile, no historian of the period can ignore the cornerstone of the history of the Second Republic of Charles Seignobos, La Deuxième République, volume 6 of Ernest Lavisse, ed., Histoire de la France (Paris, 1922).

Interpretative works on the Second Republic and the insurrection for France as a whole are few. Peter Amann's "The Changing Outlines of 1848," American Historical Review (1963) exposes and challenges many of the stereotypes of the period. While Albert Soboul makes a case for the insurrection as a vestige of reactionary peasant protests in "La question paysanne," La Pensée 18-20 (1948), Charles Tilly argues that the period was a watershed ushering in the modern industrial era in Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century 1830-1930 (Cambridge, 1975), Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized France, 1845-1855," in William Aydelotte, et al., The Dimensions of Quantitative History (Princeton, 1972) and Charles Tilly, "The Changing Place of Collective Violence," in Melvin Richeter, ed., Essays in Theory and History: An Approach to the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1970).

But the most valuable works on the period are localized studies. No study of the Second Republic would be complete without Maurice Agulhon's La République au village (Paris, 1970). In intimate detail he reveals to his readers the inner life of the communes of the Var and how they helped spread the republican gospel. Another impressive work on Southeastern France is Philippe Vigier's La Séconde République dans la région alpine (Paris, 1963). The two-volume work examines the political, economic and social aspects of the Second Republic in the Basses-Alpes. To understand the reasons why the Gironde did not react to the news of the coup d'état, see Albert Charles, La Révolution de 1848 et la Seconde République à Bordeaux et dans le département de la Gironde (Bordeaux, 1945). A similar study dealing with the political evolution in the Gers during the Second Republic is in Jean Dagnan, Le Gers sous la Seconde République (Auch, 1928) and Le Coup d'Etat et la repression dans le Gers (décembre 1851 - décembre 1852) (Auch, 1929). Neither explore the social or economic factors. John Merriman has expanded his doctoral dissertation on repression in the Limousin to study several key departments in The Agony of the Republic (New Haven, 1978). His attention is riveted on Louis-Napoleon's destruction of the demo-soc movement. The Drôme and Hérault have been the focus of Ted Margadant's attention in "Modernization and Insurgency in December 1851: A Case Study of the Drôme," in Roger Price, ed., Revolution and Reaction (New York, 1975), pp. 254-79, and "Peasant Protest in the Second Republic," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, I (Summer, 1974), pp. 119-30. So strong was the response of the peasants in these regions that Margadant sees a para-military demo-soc organization.

No study of the insurrection of 1851 can begin without reference to the detailed description of the actual events given by Eugène Ténot in La Province en décembre 1851; Etude historique sur le coup d'état (Paris, 1868). AN F^{18} 308: "Préfet réponses au Ministre de l'Intérieur sur l'oeuvre de Eugène Ténot" and Léo Delbergé, "Le coup d'état du 2 décembre 1851 en Lot-et-Garonne d'après Eugène Ténot, rédacteur du Siècle," Revue de l'Agenais, a. 83, trim. 2 (1957), pp. 91-101, and Georges Bourgin, "Les préfets de Napoléon III, historiens du coup d'état," Revue historique (1931), pp. 274-89, reveal that his account of the insurrection was generally accurate.

Several secondary works are essential to understand the politics of the Second Republic. Jacques Bouillon, "Les démocrats-socialistes aux élections de 1849," Revue française de science politique, VI, 1 (janvier-mars 1956), pp. 70-95, challenges the belief that the election revealed growing demo-soc strength. André Tudesq's L'élection présidentielle de Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, 10 décembre 1848 (Paris, 1965) shows how the Napoléonic legend helped the nephew in the provinces. George Fasel, "The French Election of 23 April 1848: Suggestions for a Revison," French Historical Studies (1968), pp. 285-98, suggests that, contrary to previously held views, the election for the Constituent Assembly was a victory for the conservatives.

