Empire by Example?

Deportees in France and Algeria and the Re-Making of a Modern Empire, 1846–1854

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In January 1848, colonial rebel Abd al-Qadir was deported from Algeria to France.* Later that same year, some 12,000 Parisian men and women were arrested for their participation in the "Bloody June Days" and subsequently sentenced to deportation. In both cases, the sentence of deportation was a response to an insurgency—one in the colonial periphery, the other at the administrative and cultural center of France.[1] Both deportation episodes represented attempts to establish (or re-establish) public order and political stability. Official correspondence, moreover, reveals that at both the colonial and the metropolitan levels, the state meant the deportations to serve didactic purposes and facilitate imperial expansion.

Both events were, in fact, typical French uses of deportation in the first half of the nineteenth century. "Insurgents" were forcibly moved from colony to colony, from metropole to colony, and from colony to metropole in an attempt to remove them from environments where they were troublesome and render them useful elsewhere. While Abd al-Qadir traveled to France, a group of June Insurgents eventually made their way to Algeria to serve their sentences.

Both sentences came about as much through improvisation as by design. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, metropolitan and colonial "insurgents" crisscrossed the Mediterranean Sea, just as earlier "rebels," "terrorists," and the like had crisscrossed the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the decades before, moving between colony and metropole, from familiar spaces to foreign ones, while remaining within an empire that held political stability as its principal goal for metropole and colony alike. But few formal establishments existed to accommodate them.

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Abd al-Qadir and the June Insurgents had something else in common: they were the final chapters in a deportation story that was marked by multiple circuits of movement and by improvisation. During the 1850s, penal and imperial policies changed and thereafter deportation became formalized and largely unidirectional, targeting specific overseas outposts as penal settlements. The French government established official penal colonies in remote, newly acquired territories, like those in the Pacific where voluntary French settlement seemed unlikely and in French Guiana, where administrators sought to fill a labor shortage after slave emancipation. In the second half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, moreover, the metropole ceased to be a place in which one could become civilized, but became a fortress of civilization under attack, from which uncivilized individuals—criminals, insurgents, and others—needed to be eliminated.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the French empire experienced widespread political instability. The revolutionary and postrevolutionary eras in France produced moments of upheaval and uncertainty that political elites in both the metropole and the colonies struggled to contain: violent street protests in metropolitan cities, Jacobin terrorism and royalist backlash, the Napoleonic wars, slave rebellions and anti-abolitionist reactions in the *anciennes colonies*, and a protracted conquest in North Africa. Both the metropole and France's overseas empire constituted significant sources of disorder in the period.

Yet a large overseas empire also offered the possibility for engineering greater social stability in both the metropole and the periphery. The empire constituted a network for forcibly moving people around. As a handful of scholars working on the Spanish, Portuguese, British, and Dutch empires have shown, there were multiple circuits of forced migrations within distinct imperial networks in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[2] As Kerry Ward has argued in her book on forced migration in the Dutch empire:

> an empire consists of multiple material networks including those of bureaucracy, correspondence, trade, transportation, and migration, as well as discursive networks of law, administration, information, diplomacy, and culture. These independent yet intersecting networks exist simultaneously as paths of circulation for people, goods, and information and in a more condensed capacity as nodal regulatory points....[3]

In the French imperial context, throughout the revolutionary and postrevolutionary eras, disorderly, rebellious, and troublesome individuals were transported around the empire from one node to another in an attempt to create a long-lasting and utilitarian solution to the problem of public disorder in both the center and the periphery. Their routes are only understandable through a close examination of both the material and the discursive networks operating at the time.

Redrawing the French imperial map of the postrevolutionary period along these lines, this article supports older arguments about the role of empire as a technology for social and political hygiene.[4] But it also expands earlier geo-

graphical frameworks to consider the multiple directionalities of forced migrations in the first half of the nineteenth century and the subsequent contraction of elite attitudes toward the practice around mid-century. As the examples of the June Insurgents in Algeria and Abd al-Qadir in France will show, elites in the 1840s believed that certain individuals in both the center and the periphery of France's empire were in need of civilizing and that the civilizing process could be carried out in either the metropole or the colony, depending upon the circumstances. But due to a series of shifts in penal and imperial policy—including an increasing preoccupation with the dangers of common-law crime in France and a trend towards cordoning off different parts of the empire for different purposes—French elites re-configured the penal and civilizing networks of empire, drawing lines that sent (or kept) "troublemakers" and "undesirables" away from the center in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Trans-Imperial Deportation in the Postrevolutionary Era

Deportation as a response to insurgency had its roots in the French Revolution, but it was in the first years of Napoleon Bonaparte's rule that the practice of deportation became clearly multidirectional throughout the empire.[5] In 1800, after an attempt on his life, Bonaparte used the moment as a pretext to expel seventy known Jacobins from Paris to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.[6] Then, in 1802, over 2,000 free blacks and former slaves from Saint Domingue and Guadeloupe were labeled mutineers and rebels and deported to continental France and Corsica as part of Napoleon's attempt to re-establish French direct rule over the islands.[7]

Most famous among them was Toussaint Louverture, whom the French imprisoned in the remote Fort de Joux. Instructions provided by the minister of the navy to the fort's commander, Baïlle, explained that if the prisoner "boasts of having been a general," he should be reminded of all of the crimes he had committed and his "tyranny over Europeans."[8] Thus, in this instance, detention in the metropole was meant to signal a return of a "natural order" in which Europeans were superior. The rebellion in Saint Domingue had exacerbated fears of a colonial inversion of the racial hierarchy and Louverture's imprisonment was at least in part a symbolic effort to assuage them. He died on 7 April 1803 after less than eight months at the Fort.

As for the rest of the deportees from Saint Domingue and Guadeloupe in 1802, penal and imperial logics used by Consulate officials suggested that deportation would benefit the larger empire by eliminating troublemakers from one node within the imperial network while making them useful in another node, whether in the center or at the peripheries. For example, officials in Paris noted that the influx of laborers from the distant Antilles would enable them to "accomplish large-scale works in Corsica, allowing for the *mise-en-valeur* of this newly acquired territory."[9] In particular, the officials put

deportees to work constructing roads into the interior to provide access to valuable lumber supplies and facilitate movements of French troops into interior valleys to help consolidate France's authority in the Mediterranean island.

During the Restoration, deportations continued throughout the French colonies. Most notably, in 1823, some 143 free men of color in Martinique were deported after being accused of conspiring against the established social (racial) order on the island. King Louis XVIII had the purported leaders of this rebellion sent to metropolitan work camps (the original *bagnes* in France's port cities), while transporting another 700 individuals to Senegal and French Guiana.[10] The deportations stemming from what became known as the Bissette Affair were the largest in a number of episodes involving the deportation of so-called "dangerous" slaves or people of color to prisons throughout the French empire (and to neighboring islands). As John Savage has shown, these deportations often resulted from elite fears of slaves poisoning masters or leading rebellions throughout the 1820s.[11] During the early postrevolutionary period, deportation had become a common penalty for slaves and free blacks in the *anciennes colonies*, who were transported around the empire as a solution to public safety concerns stemming from a system of slave labor which was becoming increasingly unstable during the period.