Social and economic forces that helped create and later destroy the Second Republic are the subject of several monographs, the most noted under the direction of Ernest Labrousse. René Schnerb, "Les hommes de 1848 et l'impôt," La Révolution de 1848, vols, 22-28 (1947), explains the political forces warring over the forty-five centime tax

and its impact on the countryside. This article should be read in conjunction with Rémi Gossez's "La Résistance à l'impôt: les quarante-cinq centimes," Etudes, XV (La Roche-sur-Yon, 1953). The map itself is invaluable. As for the industrial and agricultural slumps that preceded the February Revolution, refer to Ernest Labrousse, ed., Aspects de la crise et de la depression de l'économie française au milieu du XIX^{e} siècle (La Roche-sur-Yon, 1956), for excellent monographs covering diverse areas like the Cher, Nord and Basses-Alpes regions. Rémi Gossez's "A propos de la carte des troubles de 1846-1847" in the above work has a map of the outbursts of violence as a result of the grain crisis. Jacques Godechot, "La crise de 1846-1847 dans le Sud-Ouest de la France," Etudes, XVI (Paris, 1951), while showing those aspects of the crisis that differentiated the Southwest from the rest of France, dwells more on the Pyrenees region.

Several works are crucial to the understanding of the aftermath of the insurrection of 1851. Gisela Geywitz, Das Plebiszit von 1851 in Frankreich (Tübingen, 1965), is the best work devoted specifically to the many forces that resulted in the strong reaffirmation of Louis-Napoleon. She argues that Louis-Napoleon's victory was not the result of intimidation but shrewd exploitation of a popular need. Jacques Gouault, Comment la France est devenue républicaine (Paris, 1954), helps straighten the tangled political path to the republican Third Republic from the Empire. But because his work covers all of France from 1871 to 1876, the local personalities and issues remain obscure.

Some works have served as models or guided in their methodology. André Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République (Paris, 1913), has opened to students of French history the area of geo-social politics. Others following Siegfried's lead are André Armengaud, Les populations de l'Est-Aquitaine (1845-1871) (Paris, 1961), and Georges Dupeux, Aspects de l'histoire sociale et politique de Loir-et-Cher (Paris, 1962). Historical methodology is best described in François Goguel and Georges Dupeux, Sociologie électorale; esquisse d'un bilan; guide de recherches (Paris, 1951) and François Goguel, Géographie des élections françaises de 1870 à 1954 (Paris, 1951), in which the interrelationships of social, economic, religious, political and even geographical forces are explained.

For excellent studies of the influence of religion on politics, refer to Gabriel LeBras, Etudes de sociologie religieuse; Tome I: Sociologie de la practique religieuse dans les campagnes françaises (Paris, 1955), and Etudes de sociologie électorale (Paris, 1947). The interplay of Catholicism and Protestantism is best explained in André Latreille et André Siegfried, Les forces religieuses et la vie politique (Paris, 1951). LeBras' venture into religious sociology and politics was guided by Fernand Boulard, Premiers itinéraires en sociologie religieuse (Paris, 1954). For a better understanding of the interplay of Protestantism and French politics, see Stuart R. Schram, Protestantism and Politics in France (Alençon, 1954), and Emile G. Léonard, Le Protestant français (Paris, 1953).

Demographic studies on nineteenth century France have greatly improved since Charles Pouthas' pioneering study, La population

française pendant la première moitié de XIX^{e} siècle (Paris, 1956). Much of his data have been questioned by subsequent works. Jean Bourgeois-Pichet, "Evolution de la population française depuis le XVIII^{e} siècle," Population, a. 6, n^{o} 4 (octobre-décembre 1951), pp. 635-57, a. 7, n^{o} 2 (avril-juin 1952), pp. 319-29, traces the beginnings of the French demographic demise of the nineteenth century to the late eighteenth century. But the reliability of his sources is open to question at such an early date. Etienne Van de Walle, in his The Female Population of France in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1974), and later in "French Fertility Decline until 1850," in Charles Tilly, ed., Historical Studies of Changing Fertility (Princeton, 1978), pp. 257-88, maintains that the only accurate measurement of decline can be made currently for the early years of the nineteenth century.

The progress of education in nineteenth century France has not received widespread attention as of late. Alphone-François Villemain, Tableau de l'état actuel de l'instruction primaire en France (Paris, n.d. 1841) suffers from very incomplete data. The standard reference for the state of education during the nineteenth century is the Ministre de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Resumé des états de situation de l'enseignement primaire pour l'année scolaire 1879-1880 (Paris, 1881). This work supplemented Emile Levasseur's Rapport sur l'instruction primaire et l'instruction secondaire (Paris, 1875). But for statistics on the state of primary education before 1877, refer to Ministre de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Statistique de l'enseignement primaire, tome II: Statistique comparée de l'enseignement primaire (1829-1877) (Paris, 1880).

The secondary sources for the Lot-et-Garonne on the insurrection of December 1851 (or the history of the Second Republic in the department, for that matter) are few beyond the monographs of the Revue de l'Agenais. An eyewitness account of the march from Barbaste to Agen on the morning of December 4, 1851, is found in Anon., "Notice sure les événements qui se sont passés en 1852 (sic) notamment dans le canton de Lavardac et communes en dépendant," Revue de l'Agenais t. 101, a. 102 (1975), pp. 380-83. As for the reaction of the inhabitants to the march, see Jacques Clemens, "La 'Marche' Républicaine de Lavardac à Agen en décembre 1851," Revue de l'Agenais, t. 101, a. 102 (1975), pp. 377-80, interprets the preceding article. The most detailed portrait of the insurrection by a native of the department is J.-Alfred Neuville, Deux décembre 1851, Proscriptions de Marmande (Lot-et-Garonne) (Agen, 1882). Unfortunately, his account omits the other theatres of disturbance. For a more complete portrait of the department's upheaval during the month of December, Eugène Ténot, La Province en Décembre 1851; Etude historique sur le Coup d'Etat (Paris, 1868), is indispensible for understanding the movements of the insurrection throughout the department and the department's reaction in relation to the nation. The prefect of the Lot-et-Garonne's response to its publication (AN F^{18} 308) and Léo Delbergé, "Le Coup d'Etat du 2 décembre 1851 en Lot-et-Garonne d'après Eugène Ténot, rédacteur du Siècle," Revue de l'Agenais, a. 83, trim. 2 (1957), pp. 91-101, attest to Ténot's thoroughness and veracity. The fate of the insurgents is followed to their boarding of the Isly in Jean Tonnadre, "Coup d'Etat du 2 décembre 1851 et internement des insurgés du Lot-et-Garonne dans

la citadelle de Blaye," Revue d'histoire de Bordeaux, t. 17, n. 1 (1968), pp. 27-38, and even to the sands of the North African coast in Dr. J. Lepargneur, "L'itinéraire d'un proscrit Lot-et-Garonnais du 2 décembre 1851" Revue de l'Agenais, t. 59, a. 59 (1932), pp. 54-61. This account was the felicitous discovery of a diary kept by one of the insurgents by the doctor during a house call. The students of Simone Portail's class at the Ecole Normale d'Agen have written a short but accurate survey of the events of the insurrection and traced many of the victims (one woman received a pension until the eve of the Second World War) in Le Coup d'Etat du 2 décembre 1851 et ses victimes en Lot-et-Garonne (Agen, 1957).

Articles and books on the Second Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne are just as meager. The best personnal account of political life during this period is Paul Gauzence, Une année de journalisme et neuf mois de prison (Agen, 1851). Biased yet precious insight into the machinations and rivalries that brought the demo-socs down from within are exposed. Jean-Claude Drouin's doctoral thesis Les élections du 13 mai 1849 dans le Sud-Ouest Aquitain (Bordeaux, 1967) is an invaluable work detailing the two opposing parties and their candidates. He eliminates various explanations for the political outcomes in the departments, concluding that personalities ruled in the end. The maps and graphs are very helpful. Several monographs on the Second Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne appeared in the 1948 and 1949 issues of La Revue de l'Agenais. Unfortunately, no article ventured beyond the presidential election of December 1848. André Soulage, "La Révolution de 1848," La Revue de l'Agenais, n. 2 (1948), pp. 229-42, gives an

overview of the advent of the Republic to the department. His "La Presse Agenais et la Révolution de 1848," n. 1 (1948), pp. 108-21, is invaluable for the background to the various journals as well as the rise and fall of the early republican press. J. R. Marboutin contributed four articles to the centenary issues: "Le clergé agenais et les élections en 1848," n. 2 (1948), pp. 242-51, and "Le clergé agenais et la République de 1848," n. 1 (1948), pp. 33-43, detail the clerics' attempts to create their own party. "Les deputés de Lot-et-Garonne en 1848," nos. 1 and 2 (1949), pp. 1-4, affords insight into the characters of the candidates, while "Les banquets politiques en Lot-et-Garonne en 1848," nos. 1 and 2 (1949), pp. 5-13, merely details the rash of political banquets after the February Revolution.