Unlike in the *anciennes colonies*, however, rebellious slaves and troublesome free blacks did not make up the majority of those expelled and deported from Algeria. Indeed, in the earliest years of the French conquest, many liberals in France imagined a colony in Algeria to be a new kind of project free of the chains of previous colonial endeavors. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, favored colonization of a territory near metropolitan France where a small group of talented French men could effectively administer over a native population, which would in turn be granted the benefits of French civilization. As an advocate of both free trade and free labor, he and fellow colonialists like Gustave de Beaumont and Alphonse de Lamartine, believed in an "empire of virtue" with France as the standard-bearers of the civilized world.[12]

As Jennifer Pitts has argued, early nineteenth-century French liberals like Tocqueville believed both that their nation was particularly well positioned to spread civilization to non-European societies *and* that metropolitan society faced a number of problems in its own democratic experiment resulting from the expansion of the electorate.[13] For proponents of deportation in the postrevolutionary period, precisely this threat of "vice" within the metropole made the punishment seem so desirable: colonial subjects could be civilized in the center, while metropolitan troublemakers would be made into agents of civilization abroad while being themselves civilized.

Deportations *from* Algeria were based upon the exigencies of military conquest. Arab resistance became particularly difficult after 1832, when Abd al-Qadir declared a holy war of resistance against the French in western Algeria. The French also faced the armed resistance of Ahmad, bey of Constantine, in the eastern provinces, and then in 1845, a Sufi holy man known as Bu Maza

began a guerrilla-style struggle in the Dahra Mountains. In response to this intransigence, the French military presence increased to almost 100,000 by 1846.[14] The military campaigns of the Algerian conquest generated prisoners of war who were shot, interned, or exchanged for French prisoners. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, tens of thousands of prisoners moved in and out of "depots" reserved for prisoners of war. After their detention, prisoners were often displaced to some remote region of the Algerian territory.[15]

The head of French forces in Algeria, General Bugeaud, imagined that Arab prisoners could be made useful by being sent to the Antilles or even to France, where they could be placed with farmers who would assimilate them to French life through the simple routines of farm labor.[16] The idea caught on. "Place Arab prisoners in those [French] towns," instructed the minister of war in 1836 to local authorities in Marseilles charged with detaining 118 Arab prisoners, "… where they can best experience the advantages of our Government, as well as those of our civilization, of our ways, and of our customs."[17] Yet in a decade of fighting in Algeria, only in a haphazard and inconsistent fashion did colonial authorities occasionally deport prisoners of war in the hopes of exposing resistant Arabs to the advantages of French rule.

Beginning in 1841, the minister of war designated the fortress at the île Sainte-Marguerite, off the coast of Cannes, as the site of detention for "important" Algerian prisoners of war. Between 1841 and 1843, some 80 prisoners were interned there. Then, in 1843, as a result of the French capture of Abd al-Qadir's *smalah* (mobile tent camp) on May 16, thousands of prisoners of war were taken captive, including the families of several of Abd al-Qadir's closest advisers, though not the leader himself.[18] Following this key victory, the minister of war instructed Lieutenant General Christophe-Louis-Leon Juchault de Lamoricière to send only the highest-profile captives to île Sainte-Marguerite. These men, the minister explained, would be most visible to other would-be colonial rebels and their punishment would set the clearest example of what happened to those who resisted the French conquest of Algiers. To secure the loyalty of the indigenous population, distinguished prisoners of war served "as hostages and guarantee the populations to which they belong."[19] Lamoricière sent more than 300 men, women, and children to France.

Meanwhile, the defeat of the *smalah* turned the tide of war in France's favor. Abd al-Qadir kept moving for three years, mobilizing and animating Algerian resistance wherever he went, but Bugeaud responded with even more men in order to maintain pressure on the resistance.[20] Bu Maza surrendered to the French in April 1847. Abd al-Qadir surrendered in December of the same year.

When Abd al-Qadir sent emissaries to Lamoricière spelling out the terms of his surrender, he asked only that he and his family be granted safe passage to another Arab land. Lamoricière agreed to everything, sending his sword and seal in confirmation. Lamoricière later addressed the Chamber with his own reading of the events:

> For France, this was at once a military, a political, and a moral triumph. The effect produced by it among the natives was immense.... When a man [al-Qadir] ... has become the living representative of an idea profoundly agitating the masses, an immense danger is incurred as long as he is left in his country.[21]

Yet when news of the surrender and Abd al-Qadir's terms reached Paris, the Chamber of Deputies was less willing to accede to the colonial rebel's demands. Many in the Chamber wanted to make an example of the man who had proved so troublesome in Algeria. But they agreed that Abd al-Qadir could not remain in Algeria. French authorities thus resorted to a familiar punishment: transport him overseas to France. Abd al-Qadir arrived in metropolitan France on 8 January 1848.

The next month, the Revolution of 1848 began. In just a few heady days in February, popular unrest overthrew King Louis-Philippe and established the Second Republic. Almost immediately, the Provisional Government of the Second Republic responded to workers' demands by guaranteeing French citizens the right to labor and creating the National Workshops to match unemployed Frenchmen with public works projects. But when national elections returned a more conservative legislative assembly in April, some of the more radical early reforms were quickly reversed. On 21 June 1848, the government abolished the National Workshops. The reaction of the Parisian proletariat to this announcement was violent and bloody.

The insurrection, known as the Bloody June Days, resulted in some fifteen hundred deaths and the arrests of over twelve thousand more.[22] As the dust settled after the strong reprisals handed down against the men and women mounting the barricades in Paris, the National Assembly met to determine the fate of those arrested. The decree issued June 27 meted out swift and uncompromising measures to punish the flood of prisoners: summary deportation. No specific colony was designated to receive them, yet the decree specifically excluded one colony from consideration: Algeria.

Why not Algeria? As we have seen, colonialists considered Algeria a privileged site of voluntary colonization and encouraged the immigration into the colony of farmers and craftsmen who could create self-sustaining agricultural communities.[23] The National Assembly was simply not willing to sacrifice Algeria for the sake of public order—at least not yet, and not for long. Moreover, the surrender and deportation of Abd al-Qadir had been closely followed by the defeat of Ahmad Bey in 1848. The French had therefore largely completed the conquest of the plains regions, and official plans to open Algeria to large-scale colonization by citizen-farmers from Europe became the top priority for colonial authorities.