Two works well worth consulting for biographical information are Jules Andrieu, Biographie générale de l'Agenais, 3 vols. (Agen, 1888), and C. M. Lesaulnier, Biographie des neuf cents deputés à l'Assemblée Nationale (Paris, 1848). The former is a very detailed collection of many leading individuals of the region during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The author takes pains to list the individual's publications and possible location. The latter is composed of short vignettes of the newly-elected Constituent representatives. Several short articles in the Revue de l'Agenais expand on the biographies of the candidates of April 1848. Ernest Lafont, "Gaspard Dubruel, Commissaire central de la République en Lot-et-Garonne," Revue de l'Agenais, n. 2 (1948), pp. 242-51, and "Charles Lesseps, député de Villeneuve-sur-Lot (1846-1848)," nos. 1 and 2 (1949), pp. 14-16; Fernand Mombet, "Un tribun agenais: Jean-Didier Baze," t. 93, a. 94

(1967), pp. 35-45; Génpral Beranguier, "Le général Radoult-de-Lafosse, député de Lot-et-Garonne," t. 64, a. 64 (1959), pp. 1-47; Philippe Lauzun, "Le général Tartas," t. 42, a. 41 (1915), pp. 3-9-20.

The Lot-et-Garonne before the Second Republic has not been extensively chronicled. Michael Simondin, Les listes électorales de la Monarchie de Juillet en Lot-et-Garonne (Bordeaux, 1958), later became part of André Tudesq, Les grands notables de la France (1840-1849) (Paris, 1964). But Simondin refuses to draw any conclusions from the well-researched data of the cens. Meanwhile, André Soulage has utilized the Comtesse Marie de Raymond's diaries to recreate the Agenais social life and structure in "La société agenais entre deux révolutions (de 1789 à 1848)," Revue de l'Agenais, a. 75, nos. 1 and 2 (1949), pp. 103-78. Unfortunately, many of the prominent names of the Second Republic did not figure into her portrait.

The history of the Lot-et-Garonne after the Second Republic has received as little press as the decades preceding. The most valuable work on this period, especially the early Third Republic, is Joseph Zapata, Les élections législatives en Lot-et-Garonne sous la III^{e} République (Bordeaux, 1973). His doctoral thesis details not only the mounting tide of republicanism in the department but also traces the sociological roots for voting behavior. Together with Deffontaines' Les hommes et leurs travaux, this work forms a cornerstone in the understanding of the Third Republic in the Lot-et-Garonne. Eugène Ténot and Antonin Dubost, Les suspects en 1858; Etude historique sur l'application de la loi de Surèté Général (Paris, 1869), mentions the surviving cells of demo-soc resistance during the Second Empire.

Gordon Wright contributed two articles that attempt to explain the strong support for communism in the department in the twentieth century. Both "Communists and Peasantry in France" in Edward Mead Earle, ed., Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics (Princeton, 1951), pp. 219-31, and "Four Red Villages in France," Yale Review, XLI, 3 (Spring 1952), pp. 361-72, use the arrondissement of Marmande as a case study.

While the political histories of the Lot-et-Garonne are few, economic and social analyses abound. No work on the Lot-et-Garonne would be complete without reference to Pierre Deffontaines, Les hommes et leurs travaux dans le pays de la Moyenne Garonne (Lille, 1932). No other work captures so accurately and concisely the economic, social and geographical forces that shaped the region of the Moyenne Garonne from the eighteenth century to the twentieth. A much more general account of the department, suitable for a high school textbook of the region, is Maurice Luxembourg, Géographie du département de Lot-et-Garonne (Nérac, 1954).