The men and women arrested as insurgents in June 1848 were thus hastily but vaguely sentenced to deportation—*somewhere*. But bureaucratic indecision and judicial second-guessing delayed the execution of their sentences. Following a series of releases, clemencies, and pardons, only 468 men of the original

12,000 prisoners taken during the repression of the June Days remained subject to deportation after 20 December 1848.[24] The minister of the interior described these remaining men as the incorrigible ones, still detained due to previous criminal records or because of an "implacable hostility that they manifest against all of society."[25] These were the 468 participants in the June Days for whom, on 24 January 1850, the Legislative Assembly finally—and rather surprisingly—designated Algeria as the temporary site of their punishment.[26]

But why now Algeria? In the months after the decree, the ministry of the navy received dozens of proposals of potential sites of deportation in South America and the Pacific.[27] But the overseas empire had recently undergone a dramatic change. The Provisional Government of the new Second Republic had proclaimed the final abolition of slavery on 27 April 1848. The immediate economic and social effects were profound and the situation was unstable enough as to discourage any deportation projects toward any former slave colony, at least for the moment.[28]

Meanwhile, a shortage of willing and productive colonists to North Africa provided officials of the Second Republic and Second Empire with an excuse to deport the men and women caught up in the first round of arrests in June 1848 to Algeria. The main arguments in favor of sending the June Insurgents to Algeria came from two prominent generals of the Second Republic who had both served in Algeria, Lamoricière (now minister of war) and Louis-Eugène Cavaignac (the temporary chief executive). Both men believed it important to populate Algeria with Frenchmen as quickly as possible in order to shore up the French military victories of 1847–1848.[29] In haste, Lamoricière and Cavaignac sought new means of "encouraging" settlement. Their recommendation to transport the June Insurgents to Algeria came on the heels of a similarly motivated project in the fall of 1848 to boost voluntary settlement through state-sponsored agricultural settlements known as *colonies agricoles*.[30]

Thus, two years after Abd al-Qadir was transported to France as a defeated foe whose mere presence in Algeria would be too destabilizing for a fledgling colony in need of development, the remaining rebels of June were transported to Algeria as defeated insurgents whom officials hoped would be useful as a colonial labor force. In the first case, local officials in France struggled to accurately define and represent the terms and conditions of Abd al-Qadir's detention in the metropole. In the second case, local colonial officials in Algeria were continually frustrated in their attempts to create a balance between the need to isolate the deportees from the voluntary colonists and a desire to mobilize the detainees' labor in the development of an under-settled colony.

The Deportation of Abd al-Qadir

Authorities involved in the deportation of Abd al-Qadir to France sought to render French conquests visible through his metropolitan detention. As the

army continued to pacify and civilize Algeria, officials wanted to publicly demonstrate both the military's victories and the moral force of French civilization as a model for others. Abd al-Qadir's detention in France provided such an opportunity. Popular literature of the time shows the extent to which these ideas penetrated French culture.

In 1848, a fifteen centime tract—*Abd-el-Kader en France!!!*—appeared in Paris. The unknown author presented Abd al-Qadir as a heroic figure who had bravely fought a futile war against France. After setting the scene of Abd al-Qadir's surrender, the pamphleteer imagines how the "ex-emir's" life in France will play out:

> The emir, instead of going to Egypt, stays among us. Our ways please him; … finding that Mahomet has served him poorly against us, he becomes Christian and French. Weary of his military career, he embraces a civil career: he becomes an elector; finally, one fine day, a grand ambition takes hold of his heart … , he wants to be mayor … yes, mayor, neither more nor less.[31]

Imagining the infamous Algerian rebel as a mid-level functionary fully assimilated to the French way-of-life was the ultimate expression of France's nascent civilizing mission and the role deportation could play in facilitating that mission.[32]

In reality, however, Abd al-Qadir showed little inclination to assimilate. Upon learning that officials of the July Monarchy would not honor the terms of Lamoricière's original agreement with him, Abd al-Qadir reportedly intoned, "make me your prisoner if you will; but the shame and ignominy will be with you, not with me." When invited to see Paris, the defeated emir declined, stating that "as long as I remain a prisoner, all France is but a dungeon."[33]

Between January 1848 and his pardon in November 1852, Abd al-Qadir and dozens of his "companions in captivity" moved among various forts and chateaux throughout southern France.[34] As a result, the colonial rebel's detention became a public spectacle. Though the minister of war had expressly warned against making "his person … an object of indiscrete curiosity," Abd al-Qadir drew crowds whenever he passed through French cities. When his entourage entered Toulouse, "all the streets leading to the Canal from the place du Capitole were congested with the curious who waited on his passage."[35] Newspaper coverage of the event highlighted the exotic aspects of the emir and his companions:

> The first convoy carried in omnibus the wives of the emir and his mother, accompanied by domestics of the black race, and a fairly good number of children in swaddling; this first caravan was accompanied by a fine-looking Arab who drove them, attended by Colonel Daumas, to the apartment that awaited them. All these women were seated on rugs in the Oriental manner, and the Arab immediately placed them under lock and key: a half hour later, the convoy that carried the emir and the males of his family or of his domestic service arrived….[36]

The public spectacle of the Algerian's detention in France was not simply meant to instill in a defeated enemy a sense of French superiority, but it also

confirmed French notions of the imperial racial (and gender) hierarchy. While Abd al-Qadir traveled with a royal retinue complete with black slaves, and his male envoy maintained control over the harem, the defeated rebel was clearly also on display as the exotic and corrupt "Oriental," inferior to his French captors and an object of curiosity.

Abd al-Qadir, for his part, recognized that the French intended to use his deportation to impress him with the advantages of French rule. After the February Revolution, he framed an appeal to the new government in the following terms: "I rejoiced upon hearing this news, because I have read in books that such a state of things is best suited to the People because it destroys injustice and prevents the strong from oppressing the weak.... Today you ... judge only by legality...."[37] When Lamoricière was appointed minister of war in June 1848, Abd al-Qadir thought his imprisonment was over. But instead, in November 1848, Lamoricière ordered his transfer to the chateau d'Amboise.

It was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte who began to argue for Abd al-Qadir's release. As he gained in power and influence, designating himself Prince President in preparation for his self-proclamation as emperor the next year, Louis Napoleon exercised his powers of clemency in the Algerian captive's favor. After receiving the French leader's promise to honor the terms agreed to when Abd al-Qadir first surrendered, the deportee suddenly became desirous to see the Paris he had spurned four years earlier and received the grand tour in October 1852. Then, in November, Abd al-Qadir rather remarkably claimed and received the right of suffrage expressly so that he and twelve of his companions could vote for Louis Napoleon as Emperor on 21 November 1852.[38] In a turn of events strangely reminiscent of that 1848 pamphlet, Abd al-Qadir became a member of the French electorate in order to legitimize the rule of the new French Emperor.

After that, in exchange for his promise to never again return to Algeria, Napoleon III granted him a pension of 100,000 francs and passage outside France in December 1852. He eventually settled in Syria, where he died on 26 May 1883. Though the former leader of Algerian resistance may only have appropriated the republican language of his captors in order to try and win his release, and though we can never be sure of the impressions that his captivity made upon other would-be rebels in Algeria, this episode of deportation succeeded in at least one of its goals: Abd al-Qadir never returned to Algeria and no longer stood a direct threat to French rule there.

With regard to the effects of the public spectacle of his detention, moreover, authorities could never be sure what message the spectators received. Certainly, contemporary fictionalized accounts of Abd al-Qadir's time in France assumed that the superiority of French civilization would be obvious to even the most ardent opponent of French colonial conquest, as the 1848 pamphlet predicting the emir's mayoral aspirations highlights.