Historians and archivists of the region have preferred the rich history of the Lot-et-Garonne before the mid-nineteenth century. The work by Pierre de Saint-Amans, Coup d'oeil sur le département de Lot-et-Garonne en 1828 (Agen, 1828), is a detailed and well-written account of the department that complements the SHAT MR 1273: Mémoires et Reconaissances. The prefect Jules Pieyre, fils, made the first inventory of the agricultural and industrial production of the department during the revolutionary period in his Statistique du département de Lot-et-Garonne (Paris, An X). While its accuracy is

questionable, it provides a reasonable point of departure for economic studies of the department. The present assistant archivist, Lucile Bourrachot, has intensively researched the rise and fall of the metalworking industries of the department in "Les anciennes forges de l'Agenais," Villeneuve-sur-Lot et l'Agenais (Nérac, 1962). While the bulk of the work deals with the seventeenth and eighteenth century mills, the work also transmits a valuable portrait of the constricting metal industries in the early nineteenth century and their locations. Norman Mutton, "Charcoal Iron-Making in the Department of the Lot-et-Garonne," Journal of the Historical Metallurgy Society, X, 2 (1976), pp. 64-69, should be read in conjunction with Mlle. Bourrachot's article for better geographical orientation. The rise and fall of industry during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century is treated well in Maurice Bessières, "Coup d'oeil sur l'industrie du département de Lot-et-Garonne," Recueil des Travaux de la Société d'Agriculture, Sciences et Arts d'Agen, IX (1858-1859), pp. 39-57. An excellent treatment of artisanal activity before the Revolution is O. Granat, Les Artisans Agenais sous l'Ancien Régime (1691-1791) (Agen, 1904).

While industry played a minor role in life as well as print, agriculture was and has remained the mainstay in the economy of the Lot-et-Garonne. The most complete picture of agriculture in the department in the period 1750-1850 is with Jean Tonnadre, "Technique et économie agricole en Agenais de 1750 à 1850," Revue de l'Agenais, a. 100, t. 99, n. 4 (1973), pp. 215-36; a. 101, t. 100, n. 2 (1974), pp. 187-97, 267-91; and his "l'alimentation dans les campagnes de l'Agenais du XVIII^{e} siécle à nos jours," Revue de l'Agenais, t. 102, a. 103

(1976), pp. 411-18. He goes beyond the statistics to describe the actual existence of the peasant. Another work, written by the Journal's meteorologist A. Bartayrès, "Statistiques agricoles," Recueil des travaux de la Société d'Agriculture, Sciences et Arts d'Agen, VI (1852), pp. 14-57, 373-89, 414-28, VII (1854-55), pp. 149-83, 364-75, VIII (1856-57), pp. 77-95, is a detailed survey of the department and its agricultural output according to geological regions. A survey of the arrondissement of Villeneuve detailing the number of grain mills per stream and the produce per canton is found in Auguste Casany-Mazet, Essais statistiques et historiques sur le quartième arrondissement du département de Lot-et-Garonne (Agen, 1839). For an appreciation of the transformation in agriculture wrought by the railroad and truck farms during the late nineteenth century, refer to Comité regional d'action économique de Toulouse, Le Lot-et-Garonne économique (Agen, 1919) and Maurice Boisvert, L'Agriculture dans le Lot-et-Garonne (Tonneins, 1897).

Several articles in the Revue de l'Agenais deal with such diverse but interesting topics as roads, canals and railroads. Th. Alem wrote on the developing road system of the nineteenth century in "Le reseau routier de la région agenaise dans son contexte provincial ou national des origines à nos jours," Revue de l'Agenais, t. 89, a. 90 (1963), pp. 53-65, 157-69, the lateral canal in "Propos sur la création de canal du Languedoc au XVII^{e} siècle, sur les projets de canaux navigables entre la Garonne et le Pyrènees au XIX^{e} siècle, et historique du canal latèral à la Garonne," Revue de l'Agenais, t. 88, a. 87 (1962), pp. 153-63, and the railroads "Les chemins-de-fer: Historique des lignes du carrefour ferroviaire agenais," Revue de l'Agenais, a. 84, n. 1

(janvier-mars 1958), pp. 295-319. While the first two contribute valuable insight into the communications network on the eve of the Second Republic, the article on the railroads is worthwhile in comprehending its impact on the canal's eventual demise. A fascinating article that sheds light on the hazards of road travel and the time necessary to travel between towns is F. Thouvignon, "La poste en Lot-et-Garonne du Consulat aux Trois Glorieuses," Villeneuve-sur-Lot et Agenais (Nérac, 1962), pp. 323-41.

A set of books demanding special mention is Anon., Annuaire ou calendrier du département de Lot-et-Garonne pour l'année 1848 (and 1849, 1850, 1851, 1853) (Agen, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1852, 1853). The almanac was published by the Noubel family, the same family that published the Journal and enjoyed official favor through most of the nineteenth century. The work is an extremely helpful compilation of the names and titles of virtually all the officials of the department, important statistics, even the dates and locations of all the fairs. It was quite a bit of information in a pocket format.

But of all the aspects of life in the Lot-et-Garonne, the most press has been reserved for the topic of depopulation. Aside from Van de Walle's most recent publications, which encompass all of France, several works have addressed the particular case of the Lot-et-Garonne. The best study on the subject, though its scope is narrow, is Capot-Rey, "La dépopulation dans le Lot-et-Garonne (canton de Port-Sainte-Marie)," Annales de Géographie, n. 151, a. 28 (janvier 1919), pp. 64-70. A similar study was carried out by Arsène Dumont in a neighboring commune in "La natalité à Saint-Pierre-de-Clairac," Revue Internationale de

Sociologie (1901), pp. 3-16. Auguste Chervin's "Nombre des enfants par famille étudié par arrondissement, canton et commune dans le Lot-et-Garonne," Bulletins de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris, t. 2, séries 4 (1891), pp. 42-78, is a very statistically detailed study of the problem of depopulation with valuable comparisons and contrasts according to the number of children per family. Unfortunately, the above works deal with the latter half of the nineteenth century. A similar study, valuable despite its focus on one arrondissement, is Paul Chalet, Etude démographique sur l'arrondissement d'Agen (Agen, 1880). The work, unfortunately, deals with merely the question of infant mortality, and his data for the period before 1859-1879 are weak. While the period covered by the population statistics in Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Population par commune de 1876 à 1954; département de Lot-et-Garonne (Bordeaux, 1959), is much later, the introduction affords a valuable summary of the population trends from 1801.

The depopulation crisis at the end of the nineteenth century sent many demographers, doctors and historians to probe the peasant psyche for clues to the cause of the rapid population decline. The most famous was Jacques Bertillon, La dépopulation de la France (Paris, 1911). The respected but politically motivated demographer saw conscious family planning becoming a part of the ethics of frugality and hard work. Dr. Emmanuel Labat, in two articles on Gascogne ("En Gascogne -- A propos du problème de la natalité," Revue des Deux Mondes, IV (juillet 1911), pp. 62-95; "En Gascogne -- L'abandon de la terre," Revue des Deux Mondes, 58 (août 1911), pp. 635-68) accuses the area of

killing a race of people by conscious hyponatalité. Resting on several forays into the Gascon countryside, Labat's findings are devoid of any statistics.

Several works try to capture the peasant mentality of France in general and the Lot-et-Garonne in particular. The most illuminating is Philippe Ariès, Histoire des populations françaises et de leurs attitudes devant la vie depuis le XVIII^{e} siècle (Paris, 1948). He devotes an entire section to the "human evaporation in the Aquitaine countryside," and in particular in the Lot-et-Garonne. The causes for the early and massive demographic shift that the department underwent are lucidly explained. Pierre Caziot, La valeur de la terre en France (Paris, 1914) traces the fluctuations of land prices during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unfortunately, the bulk of his research and its link with population deal with the Lot-et-Garonne at the turn of the century. The political mentality is well described by Pierre de Preissac, Les forces historiques de la France; la tradition dans l'orientation politique des provinces (Paris, 1928). He links many of the modern trends to the historical traditions of Gascony and Guyenne.

In order to fully comprehend the historical traditions of Gascony and Guyenne, two works are indispensable. Charles Higounet, Histoire de l'Aquitaine (Paris, 1971), is one of many of the Univers de France collection of regional studies and eminently readable. A more concise history of the Guyenne is found in the Que sais-je? series by Charles Dartigue, Histoire de la Guyenne (Paris, 1950). The bulk of his history centers on the gallo-roman times.

And after a day of enduring dry archival materials and dead-end searches, take delight in reading Jean-François Bladé, Proverbes et divinettes populaires receuillis dans l'Armagnac et de l'Agenais (Paris, 1880).

Venez en Agenais
Bonne vie yous y firez
Le matin,
Poires et vin.
Au goûter,
Poires et ail.
Pour souper,
Poires et pain.