Yet long before his arrival in France, Abd al-Qadir had become a troublingly heroic and therefore problematic figure for imperialists. A vaudevillian

production at the Théâtre des Variétés in December of 1842, for example, imagined Abd al-Qadir visiting Paris even before his final capitulation. In the play, a wealthy *salonier*, Saint Chourin, anticipates a visit from the Algerian. "He comes to study the ways of the capital," Saint Chourin reads aloud from a newspaper, "and to import to [Bône and Bougie (Bejaya, Algeria)] the civilization that he wants to establish among the nomadic tribes over which he is sheik." Ultimately, however, Saint Chourin finds he has more in common with Abd al-Qadir than he had thought. He opines that civilized behavior already exists among men living in colonial climes, just as the marks of barbarism are increasingly evident within France:

> Given the literary trends
> Henceforth it is in the *bagne*
> That one must learn to read.
> Today, true Bedouins
> Are not where you think;
> You find many fewer in the desert
> Than in France.[39]

As this comedic play suggested, many in France had begun to suggest that perhaps the true "Bedouins" (those in need of civilizing) were really France's domestic criminals rather than its colonial rebels. It is within this context that the contemporaneous deportation of the June Insurgents to Algeria makes sense.

The Deportation of the June Insurgents

By the terms of the 27 June Decree, anyone arrested for participating in the insurrection and who was found to be one of the "chiefs, instigators or insurrection mongers, those who acted as leaders or committed some aggravating act of rebellion" was subject to summary "transportation" to one of France's overseas colonies.[40] But in addition to the leaders of insurrection, the 27 June Decree also targeted those who were "freed or escaped convicts or forced laborers who took part in the insurrection."[41] Thus officials forged a legal link between the insurgents and common criminals.

It was one response to a wider social problem: a growing popular fear of rising crime, freed convicts, recidivism, and overcrowded metropolitan *bagnes*. Discussions of these problems became a fixture of the postrevolutionary era.[42] The convicts laboring in metropolitan *bagnes,* which Louis Napoleon described in 1850 as "ceaselessly threat[ening]" to French society, were considered a national issue for most of the nineteenth century.[43]

Such concerns bespoke a growing trend among French elites to associate political radicalism with social rootlessness. In the mid-nineteenth century, distinctions between common-law and political criminals eroded as fear grew

that the "dangerous classes"—a term coined in 1840 by H.A. Frégier—were the cause of both criminal and political upheaval in France.[44] The trajectory from displaced urban worker to petty criminal to hardened criminal to violent revolutionary was a short and all-too-common one, according to Frégier.

In addition, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, throughout Europe, many physicians increasingly described deviant behavior as a product of degeneration and criminal heredity.[45] Prosper Lucas in 1847, Bénédict-Augustin Morel in 1857, and Jacques Moreau de Tours that same year all hypothesized the existence of "hereditary morbid predispositions" among criminals.[46] Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, many penologists, bourgeois moralists, and social commentators would begin turning away from the notion of punishment for rehabilitation and toward punishment to remove hardened criminals, whose criminality they considered an atavistic trait that could not be corrected.

Nevertheless, just as working the land in distant colonies had often seemed a good, rehabilitative punishment for social reformers who believed in redemptive theories of criminal correction, penal colonization could also appeal to those arguing for expulsive punishments to rid society of irredeemable elements. As scientific literature began equating criminals with "savages" and "inferior races," it is perhaps not surprising that the colonies came to seem a logical place to intern them.[47] The metropole was where civilization existed, the colonies where one was civilized. While in 1848 most social reformers and penologists still favored rehabilitation,[48] we can see the very beginnings of this growing new trend at work in the deportation discussions of that year.

In 1848, the punishment of *transportation* had three stated goals that were meant to address these various domestic concerns and advance colonial goals: removing disturbers of the public peace from (metropolitan) society, populating colonies with able-bodied men and women who could do the work involved in *la mise-en-valeur* of the territory, and reforming the transported criminals. The final goal, reformation or rehabilitation, was to be achieved through removal (taking the criminal out of a corrupting environment) and the refocusing of his negative energies on the positive work of developing new lands.[49] Through agricultural labor (commonly assumed to be redemptive and healthy), many still believed that convicts could be made useful colonists.[50]

Nevertheless, the 468 June Insurgents ultimately deported to Algeria found few opportunities to do any meaningful labor in the colony. Officials chose Lambessa (Constantine province) as the permanent site of the transportees' detention. Until a facility was built, however, Bône would take in the deportees. In March 1850, therefore, 450 prisoners boarded two warships and traveled from Belle-Isle to Bône.[51] They then passed two years in a large fortified barracks looming over the city, but they received little official aid in support of any project that might have encouraged these forced immigrants to become contributing colonists.

Colonial officials lamented that the infrastructure in Algeria was particularly ill-suited to this transportation scheme.[52] By their own accounts, transportees suffered from poor nutrition and boredom. Only by accident (certainly not through administrative effort) did the June Insurgents' inactivity actually spur two groups—joiners and cabinet-makers by trade—to organize workshops and begin building carriages.[53]

The detainees found other ways to ameliorate their quality of life by forging alliances with sympathetic members of the local populace and lenient guards. Groups of republican colonists took up a collection to contribute to the transportees' fraternal aid fund.[54] Prisoners received Parisian newspapers and letters from their families and friends in France from the hands of the very military personnel charged with isolating them. As a result, the *déportés de Juin* remained politically engaged: upon learning of Eugène Sue's election in Paris, they lit up the Kasbah and celebrated.

Authorities in Algeria felt frustrated by their inability to limit communication between the prisoners and the outside world. Fearing that ties to the local community might facilitate prisoner escapes, and that deportee-republican alliances would create more problems within the colony, the governor general of Algeria sped up plans to transfer the June Insurgents to the planned labor camp at Lambessa.[55]

Yet another factor motivated the governor general. On 27 February 1852, several hundred Frenchmen arrived at the docks of Algiers, the first wave of some 6,247 political prisoners transported to Algeria in the wake of Louis-Napoleon's December 1851 *coup d'état*. Following the precedent set by the June Insurgents, metropolitan officials expected the deportees of 1851 to become colonists once in Algeria.[56] Nevertheless, colonial officials, who were more concerned with security than the rehabilitation of prisoners, wanted to isolate the June Insurgents from these new deportees. The transfer to Lambessa took place in May 1852.

Once in Lambessa, the June Insurgents found that little had been prepared for their arrival. They received instructions to build the penitentiary that would house them. Many refused. With a new law of 31 May 1852, however, Prince President Louis-Napoleon ordered officials to send any shirkers from Lambessa to French Guiana. About forty transportees received this aggravated punishment and underwent a second transportation, this time across the Atlantic. For those who remained in Lambessa, authorities evidently imagined that transportee labor would construct the penitentiary that would reform them and they would become colonists by building the colonial infrastructure that would support and transform them. Like Abd al-Qadir, who literary sources imagined as a small-town mayor and who in reality cast a vote for Emperor Napoleon III, the transportees were supposed to become productive citizens in their new land.

More to the point, however, like Abd al-Qadir, few of the deportees chose to remain in the place to which the state had forcibly moved them. The June

Insurgents' Algerian chapter ended in the same way that Abd al-Qadir's metropolitan story did, with an act of clemency by Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. By mid-1852 (only a few months before he liberated Abd al-Qadir), the Prince President had begun issuing individual pardons to republicans deported to Algeria and by 1859, he had granted a general amnesty to all political prisoners there.

That was the effective end of official hopes for forced colonization in Algeria. Of the 348 June Insurgents who remained in Lambessa after 1852, only sixty-eight chose to stay on in Algeria after receiving a pardon from Napoleon III in June 1859.[57] Governor General Randon liquidated the last of the prisoner camps in the spring of 1856. At that time, only around 200 of the 6,247 prisoners sent to Algeria after the *coup* of 1851 chose to remain in the colony. The vast majority of them returned to France.[58]

But it was also the beginning of a new penal colonization thrust outward. In both cases, the Emperor's clemency made the prisoners into a different kind of example. No longer were they French insurgents or colonial rebels, but rather imperial subjects. This act of clemency elevated the emperor's power, adding greater authority to the center and taking away authority from the nodal regulatory points that had made the French empire a network of multidirectional forced movements of people. Combined with recent changes in attitude toward the colonial spaces and a shift in metropolitan security concerns that made common-law criminals as much a focus of expulsive practices as political protestors, this was the final fatal blow to the postrevolutionary period's improvisational approach to punishment and public order. The result was a re-imagined network of formal penal colonies and an expanded class of people subject to deportation.

A New Direction

Authorities in metropolitan spaces, like their counterparts in the colonies, continued to respond to threats to public order and to seek stability through displacement. Removal would continue to be a policy for dealing with crime and dissent throughout the empire. But in May 1854, Napoleon III closed the metropolitan *bagnes* for good and ordered that any man or women sentenced to hard labor (*travaux forcés*) was to be subject to deportation to French Guiana and made to perform "the most *pénibles* works of colonization…."[59] This selection of the South American colony undoubtedly resulted from the need for more labor in the colony after the end of slavery and the flight of many of Guiana's former slave laborers.[60]

Between 1852 and 1866, most transportees went to the penal colonies established in French Guiana. In 1866, however, authorities in Paris designated New Caledonia as the primary destination for any *bagnard* of European descent. French Guiana remained a penal colony for Arab, African, Asian, and Caribbean colonial prisoners. Other colonies served the same purpose. Some

268 Vietnamese "rebels" protesting French incursion into Indochina received the sentence of a minimum five-year stint on Guadeloupean sugar plantations as a replacement colonial labor force in the late 1860s and early 1870s.

Such was the imperial picture when, in a moment reminiscent of the 1848 deportations which crisscrossed the Mediterranean, metropolitan and colonial officials in the early days of the Third Republic had to decide how to deal with defeated insurgents. This time, they transported Communards from Paris and Kabyle rebels from Algeria all to the same Pacific island in the wake of their respective 1871 uprisings.[61] After the Paris Commune of 1871, the new Republic sent more than 4,000 Communards to the Isle of Pins and the Ducos Peninsula in New Caledonia. In addition, Kabyle insurgents deported in 1873 for their participation in the Insurrection of 1871 in Algeria were sent to the Mnmbo Valley of the same colony.

In some respects, official expectations for deportation sentences to the Pacific Ocean island colony did not differ markedly from those expressed over twenty years earlier. Government statements in favor of the deportation sentence and justifying the deportees' journey to New Caledonia stressed the need to "civilize" the savage Communards through an enforced exile in a remote land where they would rediscover the republican values of work, family, and property.[62] Unlike in 1848, however, this time civilization at the center was to be protected—the troublesome Kabyle rebels were displaced to another colony, rather than to France. The new governmental policies designated the peripheries of empire as spaces for rehabilitation, civilizing, and—in as much as those goals overlapped—punishment.

By the second half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, specific colonies had become frontier outposts or, to borrow a phrase from historian Peter Zinoman, "colonial Bastilles," containing the empire's most unruly inhabitants.[63] In 1887, after the Kanak rebellion in New Caledonia, rebel leader Poindi-Patchili was deported to Obock. In 1891, the Sultan Said Athmann, who led the resistance against the French in Anjouan (Comoros Islands), was sent to New Caledonia. Colonial protestors in Indochina in 1898 were deported first to Nouméa and then to Tahiti; rebels in 1913 (including Cao Dam and Le Ngoc Liem) went to New Caledonia; and others who led a rebellion in 1917 were sent to the New Hebrides islands. In the 1920s, anticolonialists on Wallis and Futuna were interned in Nouméa.[64] From the late eighteenth through the early nineteenth centuries, colonial prisoners from Indochina were sent to French Guiana, Asia, and Africa.[65] Meanwhile, the state transported some 100,000 French common-law and political criminals from the metropole to the overseas *bagnes*.[66] French authorities closed the *bagne* in New Caledonia in 1897, but the penal colonies remained in French Guiana and received both colonial and metropolitan deportees until 1938.

French historian Michelle Perrot and New Caledonian scholar Louis-José Barbançon have described how French lawmakers and penologists vacillated between two potential formulations of the practice of deportation: either the

penal colony was the *terre salvatrice*, where prisoners would find redemption and be reinserted into French society, or the overseas empire was the "sea of exile," separating France's troublemakers from the rest of its population.[67] As Colin Forster has so ably shown, transportation became a popular measure in the mid-nineteenth century precisely because it served both penal needs (eliminating troublemakers without burdening the prison system) and imperial interests (providing labor in the now-faltering former plantation economy of French Guiana and in potential new acquisitions in the South Pacific).[68]

Yet postrevolutionary deportation practices reveal that imperial distinctions between metropolitan and colonial spaces were not firmly drawn during the period. Shortages of voluntary settlers and free laborers throughout the empire ultimately marked certain colonial spaces as sites of punishment for men (and few women) sentenced to hard labor. In addition, as physicians and social reformers began linking common-law crimes with social disorder and degeneration, a Neo-Lamarckian logic dictated that these individuals—domestic savages—be separated and excluded from metropolitan society indefinitely.[69] Moreover, rehabilitation became increasingly linked to the civilizing mission, which was thereafter directed outward, toward the periphery. What better place to send metropolitan agents of disorder than to the colonies, spaces subordinated to metropolitan France and in which the project of civilization was by no means a *fait accompli*?

For historian Patricia O'Brien, the implementation of large-scale deportation and transportation projects in the 1850s did not signify the failure of the rehabilitative prison system, but rather "involved the extension and exportation of a system of power and a mode of operation into new areas of control and new locales."[70] This essay argues, however, that the exportation was itself significant, as it signaled a change in the relationship between the center and the periphery of empire, which complemented a more punitive, eliminationist ideology of punishment. This re-direction of control outward was a result of a struggle among metropolitan and colonial officials between colonization and punishment, rehabilitation and retribution. As Stephen Toth suggests in his analysis of representations of the *bagne* during the interwar period in the twentieth century, the fallout from this same struggle would later signal that a "new center of knowledge-power had emerged" in the public discourse on penal colonization and would lead to the dismantling of the colonial *bagnes* in the 1930s.[71] These tensions were already at play between 1848 and 1852, as evidenced by the accounts of the deportations of the June Insurgents and Abd al-Qadir. And they contributed ultimately to the re-orientation of punishment outward long before its eventual abandonment.

As a result of an unexpected overlapping and subsequent remapping of the multiple material and discursive networks of empire at play in the early nineteenth century, such unlikely figures as Abd al-Qadir and the June Insurgents became unwilling (though not always unwitting) agents of a nascent imperial mission. But their deportations heralded a significant departure in

French penal and colonial theory and practice. The movement of people around the empire in order to punish and to preserve (or restore) public order continued into the twentieth century. But after 1852, it was confined to the periphery of empire more than it had been before.

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Notes

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1. Throughout this article, I use the terms *deportation* and *transportation* interchangeably, unless explained otherwise. Though the two terms came to have distinct meanings in the period around 1848, during most of the postrevolutionary period they were synonyms in official French correspondence. Transportation was the British term for forcibly moving convicts from the metropole to a colony. The French primarily used deportation, though after 1854, *transportation* (taken from the British usage) was applied to common law criminals removed to the penal colonies and *deportation* was the penalty for political criminals headed often for separate camps in the same colonies. The period between 1848 and 1854 saw enormous juridical, legislative, and bureaucratic confusion and wrangling over the terms that only complicated the issue. The conflation of the two terms, however, is historically appropriate given the period and it suits my stylistic preferences, as well.
2. Clare Anderson, *Convicts in the Indian Ocean: Transportation from South Asia to Mauritius, 1815–53* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Timothy Coates, *Convicts and Orphans: Forced and State-Sponsored Colonizers and the Portuguese Empire, 1550–1755* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Ruth Pike, *Penal Servitude in Early Modern Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); and Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
3. Ward, *Networks of Empire*, 10.

4. Research on the role of empire as a technology for social hygiene began as an exploration of the notion of "social imperialism." For German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, social imperialism was a "technique of rule" involving "the diversion outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo." See Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969), 115. See also Thomas McCormick, *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform, 1885–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and Thomas David Schoonover, *The United States in Central America, 1860–1911: Episodes of Social Imperialism and Imperial Rivalry in the World System* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).
5. During the Terror, many revolutionaries believed that refractory clergy (those who refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the constitution) posed a counter-revolutionary threat to the Republic. Thus, in 1794, 1,428 priests and clerics were designated for deportation and loaded on five ships, evidently with the coasts of Mozambique as their destination. But the ships never lost sight of the coastal islands of France and due to both disease on board and regime change in Paris the mission was aborted. Then, in 1797, more refractory clergy joined the ousted royalist members of the Council of 500 and Council of Ancients after the *coup* of Brumaire in their deportation to French Guiana. Of the 329 men deported, 172 died, 25 escaped, and 132 remained in French Guiana until 1800, when Napoleon Bonaparte allowed them to return to France. A primary account of the ill-fated voyages of 1794 was recorded by Marc Fardet, "Joseph Pradal, prêtre tarnais mort en déportation en Guyane (1765–1798)," *Revue du Tarn* 3, 170 (1998): 243–82. Among the secondary sources, historians of religion and the Catholic Church, in particular, have retraced the paths of these imprisoned priests. See, for example, Ivan Gobry, *Les Martyrs de la Révolution française* (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1989); Yves Blomme, *Les Prêtres déportés sur les pontons de Rochefort* (Saint-Jean-d'Angely: Éditions Bordessoules, 1994); and Nigel Aston, *Religion and Revolution in France, 1780–1804* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000). For the latter episode, numbers of deportees taken from Michel Devèze, *Cayenne: Déportés et bagnards* (Paris: Julliard, 1965), 51–66.
6. Allyson Delnore, "Robinson Crusoes in Chains: French Deportee Travel Writing, 1795–1840," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions historiques* 33, 3 (Fall 2007): 395–419. See also Robert Cornevin, "Les déportés 'terroristes' aux Seychelles et aux Comores (1801–1802)," *France-Eurafrique* 202 (1969): 15–21; Jean Destrem, *Les Déportations du Consulat et de l'Empire* (Paris: Jeanmaire, 1885), chap. 2–6.
7. See Francis Arzalier, "Les déportés guadeloupéens et haïtiens en Corse," in *Révolutions aux colonies*, ed. Annales historiques de la Révolution française (Paris: Société des études Robespierristes, 1993), 469–90.
8. Letter from Commandant Baïlle to the Minister, 1 November 1802 (10 brumaire XI), AN CAOM fm CC^{9B} 18. See also Cornevin, "Les déportés 'terroristes' aux Seychelles et aux Comores," chap. 2–6.
9. Cited in Arzalier, "Les déportés guadeloupéens et haïtiens en Corse," 138.
10. AN CAOM Séries géographique Martinique, carton 51, dossiers 409–29.
11. John Savage, "Unwanted Slaves: The Punishment of Transportation and the Making of Legal Subjects in Early-Modern Martinique," *Citizenship Studies* 10, 1 (2006): 35–53.
12. Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 194ff.
13. Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It is worth noting, however, that Toc-

queville was not an advocate of deportation and staunchly defended the colony against becoming a French Botany Bay.

14. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 85.
15. Sylvie Thénault, *Violence ordinaire dans l'Algérie coloniale: Camps, internements, assignations à residence* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2012), 130–31.
16. Ibid., 131.
17. Minutes of a letter written by the minister of war to the commander of the 8th maritime division at Marseilles, 28 July 1836, SHAT 1 H 39, dossier 1.
18. Thénault, *Violence ordinaire*, 136–37.
19. Letters from the minister of the army to Lieutenants General Lamoricière and Changarnier, 7 June 1843, SHAT 1 H 90, dossier 2.
20. Paddy Griffith, *Military Thought in the French Army: 1815–1851* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 42–43.
21. Colonel Churchill, *The Life of Abdal-Qadir, Ex-Sultan of the Arabs of Algeria: Written from His Own Dictation and Compiled from Other Authentic Sources* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1867), 266–67.
22. Estimates of the numbers arrested can be found in Charles Tilly and Lynn H. Lees, "The People of June, 1848," in *Revolution and Reaction: 1848 and the Second French Republic*, ed. Roger Price (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1975), 186. According to their figures, the Parisian police generated arrest records for 11,616 people.
23. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 206–207.
24. The government preferred to release those for whom evidence of their participation was scant rather than incur needless expense transporting and provisioning large numbers of prisoners. The figure of 468 is based on Marcel Emerit's detailed accounting of the June Insurgents after the summary judgment against them. See Marcel Emerit, "Les déportés de Juin," in *La Révolution de 1848 en Algérie*, ed. Marcel Emerit (Paris: Éditions Larose, 1949), 64.
25. *Moniteur universel*, 22 January 1850, 236. Louis-Napoleon cites the number as 458 (ten fewer) in his address to the nation, 12 November 1850. See the *Moniteur universel*, 13 November 1850, 3245. He counts an additional 348 political prisoners unrelated to the June Insurgents still detained in French prisons.
26. The law of 24 January subjected those still in detention under the law of 27 June 1848 to military rule, forced labor, and isolated detention in a facility in Algeria and provided the War Ministry with one million francs to cover the costs of transportation and the construction of new detention facilities. *Bulletin des lois de la République française* 230, n. 1890, 24 January 1850.
27. See Allyson Delnore, "Making Space in the Overseas Empire for the June Insurgents, 1848," *Proceedings of the Western Society of French History* 30 (2003).
28. Robert Cornevin and Marianne Cornevin, *La France et les Français outre-mer: De la première croisade à la fin du Second Empire* (Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 1990), 396; Jean Meyer and others, *Histoire de la France coloniale des origines à 1914*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Des origines à 1914* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), 412–13.
29. Stacey Renee Davis, "Turning French Convicts into Colonists: The Second Empire's Political Prisoners in Algeria, 1852–1858," *French Colonial History* 2 (2002), 97. After all, by 1846 only 16,422 out of the 109,400 European civilians in Algeria made their living on the land. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 216.
30. On 19 September 1848, the National Assembly decreed that 12,000 colonists would receive state support to voluntarily settle in Algeria. These free colonists were to be established in frontier *colonies agricoles*. If volunteerism is to be the measure, the policy was a success. Due to overwhelming public response, some forty-two agricultural colonies were created for the settlers who became known as the "colons de 48." By almost any other measure, however, it was a failure. Hastily organized, the project got off to a poor start when the colonists arrived to villages only partially

surveyed and with few permanent buildings completed. Few of the migrants could boast of any agricultural experience, and the assignment of qualified *directeurs d'agriculture* to teach them the necessary skills for rural life was unevenly administered. Furthermore, as the villages were put under the control of the Ministry of War, many colonists balked at the military rule under which they labored. When state assistance to the *colonies agricoles* in Algeria ran out at the end of 1851, the establishments were largely abandoned. See Claire Salinas, "Colonies Without Colonists: Colonial Emigration, Algeria, and Liberal Politics Within France, 1848–1851" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2005); Michael J. Heffernan, "The Parisian Poor and the Colonization of Algeria during the Second Republic," *French History* 3, 4 (1989): 377–403; Yvette Katan, "Les colons de 1848 en Algérie: mythes et réalités," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 31 (April–June 1984): 177–202.

31. *Abd-el-Kader en France!!! Son portrait. Ses combats. Sa soumission. Adieux à sa patrie* (Paris: Pourreau, 1848), 12–13.
32. For more on the roots of the civilizing mission, see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 5–6.
33. Churchill, *The Life of Abdal-Qadir*, 272.
34. On 8 January 1848, Abd al-Qadir arrived at the Fort Lamalgue in Toulon along with thirty-three members of his family and domestic staff. They were joined three days later by eleven more deportees. At the same time, another fifty-seven Arab prisoners (forty-eight men, six women, and three boys) were transferred to Fort Malousquet in Toulon. On 1 April 1848, some thirty-five additional people, including Abd al-Qadir's three brothers, their families, and a retinue of domestic servants and slaves were transferred to Fort Lamalgue. By mid-April, local authorities in southern France were urging the minister of war to select a larger detention site that would better accommodate Abd al-Qadir, "his family, and his companions in captivity." These movements are detailed in archival records, particularly CAOM 1E 224-225. The Ministry eventually settled on the Chateau at Pau in the Pyrenees for Abd al-Qadir's detention, sending others of his retinue to île Sainte-Marguerite. Around ninety family members and servants accompanied Abd al-Qadir to Pau, while forty-nine others were sent to the coastal island that once famously housed the Man in the Iron Mask, "where they will be treated like political prisoners of the first classes." Minutes of a letter written by the minister of war to the commander general of the 8th Division in Marseilles, 14 April 1848, CAOM Algeria, Series E, 1E219 (18MIOM/58).
35. CAOM 1 E 225 (18MI/58).
36. Ibid.
37. Letter from Abd al-Qadir, 15 March 1848, CAOM 1 E 221 (Series E 18MI/58).
38. Churchill, *The Life of Abdal-Qadir*, 297–98.
39. Emile Fontaine and Théophile du Mersan, *Abd-el-Kader à Paris, vaudeville épisodique en un acte* (Paris, Théâtre des Variétés, 18 December 1842).
40. *Bulletin des lois de la République française* 47, n. 513, 27 June 1848. The term *transportation* was significant, employed by the legislators to imply some difference in punishment from the *deportations* that had come before. It was an attempt to rebrand the punishment in order to capitalize on the popular belief that the British had successfully implemented "transportation" policies as a means to develop their Australian colony. It also signaled a shift in penal theory away from cellular confinement and its reliance on forced labor, a policy harshly condemned by artisans and workers during this period. See Jacques-Guy Petit, *Ces peines obscures: La prison pénale en France (1780–1875)* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 305ff.
41. *Bulletin des lois de la République française* 47, n. 513, 27 June 1848.

42. For a discussion of the French fascination with crime, see Dominique Kalifa, *Crime et culture au XIX^e siècle* (Paris: Perrin, 2005).
43. *Moniteur*, 13 November 1850, 3246.
44. Robert Tombs, "Crime and Security of the State: The 'Dangerous Classes' and Insurrection in Nineteenth-Century Paris," in *Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500*, eds. V.A.C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman, and Geoffrey Parker (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1980), 215–16. H.A. Frégier, *Des classes dangereuses de la population dans les grandes villes, et des moyens de les rendre meilleures*, 2 vols. (Paris: Bailliers, 1840), 1: 44–58, 254–67.
45. Sociologist Laurent Mucchielli identified the period 1840–1850 as a moment in which trends linking moral behaviors with physical manifestations, which had begun in the late eighteenth century, accelerated dramatically. See Mucchielli's introduction to Laurent Mucchielli, ed., *Histoire de la criminologie française* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 7–15. See also, Marc Renneville, "Entre nature et culture: le regard médical sur le crime dans la première moitié du XIXème siècle," in *Histoire de la criminologie française*, ed. Mucchielli, 29–53; and Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848–c.1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
46. Laurent Mucchielli, "Criminology, Hygienism, and Eugenics in France, 1870–1914: The Medical Debates on the Elimination of 'Incorrigible' Criminals," in *Criminals and Their Scientists: The History of Criminology in International Perspective*, ed. Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 207–209.
47. Gordon Wright, *Between the Guillotine and Liberty: Two Centuries of the Crime Problem in France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 143–44; see also Mucchielli, "Criminology, Hygienism, and Eugenics in France," 218.
48. See, for example, Fauché's justification of prison labor in the *Moniteur universel*, 6 January 1849, 45. As Patricia O'Brien has insisted, rehabilitation "was not merely a goal, it was a process of interaction. It provided the context, the vocabulary, the tone, and the style by which administrators dealt with directors, directors dealt with guards, guards dealt with prisoners, and prisoners dealt with each other." Patricia O'Brien, *The Promise of Punishment: Prisons in Nineteenth-Century France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 50–51.
49. Another example of convict labor within the hexagon is the *colonies agricoles pénitentiaires*, which were based on the models of reformatory agricultural colonies that had been developed for youthful offenders during the July Monarchy. A number of both state-sponsored and privately funded juvenile detention facilities dotted the French countryside between 1838 and 1848, the most famous of which was founded at Mettray in 1839. For more on this, see Michel Boulet, "Les colonies agricoles: une forme d'enseignement?" *Annales d'histoire des enseignements agricoles* 2 (1987): 51–61; and Ivan Jablonka, "Un discours philanthropique dans la France du XIXème siècle: la rééducation des jeunes délinquants dans les colonies agricoles pénitentiaires," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 47, 1 (2000): 131–47. A comparative history of the discussions surrounding the establishment of *colonies agricoles pénitentiaires* for adults and the creation of the *colonies agricoles* in Algeria for free settlers, which both occurred in the years just before and after 1850, remains to be written, but would prove fruitful for historians of both punishment and colonization in the nineteenth century.
50. Such was the argument advanced, for example, in 1819 by one Monsieur Forestier, whose arguments in favor of deportation were reviewed by the Commission on the Question of Forced Labor chaired by Count Siméon of the Royal Society for the Amelioration of the Prisons. Forestier argued that deportation could offer convicts "a better chance to become good rather than to continue in crime; to create for

them new interests; to attach them once more to society through their families." First report by commission on deportation, signed by Forestier, 10 February 1819, AN CAOM H//1.

51. Emerit, "Les déportés de Juin," 67–68. The final eighteen transportees arrived in Algiers from Toulon.
52. Few prisons existed in the colony, since it was widely agreed that the cellular regime was not suited to such a hot, dry climate. The majority of the colony's offenders served detention sentences in the *bagnes* of metropolitan France. But some alternate means of isolating unruly transportees had to be found, since nobody wanted to open up a back door through which the transportees might return prematurely to France by committing some act that would require further punishment. Note for the minister, 12 July 1851, AN F^{80} 588.
53. Emerit, "Les déportés de Juin," 68.
54. Ibid., 69.
55. Letter from the sub-prefect of Bône to the prefect of Constantine, 22 October 1850; letter from the minister of war to the commissioner general of police at Bône, 18 December 1850; "Note à la Direction de l'Algérie" from the minister of war, 10 December 1850. All in AN F^{80} 588.
56. Stacey Renee Davis, "Transforming the Enemy: Algerian Colonization, Imperial Clemency, and the Rehabilitation of France's 1851 Republican Insurrectionaries" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1999), 93–113.
57. Fifty-nine died, twelve escaped, forty were sent to Cayenne. Emerit, "Les déportés de Juin," 70–72.
58. Rude, ed., *Bagnes d'Afrique*, 37. For a discussion on Napoleon III's use of clemency, see Davis, "Transforming the Enemy," 231–320.
59. *Projet de loi,* art. 2, inserted in the *Bulletin des lois,* 30 May 1854. An 1850 commission established for the purposes of choosing a site for deportation had reluctantly recommended French Guiana, but also urged further exploratory voyages in New Caledonia to determine its suitability for penal colonization. See Colin Forster, "French Penal Policy and the Origins of the French Presence in New Caledonia," *The Journal of Pacific History* 26, 2 (1991): 145–49. The French government and the navy had been engaged in a quiet search for suitable penal colonies in the Pacific since the 1830s, and France had even taken possession of the Marquesas with the expressed intention of founding a penal colony there. Their advantage, stated one official, was "forever distancing the population of the *bagnes*—whose contact is pernicious for society—from the European continent and making these reprehensible and until now useless beings into a method of colonization for distant and uncivilized lands." H. Meuniez, "Notes sur la colonisation des Marquises par la Population des Bagnes," 15 April 1851, AN CAOM H//3.
60. Both the French historian Danielle Donet-Vincent and the American scholar Miranda Spieler go farther than any other historians in making this connection. Danielle Donet-Vincent, "De l'esclavage et du bagne en Guyane française," *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 18 (1999), *Varia*. http://rh19.revues.org/document149.html; Danielle Donet-Vincent, "Les Jésuites et le bagne de Guyane," *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuse* 80, 3 (2000): 397–407; Miranda Frances Spieler, *Empire and Underworld: Captivity in French Guiana* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 14. See also Peter Redfield, *Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 54, 66; and O'Brien, *The Promise of Punishment*, 261. See also letter to the minister of justice from Monsieur Pecot, 20 January 1853, AN CAOM H//2. But the government also decided to leave open the Pacific option and took possession of New Caledonia in 1853.
61. Germaine Mailhé, *Déportation en Nouvelle-Calédonie des communards et des révoltés de la Grande Kabylie: 1872–1876* (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1995).

62. Alice Bullard, *Exiles in Paradise: Savagery and Civilization in Paris and the South Pacific, 1790–1900* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 129 ff.
63. Peter Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
64. Louis-José Barbançon, *L'Archipel des forçats: Histoire du bagne de Nouvelle-Calédonie (1863–1931)* (Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2003), 396.
65. Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille*, 61. The *bagne* of Gabon held primarily Annamite and Chinese prisoners between 1887 and 1899 and one in Obock, on the Somali coast, was set aside as a labor camp for Arab prisoners between 1886 and 1895.
66. For more on the history of France's overseas *bagnes*, see Redfield, *Space in the Tropics*, 54, 66; Donet-Vincent, *De soleil et de silences: Histoire des bagnes de Guyane* (Paris: La Boutique de l'histoire, 2003); Spieler, *Empire and Underworld*; Stephen A. Toth, *Beyond Papillon: The French Overseas Penal Colonies, 1854–1952* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Bullard, *Exiles in Paradise*. See also Devèze, *Cayenne*; Jean-Claude Michelot, *La Guillotine sèche: Histoire des bagnes de Guyane* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1981); Michel Pierre, *La Terre de la grande punition: Histoire des bagnes de Guyane* (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1982); Julienne Baghooa, Jean-Jacques Jallet, and Gérard Prost, eds., *Un siècle de bagne* (Cayenne: Centre départemental de documentation pédagogique, 1984).
67. Michelle Perrot, Introduction to Jacques-Guy Petit et al., *Histoire des galères, bagnes et prisons, XIIIe - XXe siècles: Introduction à l'histoire pénale de la France* (Toulouse: Éditions Privat, 1991), 9. See also Louis-José Barbançon, "Les origines de la colonisation pénale en Nouvelle-Caledonie (1810–1864)" (mémoire de DEA, Université Française du Pacifique, 1992). Barbançon uses the terms *débarras* and *éloignement* to characterize this dichotomy, but the idea is still the same.
68. Forster, "French Penal Policy and the Origins of the French Presence in New Caledonia," 169.
69. For more, see Martin Staum, *Labeling People: French Scholars on Society, Race, and Empire, 1815–1848* (Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 163ff.
70. O'Brien, *The Promise of Punishment*, 259.
71. Toth, *Beyond Papillon*, 145.